CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



niul t.i tin- law. Tin- President (not wit hstand- 

 : formalities of electors and electoral 

 . in tart, chn>en and appointed to 

 a p.. pular vote taken throiigh- 

 of tin' I'nion, and inii-t n-tiirn 

 I lie poop!.- at tin- end of four 

 to !>. renewed to him or the renewal withheld 

 iiiiL' to their sovereign pleasure, lint 

 : of the Senate are chosen by the 

 Legislatures, and for six-year terms. 

 < )ne-third only of its members go out biennially, 

 nnd in its constitution and character it is a 

 )>erpetn:d body. It is, therefore, less responsi- 

 ble than tin- President to the people. But it is 

 also ten responsible- to the law, because its 

 members cannot be impeached. It was deter- 

 mined in the ca<e of Senator Blount that the 

 House of representatives cannot prefer articles 

 of impeachment against a member of the Senate, 

 ajid that is now an established doctrine or rule 

 of o institutional law. 



" But if the Senate is to be considered a pop- 

 ular body, though removed in the second de- 

 gree from the people, it is such upon a princi- 

 ple of gross inequality. Three millions of popu- 

 lation c-i-t of the Hudson have twelve repre- 

 sentatives in the Senate, while seven millions in 

 Pennsylvania and New York have but four. 

 And new States and small States in other sec- 

 tions of the Union have power hero grossly 

 disproportioned to the populations they contain. 



" Upon this point of State representation in 

 the Senate I say let the Constitution stand as 

 it is, at least let it stand until it shall be regu- 

 larly amended. As a legislative body the 

 Senate stands intrenched in the Constitution. 

 But it is now proposed to extend to it (and in 

 part by its own vote) executive powers of the 

 most extensive and dangerous character, never 

 heretofore assumed or exercised by it during 

 the seventy-seven years since the Government 

 was organized. Wffl its comparatively irre- 

 sponsible domination over all official patronage 

 and all executive action be satisfactory to the 

 people? Is it expedient by this measure to 

 invite keen scrutiny into its character and 

 conduct, and generally into its claim to the 

 possession of additional, delicate, and dangerous 

 powers ? 



" In the next place, what effect will be pro- 

 duced upon the Senate itself by the possession 

 and exercise of this new power ? Are the offi- 

 cers of the United States to be the clients of 

 members of the Senate, as persons accused at 

 one stage of Roman history were*clients of the 

 senators; their retainers? "What effect is to be 

 produced upon the popular politics of the 

 country, upon the selection of members of this 

 body in the different State Legislatures; ay, 

 sir, upon the purity of this body itself, when it 

 comes to be connected, and connected inti- 

 mately, with the innumerable questions con- 

 cerning the retention of officers in all parts of 

 the United States ; when power is lodged here 

 with individual members to hold men in their 

 offices, or to instigate and assent to their re- 

 VOL. vn. 18 



moval by the I', 

 consider what eii'rct is to 

 character of the S-nate it-elf by this n.-v 

 tentoiH, unexampled jurisdiction np<,n 

 the Senate lias IM-UT heretofore ventn: 

 enter. The Senate has never set up thin pre- 

 tension, at least in any form of practical ac- 

 tion, from the time when it was first den<. 

 and branded by the father of the Constitution 

 in the dehate of 1789. 



"Again, consider, sir, the effect of this exec- 

 utive power lodged in the Senate in Miother 

 point of view. It will give to this branch of 

 the Government domination over the executive 

 department to an extent never contemplated 

 heretofore, and of the effects of which we are 

 incompetent to form a distinct opinion. It was 

 well described, perhaps, by one member of the 

 House of Representatives, in the debate to 

 which I have referred, when he said that a 

 provision of this sort I mean a provision con- 

 ferring upon the Senate power over removals 

 from office would establish it as a two-headed 

 monster, with a legislative and an executive 

 head, planted here in the Government, domi- 

 nating over each of the other two great depart- 

 ments, the President and House, one of which 

 is united with it in the enactment of laws, and 

 the other in their enforcement. 



"Upon every ground, then, upon which I 

 hav6 examined this measure, it is in my opinion 

 open to insuperable objections. Instead of a 

 measure of reform, it is one of degeneracy. 

 Instead of applying in practice a principle of 

 the Constitution, it invades that instrument. 

 Instead of introducing purity into the Govern- 

 ment, it will be the source and parent of cor- 

 ruption and of evil. It treats with contempt 

 the whole past history of this Government and 

 the decision even of Congress itself upon a for- 

 mer occasion. It sets precedent at naught, 

 while on grounds of reason it stands con- 

 demned, as I have attempted to show, by the 

 most conclusive and indisputable arguments." 



Air. Sumner, of Massachusetts, offered the fol- 

 io wing amendment : 



And le it further enacted, That all officers or 

 agents, except clerks of departments, now appointed 

 by the President or by the Lead of any department, 

 whose salary or compensation, derived from fees or 

 otherwise, exceeds 51,000 annually, shall be nomi- 

 nated by the President and appointed by and with 

 the advice and consent of the Senate; and the term 

 of all such officers or agents who have been appoint- 

 ed since the 1st day of July, 1866, either oy the 

 President or by the head of a department, without 

 the advice ana consent of the Senate, shall expire on 

 the last day of February, 1867. 



Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, said : " I hope 

 that amendment will not be adopted. It is a 

 very sweeping proposition. "We cannot tell, 

 without a careful investigation by some com- 

 mittee, precisely what officers it will operate 

 upon, whether it ought to go so far as it does ; 

 and it bears on the face of it as connected with 

 this bill, which is a general one relating to the 

 powers and duties of the Senate, an implication 



