PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



i, 



General of the Army of tho United States, an unlimit- 



>m oflice any civil or military 



, li nl' ihcM- ten Stall's, and the' furllitT 



the name approval, tn ! t i 



military officer or soldier uf tin- I 'nited 



perform tin- duties of tin- officer so re- 



.. and to till all vac. nicies occurring in tho>c 



: nation, i>r othi-rui-.e. The 



jiiircd to p-rforni the 



. civil office, according t-i tin- Uws of 



the Stales, anil as such rei[uirei! to take an oath, is 



lor I:. 1.1'.; a civil officer. What i.i his 



char.u I'T '! Is lie a civil officer of (lie Slate or a 



li h-' i- a civil 



of the Stale, wh'T" is t.he Federal 

 under our Constitution which aiith iri/cs his appoint- 

 ii-ral officer ? If, however, he ia to 

 1 a civil ollicer of the United Si 



his appointment anil oath would seem to indicate, 

 where is the authority for his appointment, vested l> 

 Msiitiition ? The power of appointment of a! 

 officers of the United States, civil or military, where 

 noi provided for in the Constitution, is vested in the 

 President, by and with the advice and consent of the 

 . with this exception: that Congress " may 

 bv law \.--t the appointment of such inferior officers 

 - think proper in the President alone, in the 

 conns of law, or in the heads of Departments." But 

 'ill, if these are to be considered inferior 

 officers within the meaning of the Constitution, does 

 not provide for the^r appointment by the President 

 alone, or by the courts of law, or by the heads of 

 Departments, but vests the appointment in one sub- 

 ordinate executive officer, subject to the approval of 

 another subordinate executive officer; so that, if we 

 put this question and fix the character of this mili- 

 tary appointee either way, this provision of the bill 

 is equally opposed to the Constitution. 



Take the case of a soldier or officer appointed to 

 perform the office of judge of one of these States, 

 and us such to administer the proper laws of the 

 Where is the authority to be found in the 

 Constitution for vesting in a military or an executive 

 officer strict judicial functions to be exercised under 

 law? It has been again and again decided by 

 the Supreme Court of the United States that acts of 

 Congress which have attempted to vest executive 

 powers in the judicial courts or judges of the United 

 States are not warranted by the Constitution. If 

 ess cannot clothe a judge with merely execu- 

 tive duties, how can they clothe an officer or soldier 

 of the Army with judicial duties over citizens of the 

 United States, who are not in the military or naval 

 service? So, too, it 1. ''peatedly decided 



that Congress cannot rei[iiire a State officer, execu- 

 tive or judicial, to perform any duty enjoined upon 

 him by a law of the Ur. . " How, then, can 



Congress confer power upon an executive officer of 

 the United States to perform such duties in a Stale ? 

 If Congress could not vest in a judge of one of these 

 States any judicial authority under the United States 

 by direct enactment, how can it accomplish the same 

 thing indirectly by removing the State judge and 

 putting an officer of the United Slates in his place? 



To me these considerations are conclusive of the 

 unconstitutionally of this part of the bill now before 

 me, and I earnestly commend their consideration to 

 the ((''liberate judgment of Congress. 



Within a p"i-iod li ->s than a year the legislation of 

 Congre-s has attempted to strip the Executive De- 

 partment of the Government of some of its essential 



powers. Tho Constitution and tho oatb provided in 



ivc upon tin- Pre-idciil. tin- p.,w.-r and duty to 



i tim laws are faithfully cxecu:.-il. 'i i, Con- 

 stitution, in order to carry nut l!m power, giro him 

 the choice of the agents, and makes tie 

 his control and supervision. Hut in tl. 

 of these laws the constitutional obligation iij> 

 President remains, but the p. ..,.! t . \c-rcwe that 

 constitutional duty is effectually taken away. 



The military commander is, as to the pn .-r of ap- 

 pointment, made to take the- place of th i 

 and thetieiicralof the Army the place of the S 

 and anv attempt on the part of i :it t < 



his own constitutional power may, under pro- 

 of law, be met by official insubordination. It 

 i- to In- fe.itvd that these military officers, look 

 the authority given by these laws rather th 

 the letter 01 the Constitution, will recognize no 

 authority but the commander of the district and the 



al of tho Army. 

 If there were no other objection than this to this 



Eroposed legislation, it would be sufficient. While I 

 old the chief executive authority of the United 

 States, while the obligation rests upon me to see 

 that all the laws are faithfully executed, I can never 

 willingly surrender that trust or the powers given 

 for its execution. I can never give my assent to be 

 made responsible for the faithful execution of laws, 

 and at the same time surrender that trust and the 

 powers which accompany it to any other executive 

 officer, high or low, or to any number of executive 

 officers. If this executive trust, vested by the Con- 

 stitution in the President, is to be taken from him 

 and vested in a subordinate officer, the responsibility 

 will be with Congress in clothing the subordinate 

 with unconstitutional power and with the officer 

 who assumes its exercise. 



This interference with the constitutional authority 

 of the Executive Department is an evil that will in- 

 evitably sap the foundations of our Federal system, 

 but it is not the worst evil of this legislation. It ia 

 a great public wrong to take from the President 

 powers conferred on him alone by the Constitution ; 

 but the wrong is more flagrant and more dangerous 

 when the powers so taken from the President are 

 conferred upon subordinate executive officers, and 

 especially upon military officers. Over nearly one- 

 third of the States of the Union military power, reg- 

 ulated by no fixed law, rules supreme. Each one 

 of the five district commanders, though not chosen 

 by the people or responsible to them, exercises at 

 this hour more executive power, military and civil, 

 than the people have ever been willing to confer 

 upon the head of the Executive Department, though 

 chosen by and responsible to themselves. The 

 remedy must come from the people themselves. 

 They know what it is and how it is to be applied. At 

 the present time they cannot, according to the forms 

 of the Constitution, repeal these laws; they catfnot 

 remove or control this military despotism. The 

 remedy is, nevertheless, in their hands ; it is to be 

 found in the ballot, and is a sure one, if not con- 

 trolled "by fraud, overawed by arbitrary power, or 

 from apathy on their part too lonjj delayed. With 

 abiding confidence in their patriotism, wisdom, and 

 integrity, I am still hopeful of the future, and that 

 in the end the rod of despotism will be broken, the 

 armed heel of power lifted from the necks of the peo- 

 ple, and the principles of a violated Constitution 



vod. ANDREW JOHNSON. 



WASHINGTON, D. C., July 19, 1867. 



