244 



CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



relation to the incidental power of the Presi- 

 dent to remove, no member of that body (and 

 many of them had been members of the Con- 

 vention by whom the Constitution was framed) 

 ever suggested that the President could be com- 

 pelled to keep around him any Cabinet officer 

 whom he desired to displace. 



" Now, let me stop for a moment to inquire, 

 if there was no such power of removal, what 

 would be the condition of the country, and 

 what would be the condition of the President ? 

 He is sworn to see to the faithful execution of 

 the laws ; and how can he do it ? Not person- 

 ally ; it can only be done through the instru- 

 mentality of subordinate officers named in the 

 Constitution, or officers appointed under the 

 authority conferred upon Congress by the Con- 

 stitution. He finds that the laws are not being 

 executed, that an incumbent disregards his 

 duty, is guilty of excesses ; is dishonest, is ap- 

 propriating the public money to his own pur- 

 poses ; what is he to do ? He cannot execute 

 the laws except by means of officers ; he can- 

 not go into the country himself and collect the 

 revenue ; he cannot be at every custom-house 

 in the country and see to the collection of im- 

 posts ; he cannot go himself personally through- 

 out the country and collect the internal tax, 

 whatever that may be ; he cannot execute the 

 judgments of the courts ; he cannot go with 

 your Indian agents and see that they properly 

 apply the money set aside by Congress for that 

 purpose. He is obliged to do it through the in- 

 strumentality of subordinates, and he finds that 

 they are faithless ; what is he to do ? You ad- 

 journ on the 4th of March ; you cannot sit 

 longer at the second session ; you do not meet 

 again until December. According to this amend- 

 ment, although he may turn out (for the amend- 

 ment does not deny that), he cannot supply the 

 places of those who may be dismissed ; or un- 

 less he can find anybody disposed to take the 

 place upon the contingency that the Senate will 

 thereafter approve of the appointment, the place 

 is not to be filled. 



u Well, then, your imposts are not collected ; 

 your tax remains in the hands of those who 

 are liable to pay it ; the duties which you owe 

 to the Indians and the execution of your trea- 

 ties with them remain unperformed. The Gov- 

 ernment, in a word, comes to a stand-still ; and 

 my honorable friend from Missouri thinks it 

 would be pregnant with great public mischief 

 to give to a President of the United States, 

 elected by a majority of the people of the 

 United States, a power of removal because he 

 may abuse it. Certainly he may. Cannot we 

 abuse our power ? Are we individually better 

 than he is? I do not speak of the present 

 members of the Senate or of the House of Rep- 

 resentatives, or of the present incumbent of the 

 presidential office ; but looking into the man- 

 lier in which they are respectively elected, is it 

 a bit more probable that the President of the 

 United States will be corrupt or prejudiced, al- 

 most to the point of practical corruption, than 



it is that some members of Congress may be 

 corrupt ; or to put a more respectable suppo- 

 sition, is it probable that they will be more en- 

 lightened and more able to see the true inter- 

 ests of the country than the President of the 

 United States ? I think not. 



" As far as my knowledge extends, nobody 

 has ever impeached the personal integrity of 

 any President of the United States. As to 

 that, each has been spotless in the public esti- 

 mation. Errors of judgment have been im- 

 puted to them ; imbecility was imputed to him 

 who preceded President Lincoln ; that is to 

 say, an imbecility which unsuited him for the 

 exigencies in which he was placed ; but in 

 point of personal integrity his character never 

 was assailed. Members of the Senate have 

 been charged with improper conduct, and 

 have been expelled ; members of the House 

 of Representatives have been charged with im- 

 proper conduct, and have been expelled. So 

 then in point of fact, looking to the experience 

 of the country, it is just as likely that miscon- 

 duct may be found in the halls of Congress as 

 that it may be found in the Executive chamber. 



"But what is to supply the evil consequent 

 upon the inability of the President to execute 

 the laws because the officers placed under his 

 charge are not fit, either morally or intellect- 

 ually, to execute the laws? Above all, when 

 you charge him, as a Congress would have the 

 right to charge him ; when the judgment of 

 the country would charge him with having 

 abandoned his duty in seeing the laws faith- 

 fully executed, and he comes before you and 

 defends himself upon the ground that his offi- 

 cers were incompetent, you would, at one time, 

 and every Senate will hereafter, -if that should 

 be the ground of impeachment, tell him in re- 

 ply, ' It was your duty to remove the incom- 

 petent.' " 



Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, said : " I object to 

 this last clause requiring the President in case 

 of removals to give his reasons to the Senate. 

 I do not think we have a right to require that. 

 If the President in the exercise of this power 

 chooses to remove persons, we have a right to 

 say that those appointed in their places shall 

 not be paid until the Senate has chosen to act 

 upon their nominations ; but to put the Presi- 

 dent to the necessity in all cases of telling the 

 Senate, if he nominates another person for an 

 office, the reason why he does it, is a new 

 thing. Such a proposition was offered once in 

 the time of General Taylor by my immediate 

 predecessor. He brought it up over and over 

 again in a very strongly Democratic Senate. I 

 do not remember whether they finally voted it 

 down or not, but if not, they got rid of it ; they 

 would not pass it at any rate, holding to the 

 doctrine that the President, having the power 

 of removal, so long as he had it he must exer- 

 cise his own discretion about that, and that 

 with reference to his appointments the Senate 

 would consider whether they were proper ap- 

 pointments to be made. 



