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CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



the state of relations between him and any of 

 them had become so as to render this relation 

 of confidence and trust and personal esteem in- 

 harmonious, he should in such case be allowed 

 to dispense with the services of that officer in 

 vacation and have some other person act in his 

 stead. "We thought that so much discretion, so 

 much confidence, so much respect ought to be 

 properly attributed to the Chief Magistrate of 

 the nation. It may happen that at some par- 

 ticular time some people may suppose that it 

 has happened now the Chief Magistrate for 

 the time being ought not to be invested with 

 such powers ; but the committee have recom- 

 mended the adoption of this rule respecting the 

 tenure of officers as a permanent and systematic 

 and as they believe an appropriate regulation 

 of the Government for all administrations and 

 for all time." 



Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, said : " The Consti- 

 tution imposes upon the President of the United 

 States the duty of executing the laws ; it does 

 not impose that duty upon the Secretaries. They 

 are creatures of the law and not of the Consti- 

 tution directly. Some, and perhaps the greater 

 part, of their functions are as advisers of the 

 President and to aid him in executing the laws 

 in their several departments. There are some 

 duties that are specifically conferred upon them 

 by Congress. Their relations to the President, 

 as has been well said by gentlemen, is that 

 mostly of confidential advisers. With the ex- 

 ception of the particular duties imposed upon 

 them by law, and on the Secretary of the Treas- 

 ury more than on the others, they do nothing 

 of their own notion, but act by order of the 

 President in discharging the particular duties 

 of their office. 



" Standing in that relation to him, as his aids, 

 his confidential advisers, the men upon whom 

 he relies for advice in the first place and for aid 

 in carrying out what is determined to be best in 

 the second, their connection with him is a very 

 peculiar one. It is very important as a general 

 principle unquestionably, as all gentlemen here 

 will admit, that that relation should be a har- 

 monious relation throughout; and, if we may 

 trust to what we have heard, it is not many 

 years since it was considered by the great ma- 

 jority of the Senate a sufficient reason for wish- 

 ing that the cabinet should be changed in some 

 degree, because there was the want of that har- 

 mony among themselves, and consequently, per- 

 haps, with the President, that was desirable. 



'' That being the peculiar condition of affairs, 

 it has always been considered, since the foun- 

 dation of the Government, as a matter of course, 

 us a general rule there may have been one or 

 two exceptions, and, I think, there have been, 

 but I am not very positive on that point that 

 the President might select such persons as he 

 pleased to be members of his cabinet. Of 

 course, the confirmation of the Senate is neces- 

 sary ; but the general idea of the Senate has 

 been, whether they liked the men or not, to 

 confirm them without any difficulty, because in 



executing the great and varied interests of this 

 great country, it is exceedingly important that 

 there should be the utmost harmony between 

 those who are charged with that execution. 



" It seems to be very obvious that, with re- 

 ference to the transaction of business which is 

 peculiarly executive, the confidential advisers 

 that we put about the President should always 

 be men who, for the greater part, are satisfac- 

 tory to him." 



Mr. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, said : " This 

 bill comes from the joint-committee of the 

 two Houses upon retrenchment, of the Senate 

 branch of which the Senator from Vermont is 

 chairman. I desire, in addition to what he has 

 just said, the propriety of which will attract 

 the attention of every Senator, to say that there 

 are several subjects comprised in the bill, each 

 of which is perfectly distinct ; and what is to 

 be done by the Senate in coming to a correct 

 conclusion on this bill will be, to keep the argu- 

 ment upon each point perfectly distinct and 

 separate from the others. 



"The first section of the bill, and the mat- 

 ter contained in the second also, raises a very 

 great question; and I hope that the members 

 of the Senate will not commit their judgments 

 upon it until it is distinctly and separately de- 

 bated. It is new to us, and it is hazardous, if 

 not improper, that we should form hasty con- 

 clusions upon it. 



"Another and a distinct question is raised 

 by the latter part of the second section the 

 conferring upon the President of the power of 

 suspending from office without dismissing an 

 officer. A provision of this kind in our legis- 

 lation, if not altogether new, is new as a gen- 

 eral provision, and it may likewise deserve 

 separate consideration. 



"Finally, the third section is intended to 

 meet a class of cases which has been spoken of 

 in this debate where the President fills a va- 

 cancy, during a recess, between the sessions of 

 the Senate by issuing a commission, which 

 shall expire at the end of the next session, by 

 virtue of an express provision of the Constitu- 

 tion ; then, if during such next session that of- 

 fice shall not be filled by and with the advice 

 and consent of the Senate, it shall, after the ad- 

 journment of the Senate, remain vacant; the 

 appointments shall remain in abeyance to use 

 the words employed in the section and the 

 duties of that office shall be discharged by some 

 other officer, who may be appointed or selected 

 by law. 



"Now, sir, the first question, to wit, the power 

 of the President to make removals from office, 

 is one which was settled in the first session of 

 the first Congress which met after the organi- 

 zation of our Government, and that decision, if 

 not unchallenged, at least has not been reversed 

 in the practice of this Government seventy-seven 

 years ; and when we come to reopen the debate 

 upon it we must take care that we approach 

 this great subject in the proper temper, in a 

 spirit of impartiality, and Avithout any disposi- 



