658 



PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



its acquisition of the rights of sovereignty. A pow- 

 er should exist complete in its organization, ready 

 to take and able to maintain its place among the na- 

 tions of the earth. 



While conscious that the insurrection m Cuba has 

 shown a strength and endurance which make it at 

 least, doubtful whether it be in the power of Spain 

 to subdue it, it seems unquestionable that no such 

 civil organization exists which may be recognized as 

 an independent government capable of performing 

 its international obligations and entitled to be treated 

 as one of the powers of the earth. A^recognition 

 under such circumstances would be inconsistent 

 with the facts, and would compel the power grant- 

 ing it soon to support by force the government to 

 which it had really given its only claim of existence. 

 In my judgment, the United States should adhere to 

 the policy and the principles which have heretofore 

 been its sure and safe guides in like contests between 

 revolted colonies and their mother-country, and, act- 

 ing only upon the clearest evidence, should avoid 

 any possibility of suspicion or of imputation. 



A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, 

 in my opinion, impracticable and indefensible, the 

 question which next presents itself is that of the 

 recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the 

 contest. 



In a former message to Congress I had occasion to 

 consider this question, and reached the conclusion 

 that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating 

 as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dig- 

 nity of war. Regarding it now, after this lapse of 

 time, I am unable to see that any notable success, or 

 any marked or real advance on the part of the in- 

 surgents, has essentially changed the character of 

 the contest. It has acquired greater age. but not 

 greater or more formidable proportions. It is pos- 

 sible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts 

 of Spain herself, of this very nature, might be point- 

 ed to in defense of such recognition. But now, as 

 in its past history, the United States should care- 

 fully avoid the false lights which might lead it into 

 the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable pro- 

 priety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, 

 which has been ita guide, of doing only that which 

 is right, and honest, and of good report. The ques- 

 tion of according or of withholding rights of bellig- 

 erency must be judged, in every case, in view of the 

 particular attending facts. Unless justified by ne- 

 cessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an un- 

 friendly act, and a gratuitous demonstration of 

 moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, 

 and it is required, when the interests and rights of 

 another government or of its people are so far affected 

 by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition 

 of its relations to the parties thereto. But this con- 

 flict must be one which will be recognized in the 

 sense of international law as war. Belligerence, too, 

 is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed 

 bodies, and their occasional conflicts, do not consti- 

 tute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the 

 existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recog- 

 nized by publicists and writers on international law, 

 and which have been observed by nations of dignity, 

 honesty, and power, when free from sensitive or 

 selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the 

 insurrection the existence of such a substantial po- 

 litical organization, real, palpable, and manifest to 

 the world, having the forms and capable of the or- 

 dinary functions of government toward its own peo- 

 ple and to other states, with courts for the adminis- 

 tration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing 

 such organization of force, such material, such occu- 

 pation of territory, as to take the contest out of the 

 category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occa- 

 sional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing 

 of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would 

 aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on 

 land ; the insurrection has not possessed itself of a 

 single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, 



nor has it any means of communication with foreign 

 powers except through the military lines of its ad- 

 versaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden 

 and difficult complications which a war upon the 

 ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both 

 commercial and national, and upon the consular offi- 

 cers of other powers, calls for the definition of their 

 relations to the parties to the contest. Considered 

 as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance 

 of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and prema- 

 ture, as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as 

 a measure of right. Such recognition entails upon 

 the country according the rights which flow from it 

 difficult and complicated duties, and requires the 

 exaction from the contending parties of the strict 

 observance of their rights and obligations. It con- 

 fers the rights of search upon the high-seas by ves- 

 sels of both parties ; it would subject the carrying 

 of arms and munitions of war, which now may be 

 transported freely and without interruption in the 

 vessels of the United States, to detention and to 

 possible seizure ; it would give rise to countless vex- 

 atious questions, would release the parent govern- 

 ment from responsibility for acts done by the insur- 

 gents, and would invest Spain with the right to 

 exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 

 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very 

 large part of which, in its traffic between the Atlan- 

 tic and the Gulf States, and between all of them and 

 the States on the Pacific, passes through the waters 

 which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of 

 this supervision could scarcely fail to lead, if not to 

 abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peace- 

 ful relations of the two states. There can be little 

 doubt to what result such supervision would before 

 long draw this nation. It would be unworthy of 

 the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of 

 such result, bv means of questionable right or ex- 

 pediency, or by any indirection. Apart from any 

 question of theoretical right, I am satisfied that, 

 while the accordance of belligerent rights to the in- 

 surgents in Cuba might give them a hope and an 

 inducement to protract the struggle, it would be but 

 a delusive hope, and would not remove the evils 

 which this Government and its people are experi- 

 encing, but would draw the United States into com- 

 plications which it has waited long and already suf- 

 fered much to avoid. The recognition of indepen- 

 dence, or of belligerency,being thus, in my judgment, 

 equally inadmissible, it remains to consider what 

 course shall be adopted should the conflict not soon 

 be brought to an end by acts of the parties them- 

 selves, and should the evils which result therefrom, 

 affecting all nations, and particularly the United 

 States, continue. 



In such event, I am of opinion that other nations 

 will be compelled to assume the responsibility which 

 devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the 

 only remaining measures possible, mediation and 

 intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse 

 of water separating the island from the peninsula, 

 the want of harmony and of personal sympathy be- 

 tween the inhabitants of the colony and those sent 

 thither to rule them, and want of adaptation of the 

 ancient colonial system of Europe to the present 

 times and to the ideas which the events of the past 

 century have developed, the contending parties ap- 

 pear to have within themselves no depositary of 

 common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion 

 and excitement have their sway, and to assume the 

 part of peace-maker. In this view, in the earlier 

 days of the contest the good offices of the United 

 States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, 

 without any selfish purpose, in the interest of hu- 

 manity and in sincere friendship for both parties, 

 but were at the time declined by Spain, with the 

 declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they 

 would be indispensable. No intimation has been 

 received that in the opinion of Spain that time has 

 been reached. And yet the strife continues with all 



