304 



ILLINOIS. 



well to notice another phase of the opposition 



which tended to make the feeling between the 

 contending parties still more hittir. This was 

 known us the "Three-cent War," which raged 

 so violently lor a while as to withdraw an. n- 

 tinii from the more important questions ot' the 

 contliet. Tlie Railroad Commissioners of Illi- 

 nois having tixcd l'i>r tlie various lines a schcd- 

 ule of passenger-rates beyond which the com- 

 panies \vere t'urhiilden to charge, tlie Illinois 

 Central, on which the maximum rate had IT. a 

 fixed at three cents a mile for each passenger, 

 di-regardcd this limit, and demanded fare* in 

 excess of the legal rates. In some cases nearly 

 four cents a mile were charged, anil conduct- 

 ors were in.-trueted by their employers, who 

 : upon the presumption that the law was 

 unconstitutional, and therefore inoperative, to 

 eject from the train any passenger refusing to 

 pay this amount. To meet this state of affairs, 

 the farmers formed " Three - cent Clubs," re- 

 solved not to pay more than three cents a 

 mile, and to travel in such numbers as to 

 secure the enforcement of their legal n. 

 In such cases, the employes of the railroad, 

 out of respect to the number of those re- 

 fusing to pay more than three cents a mile, 

 accepted that amount ; but, in cases where 

 the i - refusing to pay tin- tare de- 



manded were not in force, they were summa- 

 rily ejected from the train. In some cases 

 trains were stopped because certain passen- 

 gers refused to pay the fare demanded. Pas- 

 r- were put otfthc train by force, and the 

 conductor* were subsequently arrested and 

 fined for a-sault and buttery. The Alton road 

 was sued for dama: 



and in turn brought suit under the Ku-klux 

 act, claiming heavy >'. i- the delay nnd 



disturbance of trains. So matter- went on un- 

 til the act authorizing the conn to fix 

 passenger- rates was declared unconstitutional 

 by the Supreme Court. 



As a natural result of the circumstances 

 above set forth, resort was had by tin- pn>- 

 duciiiL' classes to legislation, to etl'ect what bad 

 not been satisfactorily adjusted by the general 

 principles of political economy, or the natural 

 laws of trade. In the Constitutional Conven- 

 tion of 1870 the subject of railroad corpora- 

 tions r. eei . I'd M larL'c .-bare of attention, and a 

 provision \\ a- incorporated in the new consti- 

 tution, to the effect that the "(Iciicrnl Assem- 

 bly shall, from time to time, pa-s laws e-tab- 

 lishing reasonable maximum rates of cl. 

 fertile transportation of passengers and freight 

 on the different railroads in thi- Mute." 1'ur- 

 snant to this provision, an act was pawed by 

 the Legislature in the following year. JN71, 

 Jmvinir for its object the establishment of a 

 reasonable maximum rate of charge- for 

 porting passengers; and another, "topr- 

 unjust di-crimination nnd extortions in the 

 rate* to lie charged by the different railroads 

 in this St:it.- for the transportation of freights 

 on the said roads." To secure the enforce- 



ment of the provisions of t : a law was 



passed providing lor the appointment, by the 

 (oivcrnor, of a Hoard of \\arehouse and Kail- 

 road Commissioners, consisting of three mem- 

 bers, who mi:.-t not be connected, directly or 

 indirectly, with any railroad or warehouse in- 

 tcre-t. The railroad corporations prot 

 strongly against this legislative interference. 

 a- they termed it. and denied the power of the 

 I.eni-lature to control railroad charges in any 

 way, or even to tix their maximum limit; 

 and, while admitting that the companies were 

 hound to make their charge- re.-.sonable. it was 

 not the province of the Legislature to deter- 

 mine whether these charges were or wen 

 reasonable. They further held that the ch: ; r- 

 ter (.-ranted to each company by tlie State is a 

 contract "by which the latter lias irrevocably 

 granted to tlie corporation the right to estab- 

 lish its rates of toll, subject only to an implied 

 condition that they shall not be unreasonable 

 or excessive;" also, that the charier, with 

 all the privileges granted, was protected by 

 that dance of the Constitution of the United 

 States which prohibits the State from enact- 

 ing any law impairing the obligation of con- 

 tracts. In opposition to these views, it was 

 maintained by the friends of the law that rail- 

 road companies, having obtained their right 

 of way by the exercise of the right of i mineiit. 

 domain a power which belongs only to the 

 State in its sovereign capacity, and can bo 

 delegated only for public purposes are really 

 public corporations, and therefore subject to 

 legislative control so far as the public good 

 may require: and of this the legislature is 

 the sole judge. Furthermore, it v\as claimed 

 that no Legislature had the power to alienate 

 from the State this right ami duty, which arc 



ial to the sovereignty of the State. 

 Tin- railroad companies refused obedience to 

 the act, nnd a ( rdcd by the ac- 



tion of tin- Chicago >v. Alton Ilailnmd Compa- 

 ny. The rate charged by this line lor trans- 

 porting lumber from Chicago to I.i xington, a 



distance of 110 miles, was ."i.r,r> p.-r 1. feet, 



while the rate to 1'doomington. !' miles be- 

 yond Lexington, was only *.">. 1 or this vio- 

 lation of the law of 1871, which prohibited 

 any railroad company from charging greater 

 rate- tor carrying freight shorter distances, 

 an action \\ as brought by the railroad com- 

 lui -ioiicrs to enforce the penalty of the law, 

 which WHS forfeiture of charter. In the Cir- 

 cuit Court of McLean County. Judge Tipt. n 

 decided against the railroad, and held ll 

 to be constitutional. This dec i-ioii. howev < r, 

 when the matter came before the Supreme 

 Court of the State on appeal. "MS reversed, 

 and the act of 1*71 was declared unconstitu- 

 tional. This opinion of the Supreme Court, 

 which was delivered by Chicf-.lustice Law- 

 re nee. was based upon the ground that the act 

 forbade not merely unjust but all discrimina- 

 tions; that it provided for the punishment of 

 the corporation on a mere allegation of offense, 



