170 



CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



that independence, eacli for itself became as 

 absolutely a nation as it is possible for any peo- 

 ple to be. They professed to have no superior ; 

 they claimed perfect and absolute nationality 

 as separate and distinct people, competent to 

 do in peace or in war what any people, under 

 any form of government, was competent to do 

 in that condition. Finding it necessary, how- 

 ever, to have some form of general government, 

 they adopted for that purpose the Articles of 

 Confederation, and in those articles not only did 

 not devolve upon that Government any powers 

 inconsistent with their absolute sovereignty, 

 but cautiously guarded against a possibility of 

 an inference of that kind, by saying that all the 

 powers not expressly granted to the Govern- 

 ment created by the Articles of Confederation 

 were still to be considered as remaining in the 

 several States ; and they did more. The form 

 of government, if government it could be called, 

 which those articles created, was in one sense 

 no government at all. It constituted but a 

 compact ; it amounted but to a league ; and all 

 the powers, whatever they were, conferred 

 upon it were powers to be exerted not upon 

 the individual citizen anywhere directly, but 

 upon the individual through the State govern- 

 ments. The capital vice of such a government, 

 as experience soon demonstrated, was that it 

 was unable to perform the functions for which 

 governments are created ; and the men of that 

 day becoming convinced of that fact, recom- 

 mended to the American people the Constitu- 

 tion under which we now live, which, for the 

 execution of its own powers, looks to no State 

 interference, to no State assistance, but to the 

 direct responsibility of each individual citizen 

 to the Government, within the limit of the 

 powers conferred upon the Government. 



" But it did not pass by the States altogether. 

 It not only did not design to impair in any 

 manner, except to the extent of the powers 

 expressly delegated or existing by implication 

 from those expressly delegated, the sovereignty 

 of the States, but in order to place the contin- 

 uing existence of that sovereignty beyond all 

 doubt, and exempt it from the hazard of a pos- 

 sible implication that there might be found in 

 some clause in the Constitution a feature which 

 in the future might be construed to impair the 

 sovereignty of the States, they, by an amend- 

 ment soon after adopted, declared that all the 

 powers not conferred were reserved to the 

 States or the people. And in the clause relied 

 upon by the honorable member from Massa- 

 chusetts, which gives to Congress the authority 

 to pass all laws that may be necessary and 

 proper, that power is limited to such laws only 

 as may be found necessary and proper to carry 

 out the express or implied powers. 



"Now, Mr. President, is the Government 

 created by that Constitution a national Gov- 

 ernment ? Not if the men of th-e day when it 

 was adopted knew what its character was. It 

 was partly national and partly Federal. Its 

 adoption, the very act of its adoption, the 



very manner provided for its adoption, demon- 

 strate that in the judgment of the men of that 

 day it was not a national Government. Its ap- 

 proval or rejection was submitted to the people 

 of the several States respectively. The effect 

 of the concurrence of the people of each of the 

 States, in a number necessary "according to the 

 provisions of the Constitution to give it actual 

 being, is another matter; but as far as relates 

 to the act of adopting the Constitution, the peo- 

 ple of the States considered and judged sep- 

 arately. It was not adopted by a majority of 

 the people of the United States. It might have 

 been adopted by the required number of States, 

 and yet not have met the approval of a major- 

 ity of the people of the United States. The 

 Senate will find, upon refreshing their memories 

 on the subject, that the character of the Gov- 

 ernment is stated with his accustomed perspi- 

 cuity by Mr. Madison, the author of the thirty- 

 ninth number of the Federalist. I forbear to 

 read many of the passages which relate to the 

 particular question, and will content myself 

 with reading the paragraph at the close of the 

 number : 



The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when 

 tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in 

 strictness, neither a national nor a Federal Constitu- 

 tion, but a composition of both. In its foundation, 

 it is Federal, not national ; in the sources from which 

 the ordinary powers of the Government are drawn it 

 is partly Federal and partly national ; in the opera- 

 tion of- these powers it is national, not Federal ; in 

 the extent of them, again, it is Federal, not national; 

 and finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing 

 amendments, it is neither wholly Federal n&r wholly 

 national. 



" That is obvious from this consideration : that 

 the machinery of the Government, that with- 

 out which it cannot continue at .all, involvea 

 the existence of States. This body cannot be 

 convened, and without it there can be no Con- 

 gress, except by the votes of States. That is 

 very clear. The provision is express that Sen- 

 ators are to be chosen by the States through 

 their Legislatures ; and no provision is made 

 for any other mode under any possible state, of 

 circumstances by which they can be chosen. 

 States, therefore, are absolutely necessary to 

 the very existence of the Government. You 

 can no more administer the Government with- 

 out States than you would be able to adminis- 

 ter the Government without people ; and there- 

 fore, he who seeks to blot out of existence a 

 State, strikes a blow at the very life of the Gov- 

 ernment. It may live, although one be stricken 

 out of existence ; it may live though eleven be 

 stricken out of existence : but the blow at the 

 Government, although not absolutely fatal, ac- 

 cording to the hypothesis of fact which I have 

 supposed, is no less a fatal blow. If the men 

 by whom that Constitution was framed had 

 been asked if they contemplated as possible a 

 contingency when any of the existing States 

 should cease to exist, they would have said no, 

 because the continuing, wholesome existence 

 of the Government depends upon the continu- 



