UNITED 8TA 



797 



any of the just rights of tlio citi/cti, which tho 

 ( 'oiisiituti-'ii intended to guard against abridg- 

 ment ; iiml liccati.se, in their <i|iiniiMi, the act 

 iiisiimu. then tinder consideration, went 

 fur beyond tin- province of a police regulation, 

 mid created an oppressive and odious monop- 

 oly, thus directly impairing tho common rights 

 of tho citizens of the State, they dissented 

 from tin- judgment of tho court. * * * Jt was 

 iso the act of Louisiana transcended tin- 

 limits ..t' police regulation, and asserted a power 

 in tlio State, to farm out the ordinary avoca- 

 tioiis of litb, that dissent was made to the judg- 

 ment i't' the court sustaining the validity of 

 the act." The judge continues: "The amend- 

 ment was not, as held in tho opinion of the 

 majority, primarily intended to confer citizen- 

 ship on the negro race. It had a much broad- 

 er purpose; it was intended to justify legisla- 

 tion, extending the protection of the national 

 Government over the common rights of all cit- 

 izens of the United States, and thus obviate 

 objections to the legislation, adopted for the 

 protection of the emancipated race. It was 

 intended to make it possible for all persons, 

 which necessarily included those of every race 

 and color, to live in peace and security wher- 

 ever the jurisdiction of the nation reached. 

 It therefore recognized, if it did not create, a 

 national citizenship, and made all persons citi- 

 zens, except those who preferred to remain 

 under the protection of a foreign government, 

 and declared that their privileges and immu- 

 nities, which embrace the fundamental rights 

 belonging to citizens of all free governments, 

 should not be abridged by any State. This 

 national citizenship is primary and not second- 

 ary. It clothes its possessor, or would do so 

 if not shorn of its efficiency by construction, 

 with the right, when his privileges and immu- 

 nities are invaded by partial and discriminat- 

 ing legislation, to appeal from his State to his 

 nation, and gives him the assurance that, for 

 his protection, he can invoke the whole power 

 of the Government." The views of Mr. Jus- 

 tice Bradley were to the same effect, and were 

 concurred in by Mr. Justice Swayne. 



An important decision was rendered in the 

 early part of the year by Mr. Justice Bradley, 

 of the Supreme Court of the United States, in 

 which were considered the powers of Congress 

 in legislating to enforce the provisions of the 

 thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth constitu- 

 tional amendments. The consideration of the 

 question grew out of the conflict between cer- 

 tain white and black persons at Colfax in 

 Grant Parish, La., in 1878, an account of which 

 is contained in the President's message on Lou- 

 isiana affairs, given under the title PDBLIO DOC- 

 UMENTS in this volume. In this affair a num- 

 ber of negroes were killed, and an indictment 

 was found against certain white persons, 

 charging them with conspiring to injure, op- 

 press, intimidate, and otherwise to deprive 

 colored citizens of their rights, and with mur- 

 ders, while engaged in this conspiracy. For 



this proceeding, ninety-eight white men were 

 indicted under tin- Ku-klux act of whom nine 

 were brought to trial in the United Stat. 

 cuit Court. The lirst trial resulted in a die- 

 agreement of the jury, and the second in a 

 conviction of the accused. A motion in arrest 

 of judgment was then made before Judge 

 Bradley, of the 1 nited States Supreme Court. 

 and Judge Wood, who presided at the trial 

 when the prisoners were convicted. 



In an elaborate opinion, in which the indict- 

 ments were held to be illegal, 31 r. Justice 

 Bradley remarked that the law was firmly 

 established, that Congress has power to en- 

 force by appropriate legislation every right 

 and privilege given or guaranteed by the 

 Constitution. Those acknowledged rights and 

 privileges of the citizens which form a part 

 of his political inheritance, must be protected 

 and enforced by the State ; and when any of 

 these rights and privileges are secured in the 

 Federal Constitution only by a declaration that 

 the State or the United States shall not violate 

 or abridge them, it is at once understood that 

 they are not created or conferred by the Con- 

 stitution, but are only guaranteed against im- 

 pairment by the State or the United States. 



The thirteenth amendment declares that 

 neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex- 

 cept as a punishment for crime, shall exist 

 within the United States, and that Congress 

 shall have power to enforce this article by ap- 

 propriate legislation. This clothes Congress 

 with the power to pass laws for the prosecu- 

 tion and punishment of those who deprive or 

 attempt to deprive any person of the rights 

 thus conferred, or hinder him in the exercise 

 thereof. 



The effect of the fifteenth amendment is 

 next considered, under which the law in ques- 

 tion was primarily framed. This amendment, 

 although its terms have a general application 

 to all persons, was intended for the benefit of 

 the colored race, by securing to them the right 

 to vote. But in the opinion of the court " it 

 does not confer the right to vote. That is the 

 prerogative of the State laws. It only confers 

 a right not to be excluded from voting by 

 reason of race, color, or previous condition of 

 servitude, and this is all the right that Con- 

 gress can enforce. It confers upon citizens of 

 the African race the same right to vote as 

 white, citizens possess. It makes them equal. 

 This is the whole scope of the amendment. 

 The powers of Congress, therefore, are con- 

 fined within this scope." The amendment does 

 not confer upon Congress any power to regu- 

 late elections, or the right of voting where it 

 did not have that power before, except in the 

 particular matter specified. It does, however, 

 confer upon Congress the right of enforcing 

 the prohibition imposed against excluding cit- 

 izens of the United States on account of race, 

 color, or previous condition of servitude. 



The real difficulty in the present case was 

 to determine whether the amendment had 



