BISMARCK, PRINCE VON. 



nexation of the smaller German states. The 

 press, he declared, was working to defeat its 

 own best efforts when it attacked him; he had 

 never counselled any thing but reliance upon 

 the uprising of the national power. In 1861 

 he had a conversation with the King at Baden- 

 Baden, in which he unfolded his plans for the 

 aggrandizement of Prussia. A more close 

 consolidation of the German forces for de- 

 fence, a modification of the customs depart- 

 ments, and, perhaps, a Customs Union Parlia- 

 ment, with a "right conservative" national 

 representation, were the catch-words of his 

 programme. The King entered into these new 

 ideas slowly and reluctantly ; but the interview 

 made such an impression on him that Bis- 

 marck was invited to give him a memoran- 

 dum of the substance of it. He thus obtained 

 a basis on which he could develop his plans 

 more fully. The immediate occasion of his 

 recall from St. Petersburg (1862) was, the 

 struggle with the Chambers on the reorgani- 

 zation of the army. The King offered him a 

 place in the cabinet, but he preferred to be 

 sent as ambassador to Paris, perhaps with the 

 design of looking at the condition of affairs at 

 the French court before he took his great de- 

 signs in hand. He already stood in reality at 

 the head of the Government, and it depended 

 upon himself when he should assume the presi- 

 dency of the cabinet. "When Von der Heidt 

 and Von Roon withdrew from the ministry on 

 September 18, 1862, because the Chamber had 

 rejected the budget prepared in view of the pro- 

 ject of reorganization, Bismarck was commis- 

 sioned to form a new cabinet with Von Roon. 

 He took the department of Foreign Affairs, and 

 was, at the same time, made minister president. 

 The contest between the Government and the 

 deputies over the army bill was not allayed by 

 this change of ministry, but was made rather 

 more bitter. After the first attempt to come 

 to terms with the democracy had failed, Bis- 

 marck made no other efforts to win the Cham- 

 bers to his views. He determined to attain 

 his end summarily, by removing at once all 

 impediments, without stopping to consider the 

 constitutionality of his means. When the 

 House of Nobles, in violation of its constitu- 

 tional rights, altered the budget of the Second 

 Chamber by accepting the plan of the minis- 

 try, Bismarck excused it by the consideration 

 that the Government would have to be admin- 

 istered according to its own views if no bud- 

 get had been agreed upon ; there was a defect 

 in the Constitution, if this was not expressly 

 provided for. "When the Chamber would not 

 agree to this theory, he declared that the fac- 

 tor which had the power must decide contest- 

 ed questions. Such extreme assumptions made 

 the breach between the ministry and the As- 

 sembly seem irreparable ; Bismarck was blamed, 

 because in him was seen the leading spirit of 

 the Government, and it was believed that he 

 was violating the Constitution out of pure ca- 

 price. A contest between the president, Gra- 



bow, and Von Roon, led to an address to the 

 King, in which the House declared that an un- 

 derstanding with the ministry had become im- 

 possible, and that he ought no longer to delay 

 a change of persons as well as of the system. 

 The consequence was, the closing of the Diet 

 on May 27, 1863. Bismarck began now a sys- 

 tem of open repression againt the liberal press 

 and liberal officers. The people were thus 

 driven into new opposition to the ministry. 

 At the ensuing election the party of progress 

 obtained 260 seats, while the ministry obtained 

 only 37. The Chambers assembled on the 9th 

 of November ; on the 19th the House of Depu- 

 ties declared the obnoxious ordinances against 

 the press of the 3d of June unconstitutional. 

 The Government yielded quietly, for, in the 

 mean time, the aspect of foreign affairs had 

 become such that peace with the representa- 

 tives, or at least a postponement of the con- 

 test, seemed advisable. 



The proposition of Austria, in 1862, for a 

 popular representation of the Confederacy by a 

 Chamber of Deputies, led to a sharp corre- 

 spondence, in which Bismarck intimated that 

 the persistence of Austria in such intrigues 

 against Prussia would lead to a dissolution of the 

 Confederacy and the loss of Austrian prestige. 

 Prussia gave Russia an effective support during 

 the Polish insurrection. The Government, by 

 its strong stand against the revolutionists, only 

 paved the way to new difficulties with the Cham- 

 bers. The idea of the existence of a military 

 convention was ridiculed, but it was generally 

 believed that the only reason one had not been 

 made was that such a step would be regarded 

 with hostility in London and Paris. Perhaps 

 Bismarck wished to keep his hands free in 

 order to interfere at the right time in German 

 affairs, because, as he declared in the circular 

 to the German courts of January 24, 1863, the 

 "relations between Austria and Prussia must in 

 his opinion change either for the better or the 

 worse." The German princes met at Frank- 

 fort on August 17, 1863, to realize the unsuc- 

 cessful project for delegate representation in 

 some other shape. By Bismarck's advice, the 

 King did not attend the meeting. Its pro- 

 gramme excited no interest. The Congress ac- 

 cepted the Austrian plan, and left it for Prus- 

 sia to decide whether it would see itself ex- 

 cluded from the new organization. Prussia 

 refused to enter it on the 15th of September, 

 and again brought forward its formerly-pro- 

 posed conditions: a complete parity between 

 Prussia and Austria, the veto-power to be 

 given both the great states on questions of 

 war, and a representation of the nation on the 

 basis of universal suffrage. These proceedings 

 excited little remark among the people, yet 

 they might have led to an open breach, had 

 not the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark, 

 on November 15, 1863, opened the way for a 

 more convenient method of gaining the de- 

 sired end. 



The Diet of the Confederation had commis- 



