RUSSIA. 



721 



the shadow of Russian suzerainty, and was 

 living quite contentedly, without care for the 

 future of his throne. Liquors, which were 

 scarce and hard to get in the old days of Bok- 

 haran rule, were now within easy reach. 

 The Khan could amuse himself at will with 

 photography and Swiss clocks, in freedom 

 from all care concerning the rebellious Kipt 

 Schacks and Kirgheez, or the safety of his life 

 and throne. He had the Russians to thank 

 for the easy life he was leading, and might 

 well he cautious how he forfeited their favor 

 by any disorderly conduct. Affairs wore a very 

 different aspect with his eastern neighbor, the 

 warlike and ambitious Yakoob Kushbegi. The 

 advance of the Russian outposts on the Navin 

 appeared more and more menacing to him. 

 He sought to find some opportunity to get rid 

 of them. The latest Russian occupation be- 

 yond the Thian Shan, however, and the acqui- 

 sition of the Eelee district, had. deprived him 

 of all prospect of effecting this end. The 

 faintness of the friendship shown him by the 

 Anglo-Indian Government was also very de- 

 pressing to him. The East Indian Government 

 had, indeed, while Lord Mayo was Viceroy, 

 sent an able and skilled diplomatic agent to 

 Yarkand, but had. so restricted him in time 

 and means that he was able actually to accom- 

 plish nothing ; and Yakoob Kushbegi found his 

 situation no better than it had been before. 

 Thus Russia had no reason to anticipate effec- 

 tive hostility from that quarter. 



Against a Russian advance under these fa- 

 vorable circumstances, Khiva could oppose 

 her own military force of about 30,000 horse- 

 men a force composed, for the most part, of 

 Ozbecks, the dominant and most settled class 

 of people in the land. Although their arms 

 are of a very primitive character, they are 

 brave and, in a certain sense, effective troops. 

 A ruler of ability might have enlisted in his 

 behalf the nomadic tribes on the borders of 

 the khanate, chiefly the Jomuts on the west- 

 ern border, and the Ischaudors of the mid- 

 land between the Aral and the Caspian Seas, 

 with their several family stems, who could 

 have furnished him with additional corps of 

 about 10,000 men each, and thus have given 

 him an entire force of 50,000 men. The Khan 

 does not appear, however, to have effected 

 any alliance with these tribes. More serious 

 obstacles than any military force which Khiva 

 could present against an invading army, are 

 offered by the character of the country which 

 such an army would have to traverse to reach 

 the territory of the khanate. Khiva is sur- 

 rounded on almost every side by steppes of a 

 dangerous and almost impassable character. 

 By whatever road an army could march upon 

 it from the west, the north, or northeast, it 

 would have to pass large stretches of desert, 

 in which neither grass nor water fit to drink 

 can be found, or would be embarrassed by 

 extensive and deep swamps. The intense cold 

 and heavy snows which prevail on the steppes 



VOL. XII. i6 A 



during the winter are matched by the heat 

 and drought of summer. On the southwest 

 the khanate is protected by the Hyrcanian 

 steppe. 



The reason alleged by Russia for commen- 

 cing hostilities against Khiva was, that the 

 Khivans held as slaves about forty Russian 

 subjects, whom the khan had refused to give 

 up after the Russian Government made a de- 

 mand upon him to set them free. The cap- 

 tives so held consisted for the most part of 

 fishermen and 'merchants whom the nomadic 

 Tartars had captured in their inroads into the 

 Russian territory, and had sold to the Khi- 

 vans. Ulterior motives also, probably, had 

 their influence upon the course of the Russian 

 Government. Among them, the desire to se- 

 cure commercial advantages and to complete 

 the conquest of that part of Central Asia, was, 

 doubtless, not insignificant. 



When the Khan of Khiva learned that the 

 Russians were preparing to attack him, he 

 lost no time in sending ambassadors to sue for 

 peace. One embassy reached Fort Alexander 

 on the 27th of February (old style, March 

 10th, new style), bringing with it one of the 

 Russian prisoners. The embassy was addressed 

 to the Government of the Caucasus, and was 

 composed of six princes, with Mahmet Amin, 

 the first ecclesiastic of the khanate, as chief. 

 The Khivans presented a written paper to 

 Colonel Lomakin, setting forth that the Khan 

 was prepared to treat with Russia on the fol- 

 lowing bases: 1. Establishment of peaceful 

 relations; 2. Restoration of all the Russian 

 prisoners ; 3. Complete liberty of trading for 

 the caravans; 4. Full and entire submission 

 to the grand-duke, lieutenant of the empire in 

 the Caucasus. 



The ambassadors declared that they were 

 not acquainted with the purport of a sealed 

 letter which they brought with them for the 

 Lieutenant of the Caucasus ; but they stated 

 the character of the instructions they had re- 

 ceived, and these accorded with the contents 

 of the written paper. They had been told to 

 promise restoration of the captives, and the 

 other concessions, on condition of peace being 

 guaranteed. It was afterward found that there 

 were some important discrepancies between 

 the paper presented to Colonel Lomakin and 

 the letter reserved for the grand-duke. 



Before the arrival at Fort Alexander of the 

 embassy to the Lieutenant of the Caucasus, 

 the approach of another embassy from Khiva, 

 addressed to the Emperor himself, had been 

 announced at Orenburg. The chief of this 

 embassy was Atalik Imazar, the lieutenant 

 of the Khan among the Karakalpaks, a tribe 

 subject to Khiva ; and .the ambassadors brought 

 with them numerous presents, including two 

 magnificent horses, but no Russian prisoners. 

 Believing that the object in sending these em- 

 bassies was merely to gain time, the Russians 

 resolved to stop then- further progress, and to 

 tell the ambassadors at once on what condi- 



