CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



157 



that unity of form, to preserve republican lib- 

 erty by preserving a republican form of gov- 

 ernment, not to guard against the abuses of 

 those who might be called upon to administer 

 a government of that form, but, leaving any 

 such abuses to be corrected by time and by 

 the subsequent reflection of the people, to pre- 

 serve them all as they then existed, republican 

 States in point of form. 



"What was the condition of each of the 

 States? In the most of them slavery existed, 

 and the Constitution contained a provision ^by 

 which the number of slaves might for a period 

 of twenty years be increased by immigration, 

 and placed that particular provision beyond 

 the power of amendment. And in all of the 

 States, as I believe, at that time, there existed 

 no universal right of suffrage. In most of 

 them the voter was required to have a property 

 qualification. In all of them he was required 

 to have a particular period of residence within 

 his own State, and to be of a certain age. Did 

 anybody suppose at that day, did any member 

 of the Convention for a moment imagine when 

 he signed his name to that Constitution, did it 

 enter into the imagination of the three great 

 men who recommended it to the adoption of 

 the American people in the celebrated letters 

 of Publius, that there lurked within it a pro- 

 vision which might be used by Congress for 

 the purpose of taking away from the States the 

 authority to regulate suffrage, to prescribe the 

 qualification of voters, or the qualification of 

 those who should be voted for ? 



" Did any member of the Convention, above 

 all, think at that time that the institution of 

 slavery and the provision for its increase might 

 be entirely defeated by measures which Con- 

 gress in the future might adopt under the au- 

 thority of this clause which the honorable 

 member -correctly characterizes, if his doctrine 

 is right, as including within itself a mass of 

 undefined power? So far from it, in one of 

 the letters of Publius, written by Mr. Madison, 

 No. 43, in which he discusses the meaning of 

 that clause, he recommends it to the adoption 

 of the people; and meets any possible objec- 

 tion, that might be made in the State conven- 

 tions thereafter to assemble for the purpose of 

 ratifying the Constitution, by stating that the 

 object of the clause was to preserve the States 

 as they then were. He was apprehensive 

 for those celebrated letters examined every 

 power contained in the Constitution that 

 those who were fearful of conferring upon the 

 General Government powers that might be 

 used to the injury of the States, powers that 

 might be used to destroy the reserved rights 

 of the States, might construe this particular 

 clause as authorizing such legislation ; and he, 

 therefore, in commenting upon the clause, said 

 what I send to the desk and ask to have read." 

 The Secretary read, as follows, from No. 43 

 of the Federalist : 



It may possibly be asked, what need there could be 

 of such a precaution, and whether it may not become 



a pretext for alterations in the State governments 

 without the concurrence of the States themselves. 

 These questions admit of ready answers. If the in- 

 terposition of the General Government should not be 

 needed, the provision for such an event will be a 

 harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But 

 who can say what experiments may be produced bjr 

 the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of 

 enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence 

 of foreign powers ? To the second question it may 

 be answered, that if the General Government should 

 interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it 

 will be, of course,, bound to pursue the authority. But 

 the authority extends no further than to a guarantee 

 of a republican form of government, which supposes 

 a preexisting government of the form which is to be 

 guaranteed. 



Mr. Johnson : " Now, Mr. President, it is evi- 

 dent that in the judgment of the men of that 

 day it was not thought that there was included 

 within this particular clause any power to in- 

 terfere with the government of a State ; in other 

 words, it was held that it conferred upon Con- 

 gress no power to create a government for a 

 State. Its purpose was to protect the States 

 and nothing else. Its object and its effect was 

 to defend the States, and not to confer upon 

 Congress the power to interfere with the gov- 

 ernment of a State. It supposes, in the lan- 

 guage of Madison, that there exists a govern- 

 ment in point of fact republican in form, and 

 that the government, in point of fact, which 

 the States are entitled to have is one of their 

 own creation; and until now, as far as my 

 knowledge -extends, it never was pretended 

 that Congress had any power under this clause 

 to make a constitution for any State. 



"But again, Mr. President, the honorable 

 member reads the clause as if the word 'loyal ' 

 was in it. Hence the admission, from the ne- 

 cessity under which he labors of reading the 

 clause with that word in, is, that without it it 

 would not serve the purpose of his argument. 

 Now, we have examined the clause ; it con- 

 tains no such w^ord. What is loyalty ? What 

 meaning does the honorable Senator attach to 

 the term in that connection ? Does he mean 

 to say that a republican form of government 

 does not exist because its people, few or many, 

 entertain opinions which, in his judgment, are 

 not loyal to the United States ? 



" Now, what is loyalty ? What do we under- 

 stand it to be at this time of day ? The war 

 is over ; not an arm is raised in any part of 

 our wide domain in resistance to the just au- 

 thority of the Government; peace, in the sense 

 of that term as contradistinguished from war, 

 prevails throughout the land. Is it disloyalty 

 to entertain abstract opinions upon the mean- 

 ing of the Constitution, to have believed in the 

 doctrine of secession in the past, or to believe 

 in it now ? Is it disloyalty to believe that the 

 measures which the Congress of the United 

 States have adopted or propose to adopt are 

 not such as should be adopted, looking to the 

 true interests of the country ? Is it disloyalty 

 to believe that, so far from their tending to the 

 interests of the country, they violate many of 

 the positive limitations to be found in the Con- 



