KASHGAE. 



KENTUCKY. 



415 



The policy of England in regard to Kashgar has 

 never altered ; though negative iu its object, it is 

 clearly defined, and needs neither concealment nor 

 excuse. It would undoubtedly be inconvenient to 

 us if Bussia, either by force of arms or at the invi- 

 tation of the native ruler, succeeded in establishing 

 a protectorate over Eastern Toorkistan similar to 

 her protectorate of the Usbeg khanates and were 

 thus brought into contact, through Thibet with 

 Cashmere, and through Wakhan with Cabul. Our 

 interest, therefore, irrespective of commercial con- 

 siderations, is clearly to maintain the Amir in inde- 

 pendent power. We desire to see him ruling over a 

 contented and orderly population, giving offense 

 neither to Eussia nor to China, contracting his 

 frontiers within manageable limits, devoting him- 

 self to the improvement of his country, and laying 

 the foundations of a permanent dynasty. Fortu- 

 nately, we have not the same dread as Eussia of the 

 contagion of Mohammedan influences, the Mussul- 

 mans of India, prone as they may be to mischief, 

 being outnumbered and controlled by Hindoos and 

 Sikhs. Toorkistan, indeed, like Afghanistan and 

 Persia, may help to buttress pur Indian Empire ; but 

 it can never, so long as it retains its independence, be 

 to us a source of danger or uneasiness. Our envoys, 

 therefore, to Kashgar have invariably counseled 

 prudence and moderation. We have recommended 

 the Amir, as a measure of precaution, to withdraw 

 his garrison from Urumchi and Manass, and to re- 

 main content with the submission and tribute of the 

 Tungans. Above all things, we have insisted that 

 he should strictly fulfill his treaty-engagements with 

 Eussia, and leavfe no opening for reprisals. 



It is not possible, of course, to see very far ahead 

 in this region of nebulous politics. There are diffi- 

 culties, both external and internal, which may ship- 

 wreck the most carefully-considered plans, if Chi- 

 na, for instance, should recover from the_ military 

 paralysis which for some years past has stricken her 

 extremities, she might possibly reassert her claims 

 to Kashgar, and thus necessitate a European armed 

 intervention, the result of which it would be impos- 

 sible to foresee. Or Kokand and Bokhara, inspired 

 from without, might follow up the call they are said 

 to have already made on Amir Yakub's allegiance, 

 by invading his territories, which would certainly 

 embroil Kashgar with Eussia. But the most serious 

 indications of danger come from within. The Amir 

 Yakub has been by no means single-minded in his 

 dealings with us. His experience of Eussia had 

 rendered him suspicious of all Europeans ; and as 

 an Oriental prince, moreover, cannot understand the 

 meaning of a commercial mission, but always sup- 

 poses there is some deep political design shrouded 

 under the mask of trade, so in the Amir's reception 

 of Mr. Forsyth notwithstanding that it was marked 

 with a lavish hospitality and much personal atten- 

 tion, still, there was from the'commencement an un- 

 dercurrent of distrust, which it required the nicest 

 circumspection not to rouse into activity. There 

 was, in fact, no reason why the Amir should espe- 

 cially affect our friendship, except as a defense 

 against Eussia ; and when the suspicion, therefore, 

 crossed him partly, perhaps, from the recent mat- 

 rimonial alliance of the two royal families, and part- 

 ly from our interposition in favor of Eussian interest 

 that the two powers might have coalesced to com- 

 pass his ruin, he showed undoubted signs of recalci- 

 tration. With the intuitive love, also, for duplicity 

 which characterizes all Orientals, he has apparently 

 desired to steer his course midway between Scylla 

 and Charybdis, concluding treaties of friendship 

 with ^both powers, but never committing himself 

 irretrievably with either. As he has made known 

 his communications with Eussia to us, so, if we had 

 exposed our hands, or had had any hands to expose, 

 he might have made known our communications to 

 Eussia. Passing, then, from his shadowy ground 

 of intrigue and deception to practical life, we can at 



any rate repose with satisfaction on our own honesty 

 of intention, and take further consolation from the 

 knowledge that under no circumstances can we incur 

 real danger from the hostility of Kashgar j since in- 

 vasion through a country like Thibet, entirely desti- 

 tute of supplies, and seamed with passes 18,000 feet 

 in height, is beyond the scope of modern warfare ; 

 while the only other access to India from Toorkistan, 

 by_ the Chitral route, is closed by stubborn moun- 

 taineers, who have never succumbed to an invader 

 since the days of Timur, as well as by the proud 

 and stern resistance of the free-born tribes of Af- 

 ghanistan. 



KEMENY, SIGMUND, Baron, a Hungarian 

 author, born in 1816, in Transylvania; died 

 December 22, 1875. In the Upper House of 

 the Transylvanian Diet he belonged to the Lib- 

 eral party, and in 1848 was elected to the Diet 

 of Pesth. In 1849 he was for a short time a 

 councilor in the Ministry of the Interior. At 

 this time he wrote several political pamphlets, 

 entitled "After the Revolution" (1850), and 

 " Another "Word after the Revolution " (1851), 

 in which he severely criticised the Hungarian 

 Revolution. Since 1855 he was the editor of 

 the Pesti Naplo, the leading organ of the Deak 

 party. Among his novels are, "Gyulai Pal" 

 (Paul Gyulay, 5 vols., Pesth, 1846), " F6rj es 

 no " (Man and Wife, 2 vols., 1853), " Szerelem 

 es hiusag" (Love and Vanity, 1855), and 

 "Zord ido" (Rough Times, 4 vols., 1861-'62). 

 He also wrote " Character Sketches of the Two 

 Wesseleny and of Count Stephen Szecheny " 

 (1850), which is considered one of the best 

 productions of the Hungarian literature in this 

 field. 



KENTUCKY. The financial condition of 

 Kentucky may be regarded as very promising. 

 The entire bonded debt of the State is $184,- 

 394, of which $10,394 is now due. In the last 

 two years bonds have been redeemed to the 

 amount of $347,000. To meet the outstanding 

 indebtedness the State holds $145,559.07 in 

 the sinking-fund, Government bonds valued at 

 $246,000, and stocks of the Bank of Louisville, 

 the Louisville & Frankfort Railroad, and the 

 turnpike roads, together amounting to $350,- 

 032, besides a considerable unexpended balance 

 in the Treasury. The State also owns 260 

 shares of the preferred stock of the Louis ville, 

 Cincinnati & Lexington Railroad, and 2,178 

 shares in the Frankfort & Lexington Rail- 

 road, the value of which is not stated. It has 

 received from the Federal Government since 

 th close of the fiscal year, October 10th, $28,- 

 726.45, for internal revenue tax illegally col- 

 lected on the interest of the State in the prof- 

 its of certain banks, and $12,950.18 on war 

 claims. There remains unpaid of the latter 

 $248,863.09. At the beginning of the last 

 fiscal year, October 11, 1874, there was a sur- 

 plus in the Treasury of $241,741.17 ; the re- 

 ceipts of the year were $1,378,788.33; expen- 

 ditures, $1,258,925.25. This leaves at the end 

 of the year a balance of $361,604.25. The as- 

 sessed value of taxable property in the State 

 was $417,602,688, showing an increase of 

 $26,972,995. The amount of tax collected was 



