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CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



ters, in which the opinion was delivered by 

 Chief Justice Marshall, decided that a pardon 

 may he either absolute or conditional. They 

 quote in that opinion also from common law 

 writers on the subject of pardon and its effect, 

 and say : 



A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery 

 is essential, and delivery is not complete without ac- 

 ceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to 

 whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have 

 discovered no power in a court to force it on him. 

 United, States vs. Wilson, 7 Peters, page 161. 



" The point in that case was the authority of 

 the President to impose a condition in grant- 

 ing a pardon, and the Supreme Court held that 

 that authority existed in the President, and 

 they laid down the rule in both these cases 

 that the power of the President 'to grant re- 

 prieves and pardons ' is to be construed as those 

 words were understood at the time they were 

 incorporated into the Constitution of the United 

 States. The President's power to restore proper- 

 ty, seized under the confiscation act, to its former 

 rebel owners, will not be affected by the repeal 

 of the thirteenth section of the act of 1862, as 

 the section is silent on that subject. It is cer- 

 tainly within the power of the President to re- 

 fuse to restore property to pardoned rebels, by 

 making it a condition when he grants the par- 

 don that they shall not claim the property 

 which has been seized by the Government. 

 The President, however, has not generally done 

 this, and, by granting absolute pardons, has 

 given an order, in fact, for the restoration of 

 property. It will be seen by the report of 

 General Howard, made to Congress at the last 

 session, that the President did direct property 

 to be restored to a person who had been par- 

 doned, and, under the rule adopted in that case, 

 General Howard states that lie proceeded to 

 restore to pardoned rebels more than four 

 hundred thousand acres of land which had* 

 been seized under the confiscation act. I will 

 not undertake to say whether the President has 

 authority to restore this property. He, cer- 

 tainly, has no such authority where the rights 

 of third parties have intervened. "Whenever 

 the property has been condemned under the 

 confiscation act, his right to take away the title 

 of an individual who had acquired any interest 

 in the property, and restore it to the former 

 owners, would, doubtless, be -gone. "Whether 

 he could before, after the mere seizure of the 

 property, is another question; but it is not af- 

 fected, in my opinion, by the repeal of the sec- 

 tion under consideration. 



"If the President lias this power under the 

 Constitution, it may be asked why then repeal 

 this thirteenth section ; what harm does it do ? 

 I answer that this thirteenth section is broader 

 than the Constitution ; it authorized the Presi- 

 dent, by proclamation, to grant pardon and 

 amnesty. The difference, as I understand, be- 

 tween a pardon and an amnesty is this : a par- 

 don is an act of mercy extended to an indi- 

 vidual ; it must be by deed ; it must be pleaded 



Chief Justice Marshall says it is essential to its 

 validity that it must be delivered an amnesty 

 is a general pardon proclaimed by proclama- 

 tion. This statute undertakes to confer upon 

 the President of the United States authority 

 by general proclamation to grant pardon and 

 amnesty to everybody who has been engaged 

 in the rebellion. The President has already 

 issued general proclamations of amnesty and 

 pardon; there can be no occasion for the exer- 

 cise of that power hereafter, and, therefore, there 

 is a propriety in repealing the section of the 

 statute which confers this power upon the Presi- 

 dent. Let him have such powers as the Con- 

 stitution gives him ; of coiirse Congress cannot 

 take from him those powers ; but let us not be 

 a party to conferring any additional powers or 

 any additional facility upon the President to 

 grant pardons to persons engaged in this rebel- 

 lion, who have shown themselves, after obtain- 

 ing pardon, so undeserving of the mercy which 

 has been extended to them. Let us repeal that 

 clause which authorized the issuing of procla- 

 mations of amnesty. This will at least be an 

 expression of opinion on the part of Congress 

 that general pardons and restoration of prop- 

 erty should not be continued; and if the Presi- 

 dent does continue to pardon rebels, and restore 

 their property by individual acts under the 

 Constitution, let him do so without having the 

 sanction of Congress for his act. 



" Therefore, sir, the committee recommended 

 the passage of this bill, believing that the ex- 

 pression of such an opinion on the part of Con- 

 gress was but carrying out the expressions of 

 the people of this country, and that we should 

 withhold any encouragement on our part to the 

 granting of general pardons and restorations 

 of property for the future, until we can see a 

 better spirit manifested on the part of those 

 who are their recipients." 



Mr. Saulsbury, of Maryland, moved to strike 

 out all of the bill after the enacting clause, and 

 insert the following : 



That the act entitled "An act to suppress insur- 

 rection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and 

 confiscate the property of rebels, and for other pur- 

 poses," approved July 17, 1862, be, and the same is 

 hereby, repealed. 



Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, said : " When the 

 subject was before us prior to the recess, I ask- 

 ed my friend from Illinois, the chairman of the 

 Judiciary Committee, if he proposed to repeal 

 the section upon the ground that it gave powers 

 to the President which he had not, or whether 

 he supposed it was within the authority of Con- 

 gress to take from the President any powers 

 which he has, with reference to the subject, by 

 the Constitution. The latter question he of 

 course answered in the negative. He told us, 

 and told us correctly, as he always means to do, 

 that the power of pardon vested in the Presi- 

 dent by the Constitution cannot by legislation 

 be taken'from him ; and for the same reason I 

 have no doubt he would admit that it cannot 

 be in any way limited or qualified. It is vested 



