BISMARCK, PRINCE VON. 



sioned Saxony and Hanover with the occupa- 

 tion of the Elbe duchies. Bismarck, under a 

 plausible pretext, dispatched a Prussian army 

 corps into Schleswig. Observing the Prussian 

 movement, Austria likewise concluded to enter 

 Schleswig. Thus Bismarck won the game: 

 Austria had joined with him in the first fatal, 

 arbitrary step, and would have to continue 

 following him for good or evil, to the loss of 

 her prestige with the middle-sized and small 

 states, as the champion of the legitimacy and 

 the constitutional power of the Confederacy. 

 When Austria perceived this, she began to 

 lean to the side of the Duke of Augustenburg. 

 But it was too late. If she would not surren- 

 der the fruit of the war to Prussia, she must 

 agree to Bismarck's proposition to leave the 

 duchies to the unconditional disposition of the 

 associated great powers, thus pushing the Con- 

 federation aside. Irritation now began, and 

 soon increased to such a degree that Bismarck, 

 on July 15, 1865, declared war with Austria 

 unavoidable; on the 22d he sent his ultima- 

 tum. The Treaty of Gastein (August 14, 1865), 

 which provided that Holstein should be ruled 

 by an Austrian and Schleswig by a Prussian 

 governor, delayed the breaking out of the war 

 for a short time. But Bismarck adhered to 

 his scheme of a complete incorporation of the 

 duchies with Prussia, only adapting his meth- 

 ods of procedure to the changes of circum- 

 stances. The alliance with Italy, for which he 

 had labored since 1863, was pushed more ener- 

 getically; at the same time it was declared 

 loudly that Austria had hostile designs against 

 Prussia. When Prussia began to arm, Austria 

 comprehended that the breach could not be 

 avoided, because it was desired. On June 1, 

 1866, she formally acknowledged the juris- 

 diction of the Confederation over Schleswig- 

 Holstein. The Diet, as a demonstration against 

 the menaces of Prussia, ordered the mobiliza- 

 tion of three army corps. Now Bismarck had 

 obtained his object. On June 14th Prussia 

 declared the compact of the Confederation 

 broken by this action of the Diet. The people 

 were much embittered against the minister. 

 Regrets were even uttered over the failure of 

 an attempt to assassinate him. The war was 

 denounced as a fratricidal war, and several 

 deputies declared that they would not give 

 'Hhis minister" a groschen to carry it on. 

 Nevertheless, the programme which Bismarck 

 had unfolded to Von der Pfordten, on July 23, 

 1865, was fulfilled to the letter: U 0ne con- 

 flict, a decisive battle, and Prussia will be in a 

 position to prescribe the conditions." The 

 prevalence of the cholera in the army and the 

 possibility of a conflict with France restrained 

 him from pushing the advantage of victory to 

 an extreme point. But Austria was forced in 

 the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866) to 

 withdraw from the German Confederation, to 

 surrender Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia, 

 and to consent to the formation of a North- 

 German Confederation, extending to the Main. 



Bismarck's position relative to the opposi- 

 tion at home was greatly changed by these 

 events. His negotiations, previous to the break- 

 ing out of the war, with Von Roggenbach and 

 Von Benningsen, had been without result. 

 Now the people received him with loud re- 

 joicings, and the majority of the Liberal depu- 

 ties were willing to accept accomplished 

 events, while he began openly to separate 

 from the extreme "Junker party." He shrunk 

 from further conflict with the Chambers, yet 

 would not rashly complete the breach with 

 the ultra- feudalists. He gave up his unpopular 

 plan to assign the county of Calenberg, with 

 the city of Hanover, to the King of Hanover, 

 and applied, at the meeting of the Chambers, 

 for an indemnity, which was granted, in the 

 face of a weak opposition. The Chambers did 

 not stop with this. They voted him a rich 

 dotation, and the King made him a count. 

 His project for the Constitution of a North- 

 German Confederation found, however, only a 

 partial support. In the constituent Reichs- 

 rath, which was opened on February 26, 1867, 

 the National Liberals obtained the right of 

 originating the budget ; but they waived the 

 demand relative to the Diet of deputies, when 

 Bismarck, as chancellor, declared decidedly 

 that the Council could not on this question bo 

 moved from the position it occupied. The 

 Luxemburg question again modified his rela- 

 tion to the Nationalist party. In this he fal- 

 tered a moment, but the voice of South Ger- 

 many as well as of North Germany assured 

 him that he might be firm in resistance to 

 Napoleon's annexation plans. On May 8, 1867, 

 he declared to the French envoy, Benedetti, 

 that 900,000 men would bo called into the 

 field immediately, if France did not disarm. 

 This bold speech averted the danger of war. 

 With the decisive attitude thus shown in for- 

 eign affairs, the progress in internal consolida- 

 tion, however, did not fully correspond. The 

 Customs Parliament, it is true, was convoked 

 in spite of the opposition of the Catholic party 

 of Bavaria against Prussia, but Bismarck un- 

 reservedly opposed the extension of its func- 

 tions, which was sought by the Liberals, as 

 well as its union with the Reichstag, giving 

 as the ground of his position : " We are too 

 liberal for the South Germans ; they will not 

 go with us, and we must wait till they come 

 to us." But when Mathy, Minister President 

 of Baden, in November 1867, pressed upon 

 him the necessity of Baden's entering the 

 Northern Confederation, he replied to him, in 

 a business way, that they would have to be 

 satisfied with the Customs Parliament. He 

 also opposed the demand of the National Lib- 

 erals that separate officers be appointed to con- 

 trol the finances of the Confederation, and for 

 the organization of a peculiar ministry, which 

 would have served as a counterpoise to the 

 reactionary Council. He, however, approved 

 the organization of separate departments of 

 Trade and Justice, although he did not seek to 



