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FLORIDA. 



of this State in tlieir civil rights, I shall use all the 

 power in me vested by the constitution and laws to 

 enforce obedience to the lawfully constituted author- 

 ities of this State, hereby publicly warning the peo- 

 ple and all officers of this State not to obey, or in any 

 manner respect, the pretended authority of the said 

 Harrison Keed. 



In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my 

 hand, and, in lieu of affixing the seal of the State, 

 hereby proclaim that the same has been secreted or 

 stolen. 



Done at the Capitol,- in Tallahassee, Florida, this 

 fifteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one 

 thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, and of the 

 Independence of the United States of America the 

 ninety-sixth. 



SAMUEL T. DAY, Acting Governor. 



On the 10th Mr. Reed had written to the 

 acting Governor declaring that, "with a view 

 of terminating this question, and settling the 

 public mind," he was willing "to make a case 

 and present the whole matter to the justices of 

 the Supreme Court, to the end that there may 

 be a determination at once of our respective 

 rights, and the rights of the good people of the 

 State." Receiving no answer to this propo- 

 sition, he filed his own application to the 

 court for a decision of the matter in dispute. 

 In this he recited the facts in relation to the 

 impeachment, the action of Lieutenant- Gov- 

 ernor Day, the grounds of his own claim, and 

 the refusal of Day to submit the matter to the 

 court for adjudication, and then put the fol- 

 lowing question : " Did the action of the said 

 High Court of Impeachment remove the disa- 

 bilities growing out of suspension from power 

 to perform the said duties, and restore and 

 reinstate me in the powers and duties properly 

 pertaining to said office, particularly in view 

 of said proclamation and assumption thereof ? " 



The judges ordered a copy of this communi- 

 cation to be transmitted to Lieutenant-Gov- 

 ernor Day, and assigned April 23d for the 

 hearing of the parties interested. The ques- 

 tion was argued at length by fwo counsel on 

 each side, and on the 29th of April the court 

 rendered its decision. A majority of the 

 court, consisting of Justices Hart and Westcott, 

 held that the Supreme Court had no jurisdic- 

 tion in the case. In the opinion delivered by 

 Justice Westcott, it was declared that the sus- 

 pension of an impeached officer could cease 

 only on acquittal by the Senate, and that ac- 

 quittal could be effected only by some " affirma- 

 tive final action by a legal Senate, other than 

 a conviction, by which it dismisses or discon 

 tinues the prosecution." The action of the 

 Senate in the matter was then referred to, 

 from which it appeared that no such " affirma- 

 tive final action was taken." It was, there- 

 fore, held that the case was still pending, and 

 that the Senate alone had the power to dis- 

 pose of it. The position is taken and sustained 

 by considerable argument that the Senate, 

 in its capacity of a Court of Impeachment, is a 

 court of exclusive, original, and final jurisdic- 

 tion, its decisions not being subject to review 

 in any other tribunal. It had been urged by 

 counsel that, by the adjournment of the Legisla- 



ture, the Court of Impeachment had gone out 

 of existence, and all proceedings before it fallen 

 to the ground. The judges held that the court 

 could not cease to exist, so long as there was 

 a Senate, and that any unfinished proceedings 

 remained pending during an appointment of 

 the legislative body. In conclusion they say : 

 In what we have said, we do not affirm the entire 

 want of jurisdiction or power in this court in proper 

 cases to investigate and inquire into any act of the 

 Senate afi'ecting the rights of parties before it, in a 

 case where what they have done comes before us col- 

 laterally. That power cannot be thrown off. But, 

 when the constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction 



for these necessarily must belong to the court vested 

 with the principal power or jurisdiction, and there is 

 no appellate power in this court to reverse it. "When, 

 therefore, in exercising the power and jurisdiction 

 vested in this court, we proceed to inquire into mat- 

 ters brought properly to our attention, the law does 

 not authorize us to substitute our judgment for that 

 of the Senate, upon questions before that tribunal, 

 and hence, if it appears that no order finally dispos- 

 ing of the case has been made by it, we are at once 

 arrested by the rule of constitutional law, which 

 affirms that the Senate itself is the only tribunal to 

 declare that the party has or has not been dis- 

 charged. 



With these views, we can only say that, until Gov- 

 ernor Eeed is acquitted by the Senate, we cannot ac- 

 quit him, and that, during his suspension, his power, 

 as Governor, to demand our opinion upon any ques- 

 tion of law, ceases. Under these circumstances, we 

 decline to say whether the law applicable to the pro- 

 ceedings of the Senate, at its last session, entitles him 

 to a discharge. We think, after mature reflection, 

 that it would be improper in this court to go beyond 

 saying that the Court of Impeachment is still in exist- 

 ence, and must determine the matter. We should 

 not suggest to that court how it should determine a 

 question to come before it in a case now pending. 

 With the circumstances reversed, we should not be 

 very much obliged to that or any other tribunal, 

 should it suggest to us how we should determine a 

 case pending before this court ; and, should it, un- 

 asked by us, give its views of the law of a case pend- 

 ing before this court, we should deem it a grave mis- 

 take, as well as an improper interference. Being sus- 

 pended, Governor Reed's relation to us in this mat- 

 ter is no more than that of a citizen, and it would 

 certainly be improper in us to give a voluntary opin- 

 ion to a citizen upon a question of law, whether it 

 was involved in a case pending in a court, or not, and 

 whether we had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, 

 or not. 



Chief-Justice Randall dissented from the 

 opinion of the majority. He held that the Su- 

 preme Court had a right to determine the legal 

 effect of the action of the Senate. His defini- 

 tion of acquittal was " a discharge by virtue of 

 any action of the Senate whereby it refuses ex- 

 pressly or otherwise further to entertain the 

 case, or act upon it, or which places the cause 

 beyond its reach, and by which it has no lon- 

 ger any power or authority to render a judg- 

 ment upon the guilt or innocence of the officer. 

 The constitution," he said, "contemplates a 

 trial, and, the power to try once gone, all the 

 consequences of the accusation cease. A refu- 

 sal to try is a refusal to convict." In conclu- 

 sion, he said : " I must, upon my convictions 

 of duty, say that, in my opinion, Governor 



