ARMY OPERATIONS. 



137 



of railroad communication, he was disposed to 

 aasten this work, and the end of the month 

 found Atlanta transformed into a considerable 

 depot of supplies, and so protected by works 

 that a moderate force could hold it against an 

 enemy numerically much superior. The de- 

 parture of the great hody of the inhabitants, 

 hy lessening the number of persons to be sub- 

 eisted, added to the capacity of the garrison to 

 withstand a protracted siege. 



Gen. Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in 

 the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his 

 supplies by the Macon road. His army num- 

 bered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the 

 Georgia militia ; and, as if to show that no im- 

 mediate offensive movement was contemplated, 

 the latter were withdrawn from him by Gov. 

 Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta, 

 through the following communication : 



EXECCTIYE DEPARTMENT, I 



MlLLEDGEVTLLE, Sept 10th, ISSt ) 



Gen. J. S. Hood, Commanding Army of Tennessee : 



GENERAL : As the militia of" the State were called 

 out for the defence of Atlanta during the campaign 

 against it, which has terminated by the fall of the 

 city into the hands of the .enemy, and as many of 

 them left their homes without preparation, expecting 

 to be gone but a few weeks, who have remained in 

 service over three months (most of the time in the 

 trenches), justice requires that they be permitted, 

 while the enemy are preparing for the winter cam- 

 paign, to return"to their homes, and look, for a time, 

 after important interests, and prepare themselves for 

 such service as may be required when another cam- 

 paign commences against other important points in 

 the State. I, therefore, hereby withdraw said organ- 

 ization from your command, in the hope that I shall 

 be able to return it with greater numbers and equal 

 efficiency, when the interests of the public service 

 require it. In this connection, I beg leave to tender 

 to vou, general, my sincere thanks for your impar- 

 tiality to the State troops, and for your uniform 

 courtesy and kindness to me individually. With as- 

 surances of my high consideration and e'steem, I am, 

 verv respectfullv, your obedient servant, 



JOSEPH E. BROWN. 



To allow their principal Southern army to 

 rust in inactivity, was not, however, the inten- 

 tion of the rebel authorities, who, whatever 

 public statements they might make as to the 

 insignificance of Gen. Sherman's conquest, 

 knew that it was a vital blow aimed at the 

 heart of the Confederacy, and that this was 

 the belief of the Southern people. Something 

 must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the 

 progress of the Federal army, or Georgia, and 

 perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably 

 lost. In this emergency Jefferson Davis start- 

 ed on a tour of inspection through the South, 

 and at Macon, on Sept. 23d, delivered a public 

 address on the crisis, so marked by indiscreet 

 admissions that many of the Confederate pa- 

 pers at first refused to believe that it was 

 genuine. He alluded with undisguised vexation 

 to the depletion in Gen. Hood's ranks caused 

 by absenteeism, and promised, if the deserters 

 would return to duty, that Gen. Sherman 

 should meet " the fate that befell the army of 

 the French Empire in its retreat from Moscow. 

 Our cavalry," he said, " and our people, will 



harass and destroy his army as did the Cos- 

 sacks that of Napoleon ; and the Yankee gen- 

 eral, like him, will escape with only a body- 

 guard." These remarks foreshadowed a new- 

 policy, borrowed from that which Gen. Sher- 

 man himself hlad so successfully employed in 

 the capture of Atlanta, and which, considering 

 the long catalogue of rebel reverses in Georgia, 

 had the merit of boldness, if not of farsighted- 

 ness. The whole army of Gen. Hood, it was 

 decided, should rapidly move in a compact 

 body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after break- 

 ing up the railroad between the Chattahoochee 

 and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and 

 destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the 

 Tennessee River at that place. Should this be 

 accomplished, Atlanta would be isolated from 

 Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated 

 from Nashville, and Gen. Sherman, cut off from 

 his primary and secondary bases, would find 

 Atlanta but a barren conquest, to be relin- 

 quished almost as soon as gained, and would be 

 obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would 

 then fall from lack of provisions, or in conse- 

 quence of the successful attacks of the Georgia 

 militia. 



In connection with this movement, Gen. 

 Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, 

 was already operating in Southern Tennessee, 

 where the Federal force was barely adequate to 

 prevent him from interrupting communications 

 between Nashville and Chattanooga. Not the 

 least favorable result anticipated from this 

 movement was the restoration of the morale 

 of their army, which, dispirited by constant 

 retreats and reverses, its leaders naturally sup- 

 posed would be encouraged to greater efforts by 

 an aggressive campaign. On the other hand, 

 the effect of abandoning their conquests, to 

 meet a defeated army operating in their rear, 

 would be likely to perplex and disconcert the 

 Federals. Such was the ingenious plan devised 

 by the authorities, and, to a less able general 

 than Sherman, its vigorous execution might 

 have been productive of enormous disaster, in- 

 cluding, of course, the abandonment of the 

 conquests gained during a long and arduous 

 campaign. The sequel will show that he was 

 fully master of the situation, and that the 

 boasts of the rebel papers, that "the great 

 flanker was outflanked," were destined to 

 prove illusive. 



A week sufficed to complete Gen. Hood's 

 arrangements, and by the 2d of October his 

 army was across the Chattahoochee and on 

 the march to Dallas, where the different corps 

 were directed to concentrate. At this point 

 he was enabled to threaten Rome and King- 

 ston, as well as the fortified places on the rail- 

 road to Chattanooga ; and there remained open, 

 in case of defeat, a line of retreat south- 

 west into Alabama. From Dallas he advanced 

 east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, cap- 

 tured the insignificant stations of Big Shanty 

 and Ackworth, effecting a thorough destruc- 

 tion of the road between the two places. He 



