BALL'S BLUFF. 



shell, I have been told by those from the right 

 and left who could correctly observe their effect, 

 that they burst, and with great effect. The 

 short range at which they were fired would of 

 course hardly admit of an> very appreciable 

 deviation from a direct course, such as has been 

 remarked of the projectile. The piece, I have 

 since learned, was taken by the enemy ; with 

 it there were but eight or ten rounds of shell, 

 and about twenty blanks. I do not think it 

 was possible to have saved the piece from cap- 

 ture, for it would have required a full half hour 

 to have gotten it down to the river, when if it 

 were shipped upon the boat it would have been 

 necessarily to the exclusion of the wounded, 

 who were being conveyed to the opposite shore. 

 Indeed, I very much doubt if it could have 

 crossed at all, for the scow sunk with its weight 

 of men the next trip after I returned in it. The 

 horses belonging to the piece were all shot ; and 

 I learn from Capt. Vaughan, who has since been 

 over to bury the dead, that five of them lay 

 dead in one heap. I regretted that the canister 

 which was to be sent over to us did not reach 

 us, as with it I might have at least kept the 

 enemy sufficiently in check to have given time 

 to many of the wounded who' were left on the 

 Virginia side to have escaped." 



The report of the Confederate General Evans 

 states his killed and wounded at three hundred. 

 He speaks of his force as twenty-five hundred 

 men, without artillery, engaged against ten 

 thousand with five batteries. The force to 

 which he was opposed was about twenty-one 

 hundred, with one piece of artillery that was 

 served effectively, the other three being fired 

 only at intervals. The Confederate forces en- 

 gaged were the Eighth Virginia, and Seven- 

 teenth and Eighteenth Mississippi Eegiments. 

 The First Mississippi was held in reserve. 



The Massachusetts Fifteenth lost, in killed, 

 wounded, and missing, three hundred and twen- 

 ty-two, including a Lieut-Colonel and fourteen 

 out of twenty-eight line officers who crossed. 

 The Massachusetts Twentieth lost, in all, one 

 hundred and fifty-nine. The Tammany com- 

 panies lost one hundred and sixty-three. The 

 First California Regiment lost three hundred, 

 killed, wounded, and missing. 



Meantime at Edwards' Ferry, where the fa- 

 cilities for transportation consisted of two 

 scows and a yawl boat, Gen. Stone was pre- 

 paring to push forward to the road by which 

 the enemy's retreat would be cut off, if driven. 

 He says: "The additional artillery had al- 

 ready been sent, and when the messenger, who 

 did not leave the field until after three o'clock, 

 was questioned as to Colonel Baker's position, 

 he informed me that the Colonel, when he left, 

 seemed to feel perfectly secure, and could doubt- 

 less hold his position in case he should not 

 advance. The same statement was made by 

 another messenger half an hour later, and I 

 watched anxiously for a sign of advance on the 

 right, in order to push forward Gen. Gorman. 

 It was, as had been explained to Colonel Baker, 



impracticable to throw Gen. Gorman's brigade 

 directly to the right by reason of the battery in 

 the woods, between which we had never been 

 able to reconnoitre. 



"At four p. M., or thereabouts, I telegraphed 

 to General Banks for a brigade of his division, 

 intending it to occupy the ground on this side of 

 the river near Harrison's Island, which would be 

 abandoned in case of a rapid advance ; and short- 

 ly after, as the fire slackened, a messenger was 

 waited for, on whose tidings should be given 

 orders either for the advance of General Gorman 

 to cut off the retreat of the enemy, or for the dis- 

 position for the night in the position then held. 



" At five p. M. Captain Candy arrived from 

 the field and announced the melancholy tidings 

 of Colonel Baker's death, but with no intelli- 

 gence of any further disaster. I immediately 

 apprised General Banks of Col. Baker's death, 

 and I rode quickly to the right to assume com- 

 mand. Before arriving opposite the island, 

 men who had crossed the river plainly gave 

 evidence of the disaster, and on reaching the 

 same I was satisfied of it by the conduct of the 

 men then landing in boats. 



" Orders were- then given to hold the island 

 and establish a patrol on the tow-path from op- 

 posite the island to the line of pickets near the 

 Monocacy, and I returned to the left to secure 

 the troops there from disaster, and make prepa- 

 rations for moving them as rapidly as possible. 



" Orders arrived from Gen. McClellan to hold 

 the island and Virginia shore at Edwards' Fer- 

 ry at all risks, indicating at the same time that 

 reinforcements would be sent, and immediately 

 additional means of intrencbments -were for- 

 warded, and Gen. Gorman was furnished with 

 particular directions to hold out against any 

 and every force of the enemy." 



The crossing was ultimately continued, and 

 by Tuesday morning four thousand infantry, a 

 section of Eicketts' battery, and Van Alen's 

 cavalry detachment were safely on the Vir- 

 ginia shore. Five hundred feet of intrench- 

 ment was thrown up. At 3 A. M. on Tues- 

 day, Gen. Banks arrived and took command. 



All Tuesday night the whistles of the loco- 

 motives bringing Confederate reinforcements 

 to Leesburg were distinctly heard. On Tuesday 

 morning Gen. McClellan was disposed to hold 

 the position on the^irginia side, but further 

 information caused a change of purpose. A 

 bridge of boats taken from the canal, together 

 with others passing up and down which were 

 stopped, was formed, and on "Wednesday the 

 entire force returned to the Maryland shore. 



The first cause of failure consisted in the lack 

 of suitable means of transportation. The Fed- 

 eral force at Ball's Bluff was evidently outnum- 

 bered and overpowered. The crossing was at an 

 exceedingly unfavorable spot ; it was the same 

 as crossing two ferries at a point where the cur- 

 rent being narrow, becomes swifter. The move- 

 ment should have ceased with what had been 

 done on Sunday night. No suitable preparations 

 were made for that afterward undertaken. 



