IM IJLIC IHHTMK 



687 



: which tin- American people arc distinguished 



the world. 

 H"W lar ill.- tlniy of ili" I'r.-M.i'-m, "to preserve, 



1 defend Ilic Constitution," rci|mi 

 in opposing an unconstitutional act oi Con- 

 aml important i|iicstioii, on 

 which I have deliberated luucli, and Ml extremely 



-(I according to the Conns oC the 



iitioii by tin- supreme legislative am 



. nrol!ed among llie public .statutes 

 five resistance to it, especially 



in times of high party excitement, would lie likely 

 tn produce violent collision bctwi en the respective 

 adherents of the two branches of the Government. 

 This would be simply civil war; and civil war must 

 to only as the last remedy for the worst 

 of evils. Whatever mL'ht tend to provoke it should 

 refully avoided. A faithful and consci- 

 entious magistrate will concede very much to honest 

 error, and something even to perverse malice, before 

 he will endanger the public peace; and he will Dot 

 adopt forcible measures, or such as might lead to 



as long as those which are peaceable remain 

 open to him or to his constituents. It is true that 



may occur in which the Executive would be 

 compelled to stand on its rights, and maintain them, 



I less of all consequences. If Congress should 



,:i net which is not only in palpable conflict 

 with the Constitution, but will certainly, if carried 

 out, produce immediate and irreparable injury to 

 the organic structure of the Government, and if 



be neither judicial remedy for the wrongs it 

 infliets, nor power in the people to protect them- 

 without the official aid of their elected de- 

 lender if, for instance, the Legislative Department 

 should pass an act, even through all the'' forms of 

 law, to abolish a coordinate department of the Gov- 

 ernmentin such a case the President must take the 

 high responsibilities of his office, and save the life 

 ofthe nation at all hazards. The so-called recon- 

 struction acts, though as plainly unconstitutional as 

 any that can be imagined, were not believed to be 

 within the class last mentioned. The people were 

 not wholly disarmed of the -power of self-defence. 

 In all the Northern States they still held in their 

 hands the sacred right of the ballot, and it was safe 

 to believe tha_t in due time they would come to the 

 rescue of their own institutions. It gives me pleas- 

 ure to add that the appeal to our common constit- 

 uents was not taken in vain, and that my confidence 

 in their wisdom and virtue seems not to have been 

 misplaced. 



It is well and publicly known that enormous frauds 

 have been perpetrated on the Treasury, and that co- 

 lossal fortunes have been made at the public expense. 

 This species of corruption has increased, is increas- 

 ing, and if not diminished will soon bring us into 

 total ruin and disgrace. The public creditors and 

 the taxpayers are alike interested in an honest ad- 

 ministration of the finances, and neither class will 

 long endure the large-handed robberies of the recent 

 past. For this discreditable state of things there 

 are several causes. Some of the taxes are so laid 

 as to present an irresistible temptation to evade pay- 

 ment. The great sums which officers may win by 

 connivance at fraud create a pressure which is more 

 than the virtue of many can withstand ; and there 

 can be no doubt that the open disregard of consti- 

 tutional obligations avowed by some of the highest 

 and most influential men in the country has greatly 

 weakened the moral sense of those vyho serve in 

 subordinate places. The expenses of the United 

 States, including interest on the public debt, are 

 more than six times as much as they were seven 

 years ago. To collect and disburse this vast amount 

 requires careful supervision, as well as systematic 

 vigilance. The system, never perfected, was much 

 _'anized by the " Tenuro-of-Oflice Bill," which 



iiuost destroyed official accountability. The 



Ht may ) thoroughly convinced that an 

 officer is incapable, dishonest, or unfaithful to the 

 Constitution, hut, under the law which I have named, 

 the inmost ho can do is to nmplain to the Senate, 

 ;. the piivili-L"- of supplying his place with a 

 man. It' the Senate be regarded as personally 

 or politically hostile to the President, it is natural, and 

 not altogether unreasonable, for the officer to expect 

 that it will take hii part as far as possible, restore 

 him to his place, and give him a triumph --. 

 Executive superior. The officer has other chances 

 nt impunity arising from accidental defects < 

 dence, the mode of investigating it, and the secrecy 

 of the hearing. It is not wonderful that official mal- 

 Ceiisaiicc should become bold in proportion as the de- 

 linquents learn to think themselves safe. I am en- 

 tirely persuaded that under such a rule the ' 

 dent cannot perform the great duty assigned to him 

 of seeing the laws faithfully executed, and that it 

 disables him most especially from enforcing that 

 rigid accountability which is neccss try to the due 

 execution of the revenue laws. 



The Constitution invests the President with au- 

 thority to decide whether a removal should be made 

 in any given case ; the act of Congress declares, in 

 substance, that he shall only accuse such as he sup- 

 poses to be unworthy 'of their trust. The Consti- 

 tution makes him sole judge in the premises ; but 

 the statute takes away his jurisdiction, transfers it 

 to the Senate, and leaves him nothing but the odious 

 and sometimes impracticable duty of becoming a 

 prosecutor. The prosecution is to be conducted oe- 

 ibre a tribunal whose members are not, like him, re- 

 sponsible to the whole people, but to separate con- 

 stituent bodies, and who may hear his accusation 

 with great disfavor. The Senate is absolutely with- 

 out any known standard of decision applicable to 

 such u case. Its judgment cannot be anticipated, 

 for it is not governed by hny rule. The law does 

 not define what shall be deemed good cause for re- 

 moval. It is impossible even to conjecture what 

 may or may not be so considered by the Senate. 

 The nature of the subject forbids clear proof. If 

 the charge be incapacity, what evidence will support 

 it ? Fidelity to the Constitution may be understood 

 or misunderstood in a thousand dili'erent ways, and 

 by violent party men, in violent party times, unfaith- 

 fulness to the Constitution may even come to be con- 

 sidered meritorious. If the officer be accused of 

 dishonesty, how shall it be made out ? Will it be 

 inferred from acts unconnected with public duty, 

 from private history, or from general reputation V 

 Or must the President await the commission of an 

 actual misdemeanor in office ? Shall be, in the mean 

 time, risk the character and interests of the nation in 

 the hands of men to whom he cannot give his con- 

 fidence? Must he forbear his complaint until the 

 mischief is done and cannot be prevented ? If his 

 zeal in the public service shoula impel him to anti- 

 cipate the overt act, must he move at the peril of 

 being tried himself for the offence of slandering his 

 subordinate ? In the present circumstances or the 

 country, some one must be held responsible for of- 

 ficial delinquency of every kind. It is extremely 

 difficult to say where that responsibility should be 

 thrown, if it be not left where it has been placed by 

 the Constitution. But all just men will admit that 

 the President ought to be entirely relieved from such 

 responsibility, if he cannot meet it by reason of re- 

 strictions placed by law upon his action. 



The unrestricted power of removal from office is a 

 very great one to be trusted even to a magistrate 

 chosen by the general suffrage of the whole people, 

 and accountable directly to them for his acts. It is 

 undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at some periods of 

 our history, perhaps, has been abused. If it bo 

 thought desirable and constitutional that it should 

 be so limited as to make the President merely a 

 common informer against other public agents, he 

 should at least be permitted to act in that capacity 



