IMPEACHMENT. 



361 



such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the 

 Baid questions, or such of them as might be neces- 

 sary. 



And this respondent, further answering, says, that 

 hi further pursuance of his intention and design ; if 

 possible, to perform what he judged to be his im- 

 perative duty, to prevent the said Stanton from longer 

 holding the office of Secretary for the Department of 

 War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any 

 question respecting the extent of the power of re- 

 moval from executive office confided to the Presi- 

 dent, by the Constitution of the United States, and 

 any question respecting the construction and effect of 

 the first section of the said " act regulating the 

 tenure of certain civil offices," while he should not, 

 by any act of his, abandon and relinquish, either a 



Eower which he believed the Constitution had con- 

 jrred on the President of the United States, to 

 enable him to perform the duties of his office, or a 

 power designedly left to him by the first section of 

 the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent 

 did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to 

 the Senate of the United States a message, a gopy 

 whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein 

 he made known the orders aforesaid, and the reasons 

 which had induced the same, so far as this respond- 

 ent then considered it material and necessary that the 

 same should be set forth, and reiterated his views 

 concerning the constitutional power of removal vested 

 in the President, and also expressed his views con- 

 cerning the construction of the said first Section of 

 the last-mentioned act, as respected the power of the 

 President to remove the said Stanton from the said 

 office of Secretary for the Department of "War, well 

 hoping that this respondent could thus perform what 

 he then believed, and still believes, to be his im- 

 perative duty in reference to the said. Stanton, with- 

 out derogating from the powers which this respond- 

 ent believed were confided to the President, by the 

 Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of 

 raising, iudicially, any questions respecting the same. 



And this respondent, further answering, says, that 

 this hope not having been realized, the President was 

 compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume 

 the said office and remain therein contrary to the 

 settled convictions of the President, formed as afore- 

 said, respecting the powers confided to him, and the 

 duties required of him by the Constitution of the 

 United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as 

 aforesaid, that the first section of the last-mentioned 

 act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and 

 contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he 

 could no longer advise with or trust or be responsi- 

 ble for the said Stanton, in the said office of Secre- 

 tary for the Department of War,, or else he was com- 

 pelled to take such steps as might, in the judgment 

 of the President, be lawful and necessary to raise, 

 for a judicial decision, the questions affecting the 

 lawful right of the said Stanton to .resume the said 

 office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in 

 refusing to quit the said office, if he should persist in 

 actually refusing to quit the same ; and to this end, 

 and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st 

 day of February, 1868, issue the order for the re- 

 moval of the said Stanton, in the said first article 

 mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing 

 the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to act as Secretary of 

 War ad interim, in the said second article set forth. 



And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifi- 

 cally each substantial allegation in the said first ar- 

 ticle, says : He denies that the said Stanton, on the 

 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in posses- 

 sion of the said office of Secretary for the Depart- 

 ment of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on 

 the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold 

 the said office against the will of the President of 

 the United States. He denies that the said order for 

 the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully is- 

 sued. He denies that the said order was issued with 

 intent to violate the act entitled " An act to regulate 



the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that 

 the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned 

 act. He denies that the said order was a violation of 

 the Constitution of the United States, or of any law 

 thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the 

 said order was issued with an intent to violate the 

 Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, 

 or this respondent's oath of office ; and he respect- 

 fully, but earnestly, insists that not only was it is- 

 sued by him in the performance of what he believed 

 to be an imperative official duty, but in the perform- 

 ance of what this honorable court will consider was, 

 in point of fact, an imperative official duty. And he 

 denies that any and all substantive matters, in the 

 said first article contained, in manner and form as the 

 same are therein stated and set forth, do, by law, 

 constitute a high misdemeanor in office, within tho 

 true intent and meaning of the Constitution of tho 

 United States. 



ANSWER TO ARTICLE II. 



And for answer to the second a^iclc, this respond- 

 ent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to 

 said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in 

 said second article, bearing date at Washington, Dis- 

 trict of Columbia, February 21, 1868, addressed 

 to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant- 

 General United States Army, Washington, District 

 of Columbia, and he further admits that the same 

 was so issued without the advice and consent of the 

 Senate of the United States, then in session, but he 

 denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of 

 the United States, or any law thereof, or that he did 

 thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the Uni- 

 ted States, or the provisions of any act of Congress ; 

 and this respondent refers to his answer to said first 

 article, for a full statement of the purposes and in- 

 tentions with which said order was issued, and 

 adopts the same as part of his answer to this article ; 

 and he further denies that there was then and there 

 no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the De- 

 partment of War, or that he did then and there com- 

 mit, or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, 

 and this respondent maintains and will insist : 



1. That at the date and delivery of said writing 

 there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary 

 for the Department of War. 



2. That, notwithstanding the Senate of the Uni- 

 ted States was then in session, it was lawful and ac- 

 cording to long and well-established usage to empow- 

 er and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary 

 of War ad interim. 



3. That, if the said act regulating the tenure of 

 civil offices be held to be a valid law, no provision 

 of the same was violated by the issuing of said order, 

 or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secre- 

 tary of War ad interim. 



ANSWER TO ARTICLE III. 



And for answer to said third article, this respond- 

 ent says that he abides by his answer to said first 

 arid second articles, in so far as the same are respon- 

 sive to the allegations contained in the said third ar- 

 ticle, and, without here again repeating the same an- 

 swer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this 

 third article as fully as if here again set out at 

 length; and as to the new allegation contained in 

 said third article, that this .respondent did appoint 

 the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department 

 of War ad interim, this respondent denies that he 

 gave any other authority to said Thomas than such 

 as appears in said written authority, set out in said 

 article, by which he authorized and empowered said 

 Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of 

 War ad interim; and he denies that the same 

 amounts to an appointment, and insists that it is only 

 a designation of an officer of that Department to act 

 temporarily as Secretary for the Department of War 

 ad Interim, until an appointment should be made. 

 But, whether the said written authority amounts to 

 an appointment, or to a temporary authority or desig- 



