BULL RUK 



their haversacks. On Saturday orders were 

 issued for the available force to march. As 

 reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, 

 my personal reconnoissance of the roads to the 

 south had shown that it was not practicable to 

 carry out the original plan of turning the ene- 

 my's position on his right. The affair of the 

 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed he was too 

 strong at that point for us to force a passage 

 there without great loss, and if we did, that it 

 would bring us in front of his strong position 

 at Manassas, which was not desired. Our in- 

 formation was that the StoneBridge, over which 

 the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the 

 west of Centreville, was defended by a battery 

 in position, and the road on his side of the 

 stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alter- 

 native was, therefore, to turn the extreme left 

 of his position. Reliable information was ob- 

 tained of an undefended ford about three miles 

 above the bridge, there being another ford be- 

 tween it and the bridge, which was defended. 

 It was therefore determined to take the road to 

 the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind 

 the forces guarding the lower ford and the 

 bridge, and after occupying the "Warrenton road 

 west of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy 

 the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus 

 break up the communication between the en- 

 emy's forces at Manassas and those in the val- 

 ley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had 

 been held in check by Major-General Patterson. 



" Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to 

 move with three of his brigades on the War- 

 renton road, and commence cannonading the 

 enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, 

 moving after him, should, after passing a little 

 stream called Cub Run, tarn to the right and 

 north, and move around to the upper ford, and 

 there turn south and get behind the enemy. 

 Colonel Heintzelman's division was to follow 

 Hunter's as far as the turning-off place to the 

 lower ford, where he was to cross after the 

 enemy should have been driven out by Hun- 

 ter's division ; the fifth division (Miles') to be 

 in reserve on the Centreville ridge. 



" I had felt anxious about the road from Ma- 

 nassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, 

 along the ridge, fearing that whilst we should 

 be in force to the front, and endeavoring to 

 turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should 

 be turned by him by this road ; for if he should 

 once obtain possession of this ridge, which 

 overlooks all the country to the west to the 

 foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should 

 have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. 

 I had, therefore, directed this point to be held 

 in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize 

 some field-works to strengthen the position. 



" The fourth division (Runyon's) had not 

 been brought to the front further than to guard 

 our communications by way of Vienna and the 

 Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His ad- 

 vanced regiment was about seven miles in the 

 rear of Centreville. 



" The divisions were ordered to march at 



half-past two o'clock A. M., so as to arrive on 

 the ground early in the day, and thus avoid 

 the heat which is to be expected at this season. 

 There was delay in the first division getting 

 out of its camp on the road, and the other di- 

 visions were in consequence between two and 

 three hours behind the time appointed a great 

 misfortune, as events turned out. The wood 

 road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to 

 the upper ford was much longer than we 

 counted upon, the general direction of the 

 stream being oblique to the road, and we 

 having the obtuse angle on our side." 



At half-past two, on the morning of the 21st, 

 the division under General Tyler, which had 

 heretofore been the right wing, moved, with the 

 exception of Richardson's brigade, to threaten 

 the passage of the Warrenton turnpike bridge, 

 or Stone Bridge, on Bull Run. After moving a 

 short distance Col. Keyes' brigade was halted 

 by order of General McDowell, to watch the 

 road coming up from Manassas. This was 

 about two miles from the run. The two re- 

 maining brigades of this division, being those 

 of Cols. Schenck and Sherman, with Ayres' and 

 Carlisle's batteries, proceeded on and arrived in 

 front of the bridge about six A. M. An exam- 

 ination of the position was made, and the bri- 

 gades and artillery got into position. The first 

 gun, as a signal that they were in position, was 

 fired at half-past six o'clock. As the design was 

 to threaten the bridge, Col. Schenck's brigade 

 was formed into a line, with its left resting in the 

 direction of the bridge and the Confederate bat- 

 tery, which had been established to sweep the 

 bridge and its approach, so as to threaten both. 

 Col. Sherman's brigade was posted to the right 

 of the turnpike, so as to be in position to sus- 

 tain Colonel Schenck or to move across Bull 

 Run, in the direction to be taken by Col. Hun- 

 ter's division. 



A 30-pounder gun attached to Carlisle's bat- 

 tery was posted on the turnpike, with Ayres' 

 battery considerably in its rear, while Car- 

 lisle's battery was posted on the left of Col. 

 Sherman's brigade. In this position they were 

 ordered to remain, awaiting the appearance of 

 the divisions of Cols. Hunter and Heintzelman 

 on the other side, until such time that the ap- 

 proach to the bridge could be carried and the 

 bridge rebuilt by the engineers, who had on 

 the spot materials for that purpose. 



While this had been going on with the first 

 division, the first brigade of the second division, 

 under Col. Porter, had been silently paraded 

 in light marching order at two o'clock in the 

 morning. Owing to frequent delays in the 

 march of troops in front, it did not reach Cen- 

 treville until half-past four. It proceeded out 

 on the Warrenton turnpike, and it was an hour 

 after sunrise when its head was turned to the 

 right to commence the flank movement by 

 crossing at Sudley's Spring. The second bri- 

 gade of the division, which was now in ad- 

 vance, made such slow and intermittent progress 

 through the woods, that it was four hours be- 



