242 



CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



eation which the laws give, or which the laws 

 ought to give, to the officers who may he ap- 

 pointed from time to time by the appointing 

 power. But the honorahle member, I am sure, 

 will see that the ground upon which he places 

 the constitutionality of this legislation, as far as 

 that particular ground is concerned, is one 

 which will not hear examination. If the Pres- 

 ident has the power to appoint, and the appointee 

 has the right to go into office under the Con- 

 stitution, although Congress may have the pow- 

 er to say that they will not pay, have they the 

 moral right to say that they will not pay ? And 

 if there is no moral right to deny payment in 

 such a case, are they not warring against the 

 spirit of the Constitution, though not against 

 its letter, hy refusing to pay ? 



" The Senate of the United States, or hoth 

 hranches of Congress, may become so dissatis- 

 fied with the President of the United States as 

 to be exceedingly anxious to get rid of him. 

 His remaining in office may interfere with some 

 favorite policy of Congress; Congress may 

 look to political measures upon which, as they 

 suppose, the welfare of the country depends, 

 and find that they cannot accomplish their 

 purpose in having such measures adopted as 

 long as the incumbent of the presidential office 

 is in his seat. Thei are two ways to get rid 

 of him. One is to impeach him. That re- 

 quires, to be successful, a vote in the body of 

 two-thirds. Another is to starve him out, and 

 that may be accomplished by refusing to pay 

 his salary ; and the honorable member's argu- 

 ment would be just as solid in a case of that 

 description in support of legislation such as I 

 have supposed, as it is in relation to the case 

 before the Senate, provided the President has 

 the authority to remove and to appoint. 



" Mr. President, in all good temper, I caution 

 my friends, or rather the member who offers 

 this amendment, against what may be the con- 

 sequences of this precedent in the future. It 

 may answer the temporary purpose for which 

 he avows it now to be designed ; but it may be 

 relied upon hereafter to answer a temporary 

 purpose which the honorable member from 

 Illinois would be the last man to wish to see 

 accomplished. The precedent may return to 

 plague the inventor. The dominant party now 

 in each House of Congress may, in the course 

 of time, become a minority. They may have 

 elected their President, and he may be an offi- 

 cer who is willing to carry out their particular 

 policy. These seats, however, and the seats 

 in the other House may be filled by a majority 

 of members who think that the policy which 

 the minority and the President for the time 

 being may desire to carry out, is dangerous to 

 the country, and then they may propose just 

 what the honorahle member proposes now, not 

 to take away the power of appointment, as he 

 says, but to refuse to appropriate ; not to de- 

 clare that he shall not appoint, but to declare 

 that if he does appoint, his appointment will 

 be futile ; and they may go further and say, fol- 



lowing the principle for which this may be 

 cited as a precedent, that the President for' tho 

 time being stands in the way of the true inter- 

 est and honor of the country, or stands in the 

 way of some party aspiration ; but as he cannot 

 be got rid of by impeachment, they strike at hig 

 appointing power, and if they cannot get rid of 

 him by taking from him, practically, the benefit 

 of his appointing power, they accomplish the 

 same thing by providing that no money shall 

 go out of the Treasury to compensate his ap- 

 pointees." 



Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts, said : " The 

 proposition is very simple ; it needs no com- 

 mentary or no explanation. All familiar with 

 public offices know that there are unquestion- 

 ably abuses that have occurred in the executive 

 department from the habit, after the adjourn- 

 ment of the Senate, of filling vacancies which 

 had existed during the session of the Senate 

 but which the Senate had chosen not to fill. Is 

 Congress wrong if it undertakes to provide 

 by legislation that in such cases the party nom- 

 inated shall not be entitled to any salary or 

 compensation until he is afterward confirmed 

 by the Senate? It may be, as the Senator 

 from Maryland suggests, that we may not in- 

 terfere with the power of removal ; but there 

 is one power which Congress has and the Sen- 

 ate is a part of Congress and that is the power 

 over the purse-strings; and all that this propo- 

 sition undertakes to do is to exercise power 

 over the purse-strings in certain cases, so as to 

 impose a check, a constitutional check, which 

 recent events show ought to he imposed upon 

 the Executive. The proposition is so simple 

 that it hardly justifies argument, and I will not 

 take any further time about it." 



Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, said : " I dislike very 

 much to see these propositions attached to our 

 appropriation bills. They are in the nature of 

 conditions to what we ought freely to grant, 

 appropriations to meet the expenses of the Gov- 

 ernment. I do not like to see them put on in 

 that way ; but if the Senator from Illinois or 

 the Judiciary Committee will frame a bill which 

 will limit and restrain the power of the Presi- 

 dent to remove from office, so that when a man 

 is appointed for four years he shall hold that 

 office during those four years, unless he is re- 

 moved for cause, to be submitted to the Senate, 

 I will vote for such a proposition, and I say 

 there never was a time when this great ques- 

 tion could be more fairly met than now. It ig 

 admitted on all hands that at least a jealousy 

 exists between the President and Congress ; I 

 will not say war, because I do not think there 

 is a war, but there is a jealousy and a watch- 

 fulness probably on the part of the President 

 and on the part of Congress. "What is to pre- 

 vent Congress now from passing such a law as 

 I have indicated ? The majority here is over- 

 whelming. We have no object to accomplish 

 of a mere partisan purpose. The majority in 

 Congress is perhaps two-thirds in a party sense. 

 "What is to prevent now the Judiciary Commit- 



