248 



CONGRESS, U. S. 



when I took an oath to respect the Consti- 

 tution that they made." 



Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, said : " Mr. Pres- 

 ident, I shall content myself simply with read- 

 ing the opinion of the Supreme Court in the 

 case of Groves vs. Slaughter, reported in 15 

 Peters. In that case the State of Mississippi 

 had inserted in its constitution a provision that 

 slaves should not he brought into that State 

 for sale. Some slaves were brought in and 

 sold, and a note was taken up and sued in the 

 circuit court. The defence was that the note 

 was unlawfully made. Various points arose in 

 the case, and among others this one : whether 

 that was an attempt on the "part of the State 

 to regulate commerce between the States, and, 

 if so, whether it was an encroachment upon 

 the power of Congress to regulate commerce 

 between the States ; because the power to 

 regulate commerce between the States does 

 not exist in the alternative, with the States 

 or with the General Government, as each may 

 choose to exercise it; but it is an exclusive 

 grant of power to Congress. In considering 

 that point, Judge McLean says : 



In the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden (9 Wheat., 186), 

 this court decided that the power to regulate com- 

 merce is exclusively vested in Congress, and that no 

 part of it can be exercised by a State. 



The necessity of a uniform commercial regulation, 

 more than any other consideration, led to the adop- 

 tion of the Federal Constitution. And, unless the 

 power be not only paramount but exclusive, the 

 Constitution must fail to attain one of the principal 

 objects of its formation. 



It has been contended that a State may exercise a 

 commercial power if the same has not been exercised 

 by Congress ; and this power of the State ceased 

 when the Federal authority was exerted over the 

 same subject-matter. 



" He goes on to repudiate that, and says : 



Can the transfer and sale of slaves from one State 

 to another be regulated by Congress under the com- 

 mercial power? 



" I ask gentlemen to pay attention to this. 



If a State may admit or prohibit slaves at its dis- 

 cretion, this power must be in the State and not in 

 Congress. The Constitution seems to recognize the 

 power to be in the States. The importation of cer- 

 tain persons, meaning slaves, which was not to be 

 prohibited before 1808, was limited to such ^States, 

 then existing, as shall think proper to admit them. 

 Some of the States at that time prohibited the ad- 

 mission of slaves, and their right to do so was as 

 strongly implied by this provision as the right of 

 other States that admitted them. 



The Constitution treats slaves as persons. In 

 the second section of the first article, which appor- 

 tions Representatives and direct taxes among the 

 States, it provides, " The numbers shall be deter- 

 mined by adding to the whole number of free per- 

 sons, including those bound to service for a term of 

 years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths 

 of all other persons." And again, in the third sec- 

 tion of the fourth article, it is declared that " no 

 person held to service or labor in one State, under 

 the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in con- 

 sequence of any law or regulation therein, be dis- 

 charged from such service or labor, but shall be 

 delivered up on claim of the party to whom such ser- 

 vice or labor may be due." 



By the laws of certain States slaves are treated as 



property ; and the constitution of Mississippi pro- 

 hibits their being brought into that State by citizens 

 of other States for sale, or as merchandise. Mer- 

 chandise is a comprehensive term, and may include 

 every article of traffic, whether foreign or domestic, 

 which is properly embraced by a commercial regula- 

 tion. But if slaves are considered in some of the 

 States as merchandise, that cannot divest them of 

 the leading and controlling quality of persons by 

 which they are designated in the Constitution. * * * 

 The constitution of Ohio declares that there shall 

 be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in that 

 State except for the punishment of crimes. Is this 

 provision in conflict with the power in Congress to 

 regulate commerce ? It goes much further than the 

 constitution of Mississippi. That prohibits only the 

 introduction of slaves into the State by the citizens 

 of other States as merchandise ; but the constitution 

 of Ohio not only does this, but it declares that sla- 

 very shall not exist in the State. Does not the greater 

 power include the lesser? If Ohio may prohibit tho 

 introduction of slaves into it altogether, may not the 

 State of Mississippi regulate their admission ? 



" After arguing this at some length he comes 

 to this conclusion : 



The power over slavery belongs to the States 

 respectively. It is local m its character and in its 

 effects ; and the transfer or sale of slaves cannot be 

 separated from this power. It is, indeed, an essen- 

 tial part of it. 



Each State has a right to protect itself against the 

 avarice and intrusion of the slave dealer ; to guard 

 its citizens against the inconveniences and dangers 

 of a slave population. 



The right to exercise this power by a State is 

 higher and deeper than the Constitution. The evil 

 involves the prosperity and may endanger the exist- 

 ence of a State. Its power to guard against or to 

 remedy the evil rests upon the law of self-preserva- 

 tion, a law vital to every community, and especially 

 to a sovereign State. 



" Chief Justice Taney on this same point 

 said : 



In my judgment, the power over this subject is 

 exclusively with the several States ; and each of 

 them has a right to decide for itself whether it will 

 or will not allow persons of this description to be 

 brought within its limits from another State, either 

 for sale or for any other purpose ; and also to pre- 

 scribe the manner and mode in which they may be 

 introduced, and to determine their condition and 

 treatment within their respective territories ; and 

 the action of the several States upon this subject 

 cannot be controlled by Congress, either by virtue of 

 its power to regulate commerce o_r by virtue of its 

 power conferred by the Constitution of the United 

 States. 



" Now, Mr.- President, I consider that that 

 case has decided that this subject of the intro- 

 duction or passage of slaves from one State to 

 another is entirely within the power of the 

 several States ; that it does not fall within the 

 power given to Congress to regulate commerce 

 between the States ; and for the main reason 

 which I have given before. It was essentially 

 for this : that if we can prohibit it we can 

 allow it ; and if we can allow it, we can defeat 

 the purpose of the State altogether. The great 

 point in the case is that they are, as Judge 

 McLean says, persons, not property, not arti- 

 cles of commerce and trade, and therefore do 

 not fall within this delegated power that is giv- 

 en to Congress. I say, therefore, that the sec- 

 tions of the law of 1807 which it is proposed to 



