202 



CONFEDERATE STATES. 



an abandonment on the part of the North of its pre- 

 tended right of coercion would be an absolute 

 recognition of the independence of the several States 

 of the Confederacy would be, in a word, so com- 

 plete a concession of the rightfulness of our cause 

 that the most visionary cannot hope for such an 

 agreement in advance of the meeting of a Conven- 

 tion. The only other possible basis of meeting is 

 that each State should agree beforehand to be bound 

 by the decision of the Convention, and such agree- 

 ment is but another form of submission to Northern 

 dominion, as we well know in such a Convention we 

 should be outnumbered nearly two to one on the 

 very threshold of the scheme proposed. Therefore, 

 we are met by an obstacle which cannot be removed. 

 Is not the impracticable character of the project ap- 

 parent? You will observe that I leave entirely out 

 of view the suggestion that a Convention of all the 

 States of both federations should be held by common 

 consent, without any previous understanding as to 

 the effect of its decision should meet merely to de- 

 bate and pass resolutions that are to bind no one. 

 It is not supposed that this can really be the meaning 

 attached to the proposal by those who are active in 

 its support, although the resolutions to which you 

 invite my attention declare the function of such a 

 Convention would be simply to propose a plan of 

 peace with the consent of the two belligerents, or in 

 other words to act as negotiators in treating for peace. 

 This part of the scheme is not intelligible to me if the 

 Convention is only to be held with the consent of the 

 belligerents, that consent cannot be obtained with- 

 out negotiation the plan then would resolve itself 

 into a scheme that the two Governments should 

 negotiate an agreement for the appointment of 

 negotiators to make proposals for a treaty. It seems 

 much more prompt and simple to negotiate for peace 

 at once than to negotiate for the appointment of 

 negotiators who are to meet without power to do 

 anything but make proposals. If the Government 

 of the United States is willing to make peace it will 

 treat for peace directly ; if unwilling, it will refuse 

 to consent to a Convention of the States. The au- 

 thor of these resolutions, and those who concur in 

 his views, appear to me to commit the radical error 

 of supposing that the obstacle to obtaining the peace 

 which we all desire consists in the difficulty of find- 

 ing proper agencies for negotiating, so 'that the 

 whole scope of the resolutions ends in nothing but 

 suggesting that if the enemy will treat, the best 

 agency would be State delegates to a Convention ; 

 whereas the whole and only obstacle is that the 

 enemy will not treat at all or entertain any other 

 proposition than that we should submit to their 

 yoke, acknowledge that we are criminals, and appeal 

 to their mercy for pardon. After this statement of 

 objections it may appear superfluous to add others 

 of less gravity ; but as you invite a full expression 

 of my views, I will add that history is replete with 

 instances of the interminable difficulties and delays 

 which attend the attempt to negotiate on great and 

 conflicting interests where the parties to the negotia- 

 tion are numerous ; if this has been the case where 

 the parties possessed full power to conclude a treaty, 

 what can we hope from an assemblage of negotiators 

 from thirty or forty States, who, in the midst of an 

 exasperating warfare, are to meet without power to 

 conclude any thing ? In the history of our country 

 we find that in a time of profound peace, where the 

 most cordial brotherhood of sentiment existed, and 

 where a long and bloody war had been brought to a 

 triumphant close, it required two years to assemble 

 a convention and bring its deliberatirns to an end, 

 and another year to procure the ratification of their 

 labors. With such a war as the present in progress 

 the views of the large assemblage of negotiators 

 proposed would undergo constant changes, accord- 

 ing to the vicissitudes, according to the struggle, 

 and the attempts to secure concordant views would 

 soon be abandoned, and leave the parties more em- 



bittered than ever, less hopeful of the possibility of 

 successful negotiation. Again, how is the difficulty 

 resulting from the conflicting pretensions of the two 

 belligerents in regard to several of the States to be 

 overcome ? Is it supposed that Virginia would enter 

 into a Convention with a delegatioh from what our 

 enemies choose to term the State of West Virginia, 

 and thus recognize an insolent and violent dis- 

 memberment of her territory ? Or would the United 

 States consent that West Virginia should be de- 

 prived of her pretensions to equal rights, after hav- 

 ing formally admitted her as a State and allowed her 

 to vote at a Presidential election ? Who would send 

 a delegation from Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, 

 Missouri? The enemy claim to hold the Govern- 

 ments of those States, while we assert them to be 

 members of the Confederacy. Would delegates be 

 received from both sides ? "if so, there would soon 

 be a disruption of the Convention. If delegates are 

 received from neither side, then a number of the 

 States most vitally interested in the result would 

 remain unrepresented ; and what value could be 

 attached to mere recommendations of a body of 

 negotiators under such circumstances? Various 

 other considerations suggest themselves, but enough 

 has been said to justify my conclusion that the pro- 

 posal of separate State action is unwise, impracti- 

 cable, and offers no prospect of good to counter- 

 balance its manifold injurious consequences to the 

 cause of our country. 



Very respectfullv, yours, etc., 



JEFFERSON DAVIS. 



A proposition was made by Gen. Sherman to 

 Gov. Brown and others of Georgia, in Septem- 

 ber, for an informal meeting to negotiate for 

 peace, which received much attention in that 

 State. (See GEORGIA.) The meeting, however, 

 was declined. 



The use of the slaves as soldiers with the re- 

 ward of freedom to those who survived, was 

 strongly advocated during the year. From the 

 beginning of hostilities they were the laborers 

 on the fortifications in all parts of the Confed- 

 eracy. At the same early period both the free 

 and slave offered their services, and the former 

 in considerable numbers enrolled themselves. 

 In June, 1861, the Legislature of Tennessee 

 passed an act to authorize the Governor to re- 

 ceive into the military service free persons of 

 color between the ages of fifteen and fifty. 

 Pay and rations were assigned to them. lu 

 September one regiment, numbering fourteen 

 hundred, appeared on the field at the review 

 of troops in New Orleans. In February, 1862, 

 the subject of enrolling the free negroes was 

 discussed in the Legislature of Virginia, and 

 an act passed to provide for their enlistment. 

 The next step was the threat to draft slaves 

 to work on the fortifications when refused to 

 hire them. This was rnade by Gov. Brown, 

 of Georgia, in November, 1862. During the 

 next year they were extensively employed as 

 pioneers, sappers, cooks, nurses, and teamsters, 

 and their employment as a military arm in 

 defence of the country was advocated in Con- 

 gress. In February, 1864, Congress passed an 

 act making all " male free negroes (with cer- 

 tain exceptions) between the ages of eighteen 

 and fifty," liable to perform such duties in the 

 army, or in connection with the military de- 

 fences of the country, in the way of work upon 



