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nounces the sentence of death. A warrant 

 issues to the officer to carry into effect the sen- 

 tence of death, and a writ of fieri facia* to col- 

 lect the fine by seizure and sale of the real and 

 personal estate. Both writs are in process of 

 execution at the same time. "With the one the 

 officer makes a levy on the real and personal 

 estate and gives notice of the day of sale ; by 

 virtue of the other he purchases a rope and 

 erects a scaffold. The defendant is to be hung 

 in thirty days after sentence, but the sale can- 

 not be had without giving, say forty days' no- 

 tice of the time and place. The traitor is hung, 

 life becomes extinct, the attending physician 

 pronounces him dead; and the opposite con- 

 struction of the Constitution pronounces the 

 writ of fi-eri facias also defunct and the for- 

 feiture a nullity. For, they say, you can only 

 forfeit, take, alienate the estate for the period 

 of his life, and if you proceed to sell property 

 by virtue of the fieri facias, you sell, alienate, 

 convey the fee simple thereof, and to do this 

 would be, in the opposite view, a violation of 

 the Constitution. 



" Absurd and ridiculous as such a conclusion 

 is, it is the legitimate result of a contrary con- 

 struction of this section of the Constitution. 



"What, then, is the fair import of these words, 

 ' except during the life of the person attainted ' ? 

 To my mind they will admit of but a single 

 rational interpretation, and that is that there 

 shall be no forfeiture after the death of the per- 

 son attainted. In other words, the judgment 

 of the court shall be rendered against him 

 while he is alive, after he has had a fair trial, 

 with opportunity to confront his accusers, meet 

 them face to face, and combat their accusations. 

 That after his death, whether according to the 

 course of natnre or by process of law, no judg- 

 ment or sentence shall be had the effect of 

 which shall be to forfeit his estate, unless that 

 judgment shall be final and irrevocable prior to 

 his death. If I were disposed to indulge in 

 mere verbal criticism I might animadvert upon 

 the word 'except' used in that section. The 

 word ' except, ' we are told by lexicographers, 

 Is equivalent to the word 'unless,' and a cen- 

 tury ago, as reference to the writers of that 

 age will show, was used almost exclusively in 

 the same sense as we now use the word ' un- 

 less.' Numerous instances of this are found in 

 the Holy Bible, where the word 'except' is 

 used in sentences in which at the present day 

 we should invariably use the word ' unless ; ' 

 thus: 



Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain 

 that build it. 



Except the Lord of Hosts had left unto us a very 

 email remnant we should have been as Sodom. 



Can two walk together, except they be agreed. 



Except a man Be born again, he" cannot see the 

 kingdom of God. 



Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. 

 _ "In all these instances, and they could be mul- 

 tiplied almost ad infinitum from writings of that 

 age, both sacred and profane, the word ' except ' 

 is used in the sense in which we of the present 



day would use the equivalent word 'unless.' 

 Xow, then, let us, in further illustration of 

 my position, substitute the word 'unless' for 

 the word ' except' in the clause under consider- 

 ation. It will then read : 



But no attainder of treason shall work corruption 

 of blood or forfeiture, unless during the life of the 

 person attainted. 



i; Unless what or when? The attainder shall 

 not work forfeiture unless it be worked, com- 

 pleted, during the lifetime. If the prisoner die 

 after verdict of guilty and before judgment, 

 there can be no forfeiture. If the prisoner die 

 after sentence of death and before judgment of 

 forfeiture, there can be no forfeiture. If the 

 prisoner be executed after sentence of death 

 and before judgment of forfeiture is entered, 

 there can be no forfeiture. The sentence of 

 death and the judgment of forfeiture are not 

 necessarily simultaneous acts. They may be 

 rendered separately, on separate days, if you 

 please, and the right is thus reserved to the 

 prisoner to move in arrest of the judgment of 

 forfeiture even after sentence of death is passed 

 upon him ; for the criminal law holds the rights 

 of the prisoner in such regard that it will take 

 no step against him in any of the stages of trial, 

 from arrest to final execution, without giving 

 him an opportunity of being heard in his defence. 



" In further support of my position, let me 

 advert to the fact that in England, long prior 

 to and at the adoption of our Constitution, at- 

 tainder of treason after the death of the sup- 

 posed traitor (I mean his natural death before 

 trial or even accusation) was of frequent occur- 

 rence. This was a monstrous doctrine, shock- 

 ing to every principle of justice upon which the 

 criminal code is founded, to accuse a man of 

 crime after death, when none is to speak for hia 

 innocence, to proceed to trial and judgment, to 

 wrest from innocent hands that property which 

 by law upon his death descended to and vested 

 in his heirs, and forfeit their property, not his 

 property, to the Government for his supposed 

 criminal conduct. Is it not more just and rea- 

 sonable to suppose that the Constitution in- 

 tended to embrace and provide against this 

 monstrous perversion of natural justice than 

 that they intended so absurd a proposition as 

 that the forfeiture of estate should only be for 

 that brief period of time between sentence of 

 death and its execution ? " 



On the 14th of January the question came up 

 again in the House, and Mr. Cox, of Ohio, said: 

 ' Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Indiana, in 

 his elaborate and learned speech, drew from the 

 old feudal system, from the black-letter laws, 

 from the whole history of our common law with 

 reference to forfeiture, to show that there should 

 be another and a different interpretation given 

 to the Constitution from that which was given 

 by the men who made the Constitution, by the 

 men who passed the law of 1790, to carry out 

 that clause of the Constitution to which I 'have 

 referred, and by all the interpreters of the Con- 

 stitution to whom lue himself has referred. lie 



