188 



CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



of the right of suffrage to the colored race. 

 "We may as well state it plainly and fairly, so 

 that there shall be no misunderstanding on the 

 subject. It was our opinion that three-fourths 

 of the States of this Union could not be in- 

 duced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, 

 even in any degree or under any restriction, to 

 the colored race. "We may be right in this ap- 

 prehension or we may be in error. Time will 

 develop the truth ; and for one I shall wait 

 with patience the movements of public opinion 

 upon this great .and absorbing question. The 

 time may come, I trust it will come, indeed I 

 feel a profound conviction that it is not far dis- 

 tant, when even the people of the States them- 

 selves where the colored population is most 

 dense, will consent to admit them to the right 

 of suffrage. Sir, the safety and prosperity of 

 those States depend upon it ; it is especially for 

 their interest that they should not retain in 

 their midst a race of pariahs, so circumstanced 

 as to be obliged to bear the burdens of Govern- 

 ment and to obey its laws without any partici- 

 pation in the enactment of the laws. 



" The second section leaves the right to regu- 

 late the elective franchise still with the States, 

 and does not meddle with that right. 



" The three-fifths principle has ceased in the 

 destruction of slavery and in the enfranchise- 

 ment of the colored race. Under the present 

 Constitution this change will increase the num- 

 ber of Eepresentatives from the once slavehold- 

 ing States by nine or ten. That is to say, if 

 the present basis of representation, as estab- 

 lished in the Constitution, shall remain oper- 

 ative for the future, making our calculations 

 upon the census of 1860, the enfranchisement 

 of their slaves would increase the number of 

 their Representatives in the other House nine 

 or ten, I think at least ten ; and under the next 

 census it is easy to see that this number would 

 be still increased ; and the important question 

 now is, shall this be permitted while the col- 

 ored population are excluded from the privi- 

 lege of voting ? Shall the recently slavehold- 

 ing States, while they exclude from the ballot 

 the whole of their black population, be entitled 

 to include the whole of that population in the 

 basis of their representation, and thus to obtain 

 an advantage which they did not possess before 

 the rebellion and emancipation? In short, 

 shall we permit it to take place that one of the 

 results of emancipation and of the war is to in- 

 crease the Eepresentatives of the late slave- 

 holding States ? 



" The committee thought this should no 

 longer be permitted, and they thought it wiser 

 to adopt a general principle applicable to all the 

 States alike, namely, that where a State ex- 

 cludes any part of its male citizens from the 

 elective franchise, it shall lose Eepresentatives 

 in proportion to the number so excluded ; and 

 the clause applies not to color or to race at all, 

 "but simply to the fact of the individual exclu- 

 sion. Nor did the committee adopt the prin- 

 ciple of making the ratio of representation 



depend upon the number of voters, for it so 

 happens that there is an unequal distribution 

 of voters in the several States, the old States 

 having proportionally fewer than the new 

 States. It was desirable to avoid this ine 

 quality in fixing the basis.' The committea 

 adopted numbers as the most just and satis- 

 factory basis, and this is the principle upon 

 which the Constitution itself was originally 

 framed, that the basis of representation should 

 depend upon numbers ; and such, I think, after 

 all, is the safest and most secure principle upon 

 which the Government can rest. Numbers, not 

 voters; numbers, not property; this is the 

 theory of the Constitution. 



"By the census of 1860, the whole number 

 of colored persons in the several States was four 

 million four hundred and twenty-seven thou- 

 sand and sixty-seven. In five of the New Eng- 

 land States, where colored persons are allowed 

 to vote, the number of such colored persons is 

 only twelve thousand one hundred and thirty- 

 two. This leaves of the colored population of 

 the United States in the other States unrepre- 

 sented, four million four hundred and fourteen 

 thousand nine hundred and thirty-five, or at 

 least one-seventh part of the whole population 

 of the United States. Of this last number, 

 three million six hundred and fifty thousand 

 were in the eleven seceding States, and only 

 five hundred and forty-seven thousand in the 

 four remaining slave States which did not 

 secede, namely, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, 

 and Missouri. In the eleven seceding States 

 the blacks are to the irhites, basing the calcu- 

 lation upon the census of 1860, nearly as three 

 to five. A further calculation shows that if 

 this section shall be adopted as a part of the 

 Constitution, and if the late slave States shall 

 continue hereafter to exclude the colored popu- 

 lation from voting, they will do it at the loss 

 at least of twenty-four Eepresentatives hi the 

 other House of Congress, according to the rule 

 established by the act of 1850. It is not to be 

 disguised the committee have no disposition 

 to conceal the fact that this amendment is so 

 drawn as to make it the political interest of the 

 once slaveholding States to admit their colored 

 population to the right of suffrage. The pen- 

 alty of refusing will be severe. They will un- 

 doubtedly lose, and lose so long as they shall 

 refuse to admit the black population to the right 

 of suffrage, that balance of power in Congress 

 which has been so long their pride and their 

 boast. 



"I did not favor the third section of the 

 amendment in the committee. I do not believe, 

 if adopted, it will be of any practical benefit to 

 the country. It will not prevent rebels from 

 voting for members of the several State Legis- 

 latures. A rebel, notwithstanding this clause, 

 may vote for a member of the State Legislature. 

 The State Legislature may be made up entirely 

 of disloyal elements, in consequence of being 

 elected by a rebel constituency. That Legisla- 

 ture when assembled has the right, under the 



