186 



CONGKESS, UNITED STATES. 



country was deceived. I desire to enter my 

 protest against that language. The Govern- 

 ment is not liable to that charge. The Sen- 

 ator from Massachusetts said the other day in 

 his argument that it was a promise to pay coin 

 upon demand, and that is the literal effect 

 of that promise; and yet when that promise 

 was made it was understood by everybody that 

 it was to be broken for an indefinite length of 

 tune. If it was to be redeemed literally and 

 at that time, there would have been no use 

 in issuing greenbacks. The understanding of 

 the country was, and nobody can be deceived 

 upon that point, that the Government was to 

 redeem those notes in coin when it was prac- 

 ticable to do so, and not before ; and the ques- 

 tion may be fairly presented, Has it up to this 

 time been practicable ? 



" Mr. President, is this the time (and that is 

 the main question I rose to discuss) to adopt 

 definite measures to return to specie payments? 

 I submit that we should come to specie pay- 

 ment in prosperous times, and not in adversity ; 

 that any definite measures now to return to 

 specie payment in a short time will create a 

 further shrinkage of values. Everybody un- 

 derstands that. And now, when we want re- 

 lief, when we want to come out from under 

 the load that is upon us, it is proposed that we 

 shall adopt measures that will increase that 

 burden, and diminish the general prices of 

 property and labor. 



" Mr. President, let me ask another question. 

 It is said, and that has been the argument, 

 that this is a good time to return to specie 

 payments. I have heard it said by able men, 

 ' We have got pretty nearly down to the bed- 

 rock now ; it is time to return to specie pay- 

 ments.' I ask this question : Has this panic 

 increased or does the present condition of 

 things increase the facility of returning to spe- 

 cie payments ? I say no. Why ? Because, 

 while property has decreased in value and 

 there has been a vast shrinkage in the price of 

 property and in every thing, still the same dif- 

 ference exists between greenbacks and gold 

 that existed before the panic. Gold has now an 

 average premium of ten per cent. So it had 

 before the panic took place. Therefore, if you 

 still go down to gold value you must go down 

 ten per cent. more. So that the panic has not 

 increased the facility of returning to specie 

 payments, for you will have an additional 

 shrinkage on the top of the shrinkage you 

 have now. 



" Sir, the panic was not caused by the de- 

 preciation of the currency ; and if it was not 

 caused by that, I ask how you are to relieve 

 the effects of the panic by taking steps to come 

 to specie payments? The good physician al- 

 ways looks to the, character of the disease, and 

 what brought it about, before he attempts to 

 prescribe ; and when we look to the cause of 

 this panic -we find that it was not caused by 

 any defect in the currency. The people hav.e 

 faith in our currency, more than they have 



ever had in any paper currency this nation 

 has had heretofore. While we may abuse 

 greenbacks, I tell you the nation has faith in 

 them. The great body of the people love 

 them, and nearly all of them want more. 

 What was it that caused this panic? Why, 

 sir, it was just such a cause as operates in 

 countries where they have no currency but 

 gold and silver ; and I make the statement 

 that panics occur quite as frequently where 

 the currency is gold and silver as where it is 

 paper convertible into coin. They have had 

 ' two panics in England when their currency 

 was upon a gold basis since we have had one 

 in this country. Panics are just as likely to 

 occur in countries where they have nothing 

 but gold and silver as in other countries. 

 Panics do not spring out of the character of 

 the currency generally, but out of some sudden 

 and unexpected event. A panic in finance is 

 just like a panic in the army. It is generally 

 caused by some sudden event that confuses 

 the minds of men and destroys confidence, and 

 it has nothing to do with the character of the 

 currency. 



" Then, Mr. President, I desire to meet the 

 idea that this panic was brought about by a 

 defect in our currency; and I assume that it 

 was not, and, assuming that proposition to bo 

 incontrovertible, I will pass on a little further. 



" Money is scarce made scarce by a want 

 of confidence. It is all in the country. Men 

 have it, but they are hoarding it ; and they are 

 hoarding paper-money as it was never hoarded 

 before, showing the confidence the people have 

 in this currency. They are hoarding our paper- 

 money just as they hoarded. gold and silver in 

 other times. Men were willing to convert every 

 tiling they could into your greenbacks, national 

 bank notes, and bonds. Money became scarce 

 by the panic, because it was not in circulation. 



"Now, sir, what is the real remedy for a 

 panic ? I ask that question, and I should like 

 at some time for the distinguished chairman of 

 the Committee on Finance to answer it. Is it 

 by the resumption of specie payments ? When 

 before was it ever proposed as a remedy for a 

 panic ? I should like to know the single time 

 that it was ever proposed before as a remedy 

 for a panic. Why, sir, a suspension of specie 

 payments has generally been the remedy not 

 the resumption. I call the attention of the 

 Senate to the experience of banks and govern- 

 ments in every country, and I maintain the 

 proposition that so far from resumption being 

 regarded as a remedy for a panic, suspension 

 has often been the remedy. In 1837, when 

 that panic took place, the solvent banks of the 

 country were s.aved only by suspending specie 

 payments. Take a single illustration: The 

 State Bank of Indiana, one of the best banks 

 at that time in the country, was hard run and 

 could not discount a dollar. The Legislature 

 came together and authorized the banks to sus- 

 pend for five years. Belief was at once ob- 

 tained; the bank began to discount freely; 



