AFGHANISTAN. 



As Afghanistan is now the only country of 

 any importance which separates the Russian 

 possessions in Asia from the British, the Gov- 

 ernments of both these countries are watch- 

 ing Afghan affairs with the most intense in- 

 terest, in order to be prepared for future con- 

 tingencies. The plans both are forming in 

 regard to the future are studiously kept secret, 

 and little therefore that is published about the 

 movements of the two great European powers 

 in this part of Central Asia can lay any claim 

 to authenticity. A profound impression has 

 therefore been produced by the outspoken and 

 straightforward views on this subject pub- 

 lished in the new work by Major-General Sir 

 Henry Rawlinson, entitled "England and Rus- 

 sia in the East" (London, 1875). The author, 

 in the preface to his work, disclaims emphat- 

 ically any official authority for his statements, 

 he has for many years been one of the most 

 prominent representatives of English diplo- 

 macy in the East, and still is an influential 

 member of the "Council of India." In view 

 of the importance which the opinions of such 

 a statesman must have for an understanding 

 of the Central Asiatic question, we give his 

 concluding remarks on the relations of England 

 and Russia to Afghanistan (p. 362) : 



Russia by advancing on Merv evidently means 

 mischief. She would never embark on an enterprise 

 of so perilous a nature for mere purposes of trade or 

 police. Political objects of high import could alone 

 justify the movement. These objects necessarily 

 point to Herat, which would lie at the mercy of 

 a European power holding Merv, and whence 

 India would be seriously threatened. Herat pos- 

 sesses natural advantages of quite an exceptional 

 importance. It is the frontier town between Persia 

 and India. It is connected by high-roads with the 

 capitals of all the surrounding countries, with (Ja- 

 bool through the Hazareh Hills, with Balkh and Bok- 

 hara through Mymeneh, with Khiva through Merv, 

 with Meshed, with Yezd and Ispahan, with Seistan, 

 and with Candahar. It enjoys an admirable climate, 

 and is situated in the midst of one of the most fer- 

 tile and populous valleys in Asia. Above all, the 

 city itself is surrounded by earthworks of the most 

 colossal character, dating from prehistoric times, 

 and which, with the adaptations and improvements 

 of modern science, might be rendered quite impreg- 

 nable to an Asiatic force. Kussia in possession of 

 Herat would have a grip on the throaj; of India. She 

 would, indeed, in virtue of the position, command 

 the military resources both of Persia and Afghanis- 

 tan, and would thus oblige us at once to increase 

 our frontier army bv at least twenty thousand fresh 

 British troops. Viewing, then, the question as 

 merely one of finance, it may be assumed that our 

 advance above the passes and occupation of Herat 

 would be the cheapest insurance against Eussia that 

 we could effect for the benefit of our great Indian 

 estate. Let it be further remembered that all these 

 considerations have been already discounted by our 

 statesmen in regard to the smaller question of a 

 Persian occupation of Herat. We sent a consider- 

 able expedition to the Gulf in order to oblige Per- 

 sia to raise the siege of Herat in 1838, and, when 

 Persian troops occupied the place in 1856, we actu- 

 ally went to war with the Shah for the purpose of 

 compelling their withdrawal. If, then, such meas- 

 ures were justifiable in order to prevent the west- 

 ern Afghan capital from falling into the hands of 

 Persia, who was only to be feared as the minion or 



precursor of Eussia, much more must they be re- 

 quired when the danger comes directly from Eussia 

 herself. 1 will not pretend to calculate the cost of 

 sending an expedition to Herat. Any estimate, 

 based on the uncertain premises which are alone at 

 present available, would be fallacious: but I may 

 point out that the expenses of our defensive posi 

 tion, however great, must be far less than those en- 

 countered by Eussia in constructing or maintaining 

 her elaborate system of attack. For when Eussia is 

 established at Merv, and has completed the commu- 

 nications of that post with the Caspian on one side, 

 and with the Oxus and Toorkistan on the other, she 

 will have at least fifty thousand soldiers in Central 

 Asia, and it is not too much to assume that the main 

 object of bringing that large body of troops into the 

 field, toward whose support the conquered Uzbeck 

 states contribute little or nothing, will have been to 

 enable her to threaten India. 



There is one other aspect of the question that re- 

 quires explanation. Some of our best authorities on 

 Central Asian politics maintain that not only should 

 we incur an enormous and useless expenditure in 

 advancing to meet Eussia above the passes, but that 

 we should be intensifying tenfold the difficulties of 

 our position. They believe that we should every- 

 where meet with hatred and resistance, that we 

 should thus throw the Afghans into the hands of 

 Eussia, who would in fact when she advanced be 

 hailed by them as a deliverer rather than opposed as 

 an invader. My own experience points in an ex- 

 actly contrary direction, and I am happy to find my 

 views corroborated by the independent testimony 

 of our latest travelers. Believing as I do the west- 

 ern Afghans to be the most contemptible of enemies, 

 and hardly, therefore, caring to consider the possi- 

 bility of a skirmish in the Bolan or Khojek Passes, 

 the only defensible positions on the line from Scinde 

 to Herat, I still feel satisfied that we should gener- 

 ally receive the warm support of the great mass of 

 the population in the districts that we traversed. 

 The Syudsof Pishin, the Atchikzyes of the Khojek, 

 who adhered to us in all our troubles in 1841-'42, 

 the Persian peasantry of Candahar, the mercantile 

 and agricultural classes throughout the country, 

 would one and all throng to us for support and pro- 

 tection. Mindful of past benefits, hopeful of future 

 favors, they would bring in their camels from the 

 desert and empty their granaries of corn to supply 

 our wants, as they did in those days when, although 

 Ghizni and Cabool were lost, and an army had per- 

 ished in the passes, we were safe and strong and 

 triumphant at Candahar. 



The only parties from whom we should experi- 

 ence ill-will would be the priesthood and a few of 

 the Durani chiefs ; and they might be called upon 

 to retire to Cabool. Most assuredly, as far as the 

 disposition of the natives is concerned, we should 

 not have more difficulty in governing Candahar and 

 Herat than the Eussians encounter in governing 

 Tashkend and Samarcand ; while our long famili- 

 arity with Eastern administration, our special knowl- 

 edge of Western Afghanistan, our consideration for 

 Mohammedan prejudices, our prestige, our high 

 reputation for justice arid good faith, ought to make 

 the task of maintaining the position far more easy 

 to us than to our less experienced Northern neighbors. 



I will only say one word in conclusion, that I 

 counsel nothing rash or premature. If Eussia re- 

 mained encamped on the Caspian, we should not, of 

 course, leave the valley of the Indus. So long as 

 she held aloof from Merv, we should hold aloof 

 from Herat ; but, if she deliberately threw down the 

 gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up. We 

 could not, as the guardians of the interests of India, 

 permit her, on the pretext of curbing the Toorko- 

 mans or establishing a trade-route through Asia, to 

 take up a position unopposed on the Murghab, which 

 would compromise the safety of Herat. That city 

 is both strategically and politically an indispensable 



