NORTH CAROLINA. 



491 



in Europe in point of arms and organization. 

 In the Senate he ably and consistently sus- 

 tained the policy of the Emperor, and, al- 

 though openly opposed to Prussian ascendency 

 in European politics, he yielded to the Emper- 

 or's decision against war. One of his latest 

 measures as Minister of War was the intima- 

 tion of his desire that no non-commissioned 

 officer should be promoted to the rank of offi- 

 cer after the age of twenty-eight. This regu- 

 lation was intended to secure greater efficiency 

 in the army, as it was based on the opinion 

 that the cases must be rare in which a man 

 having served in the ranks for eight or nine 

 years without having been marked as fit for a 

 commission would make an efficient officer. 



NORTH CAROLINA. The State govern- 

 ment of North Carolina having been reorgan- 

 ized and restored to the civil authorities under 

 the constitution adopted in the summer of 

 1868, there has been comparative quiet in 

 public affairs during the past year. The 

 Legislature in session at the beginning of the 

 year continued its sittings until late in the 

 spring, but the measures adopted were not of 

 general importance. The fifteenth amend- 

 ment to the Constitution of the United States 

 was ratified on the 4th of March, by a vote 

 of 40 to 8 in the Senate, and 87 to 20 

 in the House. An attempt was made to 

 secure the passage of a bill requesting Con- 

 gress to remove the political disabilities from all 

 the citizens of the State ; but, as the majority 

 of the Legislature were of opinion that the 

 time had not arrived when that policy could 

 be adopted with safety to the interests of the 

 State, the measure was defeated. 



The question involving the constitutionality 

 of the homestead law, which exempts "from 

 sale under execution for any debt," real and 

 personal property, to the value of $1,500, 

 came before the Supreme Court during the 

 year, and a decision was rendered in favor of 

 the validity of that law. The question at issue 

 was, whether this provision in the State con- 

 stitution was not in violation of that clause in 

 the Constitution of the United States, that 

 "no State shall pass any law impairing the 

 obligation of contract." The majority of the 

 court held that the parties to contracts made 

 before the passage of the homestead law were 

 not entitled by law to "any particular or 

 specific remedy, but only a substantial and 

 convenient one ;" and that this remedy was not 

 changed by the homestead exemption. A dis- 

 senting opinion was delivered by Chief-Justice 

 Pearson, who defined the obligation of a con- 

 tract to be, " the means of compelling perform- 

 ance according to the laws in force, at the 

 time the contract is made ; by these laws the 

 parties agree to abide, by these laws their rights 

 are fixed. This is the obligation which must 

 not be impaired by a State, whether acting in 

 convention or in General Assembly." The 

 Chief Justice was of opinion that a destruction 

 or change of the remedy impaired the obliga- 



tion of the contract, and that, as the remedy in 

 preexisting contracts was changed by the oper- 

 ation of the homestead law, he believed it to 

 be unconstitutional. By another important 

 decision rendered by the Supreme Court, the 

 intermarriage of white and colored citizens 

 was held to be unlawful. Intermarriage be- 

 tween the two races in North Carolina had 

 been prohibited by law prior to the recent adop- 

 tion of the State constitution, and in that 

 instrument it was provided that " the laws of 

 North Carolina, not repugnant to this consti- 

 tution, or to the Constitution and laws of the 

 United States, shall be in force until lawfully 

 altered." It was, however, claimed that the 

 law on this subject had been changed by the 

 operation of the Civil Rights Bill of Congress, 

 and that such marriages were valid. In pro- 

 nouncing against this theory, the court said : 

 " It is not necessary that we should decide 

 whether the operation of that bill ended with 

 the cessation of our provisional relations with 

 the United States, or whether it is operative 

 now, for by its terms it has no application to 

 the social relations. Its object was, and its 

 terms are, to declare equality between all 

 citizens without regard to race or color, in the 

 matters of making business contracts, suing in 

 the courts, giving evidence, acquiring property 

 and protection of persons and property. And 

 this is nothing more than our own State con- 

 stitution has done. But neither the Civil 

 Rights Bill nor our State constitution was 

 intended to enforce social equality, but only 

 civil and political rights." 



During the year a controversy arose between 

 a portion of the members of the bar and the 

 justices of the Supreme Court, which attracted 

 much attention throughout the State. This dif- 

 ference was occasioned by the publication of a 

 protest, signed by a hundred and ten lawyers, 

 (about one-fifth of the whole number in the 

 State) in which the judges of the Supreme 

 Court were denounced for an alleged " active 

 and open participation in the strife of political 

 contests." The occasion referred to was the 

 canvass for the presidential election of the pre- 

 ceding year ; but for some unexplained reason 

 the publication of the protest was not made 

 until the month of April, 1869. The indigna- 

 tion of the remonstrants was expressed in un- 

 mistakable language. "Many of us," they 

 said, " have passed through political times 

 almost as excited as those of to-day ; and most 

 of us, recently, through one more excited ; but 

 never before have we seen the judges of the 

 Supreme Court, singly or en masse, moved 

 from that becoming propriety so indispensable 

 to secure the respect of the people, and, throw- 

 ing aside the ermine, rush into the mad con- 

 test of politics under the excitement of drums 

 and flags. From the unerring lessons of the 

 past, we are assured that a judge who openly 

 and publicly displays his political party zeal, 

 renders himself unfit to hold the ' balance of 

 justice,' and that, whenever an occasion may 



