140 



ARMY OPERATIONS. 



entirely failed to interrupt the Federal com- 

 munications to a degree that would compel 

 the evacuation of Atlanta. Without perma- 

 nently disabling the railroad, he had been 

 driven with loss across the mountains south of 

 Chattanooga into Alabama; had cut himself 

 entirely adrift from that admirable railroad 

 system which had so long kept his army sup- 

 plied, and had left Georgia and the whole 

 Southeast open to the invaders. He perhaps 

 felt himself compensated for these disasters by 

 the opportunity, now temptingly presented to 

 him, to carry the war into Middle Tennessee 

 and Kentucky, and plunder the richly-stored 

 cities and farms of those States, forgetting that 

 a general who had shown such fertile resources 

 during a long and trying campaign, was still 

 opposed to him, with more than double his own 

 force. 



It was undoubtedly a part of Gen. Sherman's 

 plan to remain at Atlanta no longer than would 

 suffice to accumulate stores and thoroughly 

 strengthen the defences ; after which he would 

 continue his march southward. This, with a 

 determined and unbroken enemy in his front, 

 was likely, to judge from previous experience, 

 to prove a tedious and dangerous operation. 

 To relieve himself of the presence of that 

 enemy was the problem to be solved. When, 

 therefore, Gen. Hood crossed the Chattahoo- 

 chee on his flanking march upon the Federal 

 communications, it was with mingled feelings 

 of hope and apprehension that he was watched 

 by his vigilant adversary ; hope, that he would 

 finally place himself in the position where he 

 was actually found on the 1st of November ; 

 and apprehension, lest he should again retire to 

 his camp near Jonesboro. It will be remem- 

 bered how apparently slow was the pursuit of 

 the rebel army by Gen. Sherman after the for- 

 oier had crossed the Chattahoocb.ee, and how 

 readily it seemed to escape into Alabama, and 

 thence march toward the Tennessee. To those 

 who had witnessed the brilliant campaign to 

 Atlanta, the Federal general's lack of energy 

 and tardiness of movement seemed unaccount- 

 able. In the light of subsequent events it 

 would now appear that Gen. Sherman, making 

 only a show of following his adversary, delib- 

 erately lured him into Northern Alabama, for 

 the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted 

 march with his own army through the heart 

 of Georgia. The ill-advised plan of Gen. Hood 

 had given him the very opportunity which he 

 desired, and he prepared at once to avail him- 

 self of it. 



Anticipating that his army was unnecessarily 

 large for his purpose, he detached from it the 

 4th and 23d corps, which were ordered to Ten- 

 nessee, via Chattanooga and Bridgeport, to re- 

 enforce Gen.Thomas. This left him four corps 

 the 14th, 15th, 16th and iTth whfch had ac- 

 companied him from Atlanta,, and the 20th left 

 to garrison that place. Two armies were thus 

 formed, of which the former, in conjunction 

 with such forces as Gen. Thomas had in Ten- 



nessee, was fully able to cope with Gen. Hood ; 

 while the latter, as events proved, was inoro 

 than sufficient for the Georgia expedition. For 

 several days Gen. Sherman retained his main 

 force at Gaylesville, throwing out strong re- 

 connoissances in the direction of the enemy, as 

 if bent upon watching and thwarting his move- 

 ment toward the Tennessee. But no sooner 

 had he ascertained that Gen. Hood had started, 

 than he moved his whole army eastward to 

 Rome, with the exception of the two corps sent 

 to Gen. Thomas, and commenced in earnest the 

 preparations for his new campaign. Being no 

 longer under the necessity of coping with an 

 active enemy in his front, he had no further 

 occasion to keep up a long line of railroad com- 

 munication with a fortified base in his rear. 

 The original plan, therefore, of provisioning At- 

 lanta and using it as a secondary base, which 

 would have required large details of troops, 

 was willingly abandoned, and, in consequence, 

 the place itself, and the greater part of the rail- 

 road connecting it with Chattanooga, became 

 practically useless. To garrison and guard 

 either, would be a simple waste of resources ; 

 and as it would be an act of needless generosity 

 to leave them for the enemy to use, their de- 

 struction became a necessity. The army, once 

 fairly started from Atlanta on its march 

 through Georgia, was to cut loose from all 

 bases and mainly subsist upon the country. 

 This plan, so daring in its conception as to re- 

 call the achievements of the greatest generals 

 of antiquity, appears to have been matured and 

 carefully elaborated by Gen. Sherman long pre- 

 vious to its execution, and, upon being laid be- 

 fore the authorities at Washington, received 

 their cordial approval. 



During the first ten days of November every 

 locomotive and car on the Chattanooga and 

 Atlanta Railroad was employed in conveying 

 North the inmates of the hospitals, and such 

 supplies of all kinds as there was time to re- 

 move. The vast supplies of provisions, forage, 

 stores, and machinery which had accumulated 

 at Atlanta, Rome, and other points, the surplus 

 artillery, baggage, and other useless wagons 

 every thing, in fact, likely to impede the move- 

 ments of the army, was gathered up and sent 

 safely to Chattanooga. In return, the trains 

 brought down to Gen. Sherman recruits, con- 

 valescents, furloughed men, and ordnance sup- 

 plies. On the night of November llth, the 

 last train left Atlanta for the North, and the 

 army, supplied with every man and horse and 

 gun which it needed, and having 30 days' ra- 

 tions in his wagons, was prepared to move 

 toward the coast. 



The five corps mentioned above as consti- 

 tuting the army which Gen. Sherman reserved 

 for his expedition, were concentrated into four, 

 by assigning one of the two divisions of the 

 16th corps (the remaining divisions were in 

 Tennessee) to the 15th corps, and the other to 

 the 17th. The expeditionary army then com- 

 prised the 14th corps, Gen. Jeff. C. Davis ; the 



