CONGRESS, UNI 'I TES. 



241 



poorer to remove, and they have done it even 



in ivlaiion to ft judicial officer. The im-uilicrs 

 of the judicial department of ilis Government 

 prouded !>v ih,' ('uii.-titution liold their office 

 diiriiiir f- r ">"l !lia\ior. But, notwithstanding 

 that, tlio judges of territorial governments, it 

 was heM, were always liable to bo removed by 

 and a case was brought into 

 >urt by a judge who had been 

 removed, claiming hi* salary on the ground 

 that lie could not be removed, not because 

 there existed no power to remove in relation to 

 officers generally, but because of the particular 

 character of his office ; and the Supreme Court, 

 aa well as I recollect I do not speak with 

 positive certainty on the subject decided 

 that a judge in a Territory was not to bo consid- 

 etv-1 as a judge within the judicial department 

 of the Government, and was therefore just as 

 liable to be removed as any other officer ap- 

 pointed under the Constitution and laws." 



Mr. Trurabull, of Illinois, replied: "Mr. 

 President, I do not think that the question of 

 the power of the President to remove from 

 office an incumbent and appoint another in 

 his place during the recess is necessarily in- 

 vnlvcd in the amendment which I have offered. 

 That is a controverted, point and has been 

 from the foundation of the Government. The 

 practice, I am aware, has been for the Pres- 

 ident to exercise the power to remove from 

 office bj making new appointments; and this 

 has generally been acquiesced in. 



" The laws upon this subject have not, how- 

 ever, been uniform. In 18G3 there was cre- 

 ated an officer called the Comptroller of the 

 Currency, and in the law establishing the 

 Currency Bureau it was provided that ' there 

 shall be appointed a chief officer to be styled 

 the Comptroller of the Currency, who shall be 

 under the general direction of the Secretary of 

 the Treasury.' The law further provided that 

 ' he shall be appointed by the President, on 

 the nomination of the Secretary of the 

 Treasury, by and with the advice and consent 

 of the Senate, and shall hold his office for the 

 term of five years, unless sooner removed by 

 the President by and with the advice and con- 

 sent of the Senate.' 



"That law, passed in 18C3, provided that 

 the Comptroller of the Currency should be re- 

 moved from office by and with the advice and 

 consent of the Senate alone, and according to 

 that statute it is not competent for the Presi- 

 dent of the United States to remove the Comp- 

 troller of the Currency except by the advice 

 and consent of the Senate. The legislative con- 

 struction which was put upon the President's 

 power in 1863 by this act was that it was com- 

 petent for Congress to provide that persons 

 could be removed from office only by the 

 advice and consent of the Senate when they 

 were appointed by that advice and consent. 



"Bat, sir, the amendment which I have 

 proposed does not involve that question. 

 According to my understanding, the President 

 VOL. vi. 18 A 



has no authority to fill a vacancy which exists 



in an cilice, l.y liiiii-ielt', without tli; advice and 



: of the Senate, unless that vacancy 

 while the Senate is not in session; and 

 :.;! object of this amendment is to prevent 

 iij.|ioiiit:nrnts of that character. I deny that 

 if a vacancy exists in an office while the Sen- 

 ate is here, the President has any power to fill 

 up that vacancy without the advice and consent 

 of the Senate. It takes the President and the 

 Senate both to make an officer ; bnt he may 

 make a new appointment in case that officer 

 die-; (hiring the recess of the Senate, or re- 

 signs his office, or in case the term for which 

 ho was appointed expires during the recess 

 of the Senate so that a vacancy occurs, though 

 I am not quite sure that he would have au- 

 thority to appoint in the case of an expiration 

 of the term, because that may not be the hap- 

 pening of a vacancy, inasmuch as the term 

 expires at a fixed period, there is no uncertainty 

 about it, and it is competent for the President 

 to anticipate that period by sending the nomi- 

 nation of an officer to the Senate while it is in 

 session for its confirmation. I am by no means 

 clear that he has authority to appoint in that 

 case, for then it becomes an appointment to an 

 original office when the term has expired. 

 Ilowever, it is provided in this amendment that 

 in either of these cases the President may make 

 an appointment or may fill up the vacancy, and 

 the party will receive his salary. lie has the 

 constitutional authority to do this. 



" But, Mr. President, the control of the reve- 

 nues of the country and of the money of the 

 country is not in the hands of the President; 

 without the authority of Congress, he has no 

 control over one dollar; he cannot draw his 

 own salary except by authority of law; and 

 the Senator from Maryland will observe that 

 this provision does not go to the appointing 

 power at all ; it is merely a provision in re- 

 gard to the salaries of officers or the compensa- 

 tion they are to receive. It is entirely com- 

 petent for Congress to provide just as much 

 compensation as it pleases, or no compensation. 

 It may authorize an appointment of an officer 

 without attaching any salary or any fees to the 

 discharge of the duties of the office. I think 

 there is a bill now pending, reported by the 

 Senator from Massachusetts, the chairman of 

 the Committee on Foreign Relations, that pro- 

 vides for the appointment of certain commis- 

 sioners without any salary whatever. It is en- 

 tirely competent for Congress to make such pro- 

 vision. There is, therefore, no constitutional 

 question involved in this amendment which I 

 have offered." 



Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, again said: "Mr. 

 President, I am aware that the money of th 

 Government is placed under the control of 

 Congress; and in one sense, therefore, Con ^ 

 gress has the right to refuse to pay salaries. 

 They may refuse to pay the President his sal- 

 ary, now fixed by law. They may refuse to ap- 

 propriate at all for the payment of the compeu- 



