660 



PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



stroyed as if the Constitution itself had inhibited their 

 exercise. The danger of a defeat of the popular 

 choice in an election oy the House of Representatives 

 is no greater than in an election made nominally by 

 the people themselves, when, by the laws of party 

 organizations and by the constitutional provisions 

 requiring the people to vote for electors instead of for 

 the President or V ice-President, it is made impracti- 

 cable for any citizen to be a candidate except through 

 the process of a party nomination, and for any voter 

 to cast his suffrage for any other person than one 

 thus brought forward through the manipulations of a 

 nominating convention. It is thus apparent that, by 

 means of party organizations, that provision of the 

 Constitution which requires the election of President 

 and Vice-President to be made through the electoral 

 colleges has been made instrumental and potential in 

 defeating the great object of conferring the choice of 

 these officers upon the people. It may be conceded 

 that party organizations are inseparable from republi- 

 can government, and that, when formed and managed 

 in subordination to the Constitution, they may be 

 valuable safeguards of popular liberty ; but when 

 they are perverted to purposes of bad ambition they 

 are* liable to become the dangerous instruments of 

 overthrowing the Constitution itself. Strongly im- 

 pressed with the truth of these views, I feel called 

 upon by an imperative sense of duty to revive sub- 

 stantially the recommendation so often and so ear- 

 nestly made by President Jackson ; and to urge that 

 the amendment to the Constitution herewith pre- 

 sented, or some similar proposition^ may be sub- 

 mitted to the people for their ratification or rejection. 



Recent events have shown the necessity of an 

 amendment to the Constitution distinctly defining 

 the persons who shall discharge the duties of Presi- 

 dent of the United States in the event of a vacancy in 

 that office by the death, resignation, or removal of 

 both the President and Vice-President. It is clear 

 that this should be fixed by the Constitution, and not 

 be left to repealable enactments of doubtful constitu- 

 tionality. It occurs to me that in the event of a va- 

 cancy in the office of President, by the death, resig- 

 nation, disability, or removal of both the President 

 and Vice-President, the duties of the office should 

 devolve upon an officer of the executive department 

 of the Government, rather than one connected with 

 the legislative or judicial departments. The objec- 

 tions to designating either the President pro tempore 

 of the Senate, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme 

 Court, especially in the event of a vacancy produced 

 by removal, are so obvious and so unanswerable that 

 they need not be stated in detail. It is enough to 

 state that they are both interested in producing a 

 vacancy, and, according to the provisions of the Con- 

 stitution, are members of the tribunal by whose de- 

 cree a vacancy may be produced. 



Under such circumstances the impropriety of desig- 

 nating either of these officers to succeed the President 

 so removed, is palpable. The framers of the Con- 

 stitution, when they referred to Congress the settle- 

 ment of the succession to the office of President, in 

 the event of a vacancy in the offices of both President 

 and Vice-President, did not, in my opinion, contem- 

 plate the designation of any other than an officer ^of 

 the executive department, on whom, in such a contin- 

 gency, the powers and duties of the President should 

 devolve. Until recently the contingency has been 

 remote, and serious attention has not been called to 

 the manifest incongruity between the provision of 

 the Constitution on this subject and the act of Con- 

 gress of 1792. Having, however, been brought al- 

 most face to face with this important question, it 

 seems an eminently proper time for us to make the 

 legislation conform to the language, intent, and theory 

 of the Constitution, and thus place the executive de- 

 partment beyond the reach of usurpation, and re- 

 move from the legislative and judicial departments 

 every temptation to combine for the absorption of all 

 the powers of Government. 



It has occurred to me that, in the event of such a va- 

 cancy, the duties of President would devolve most ap- 

 propriately upon some one of the heads of the several 

 Executive Departments ; and, under this conviction, I 

 present for your consideration an amendment to the 

 Constitution on this subject, with the recommenda- 

 tion that it be submitted to the people for their 

 action. 



Experience seems to have established the necessity 

 of an amendment of that clause of the Constitution 

 which provides for the election of Senators to Con- 

 gress by the Legislatures of the several States. It 

 would be more consistent with the genius of our form 

 of government if the Senators were chosen di- 

 rectly by the people of the several States. The 

 objections to the election of Senators by the Legisla- 

 tures are so palpable that I deem it unnecessary to do 

 more than submit the proposition for such an amend- 

 ment, with a recommendation that it be offered to 

 the people for their judgment. 



It is strongly impressed upon my mind that the 

 tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States, 

 during good behavior, for life, is incompatible with 

 the spirit of republican government, and in this opin- 

 ion I am fully sustained by the evidence of popular 

 judgment upon this subject in the different States of 

 the Union. I therefore deem it my duty to recom- 

 mend an amendment to the Constitution, by which 

 the terms of the judicial officers would be limited to 

 a period of years, and I herewith present it in the 

 hope that Congress will submit it to the people for 

 their decision. 



The foregoing views have long been entertained by 

 me. In 1845, in the House of Representatives, and 

 afterward, in 1860, in the Senate of the United States, 

 I submitted substantially the same propositions as 

 those to which the attention of Congress is herein 

 invited. 



Time, observation, and experience have confirmed 

 these convictions ; and, as a matter of public duty, 

 and with a deep sense of my constitutional obligation, 

 "to recommend to the consideration of Congress 

 such measures as I deem necessary and expedient," 

 I submit the accompanying propositions, and urge 

 their adoption and submission to the judgment of the 

 people. ANDREW JOHNSON. 



WASHINGTON, D. C., July 18, 1868. 



Joint Resolution proposing Amendments to the Consti- 

 tution of the United States. 



Whereas the fifth article of the Constitution of the 

 United States provides for amendments thereto, in 

 the manner following, namely : 



1. Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses 

 shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to 

 the Constitution, or, on the application of the Legis- 

 latures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a 

 convention for proposing amendments, which, in 

 either case, shall oe valid to all intents and purposes, 

 as part ot this Constitution, when ratified by the 

 Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or 

 by convention in three-fourths thereof, as the one or 

 the other mode of ratification may be proposed by 

 Congress : Provided, That no amendment which may 

 be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner 

 affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section 

 of the first article ; and that no State, without its 

 consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the 

 Senate : Therefore, 



Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Represent- 

 atives of the United States of America in Congress as- 

 sembled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring). That 

 the following amendments to the Constitution of the 

 United States be proposed to the Ligislatures of the 

 several States, which, when ratified by the Legisla- 

 tures of three-fourths of the States, shall be valid to 

 all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution. 



That hereafter the President and Vice-President of 

 the United States shall be chosen for the term of six 

 years, by the people of the respective States, in the 



