BULL RUN. 



87 





the wounded and the dead of that well-found 

 army which commenced its march from Wash- 

 ington five days previous, proud, exultant, and 

 confident of victory, was panic-stricken, grop- 

 ing its way, under the cover of the darkness of 

 night, to the intrenchments opposite Washing- 

 ton. Never had the flag of the Union trailed 

 so low in the dust before ; never was so bril- 

 liant a career opened before it as that which 

 commenced on the day after that dreadful 

 night. About six months from that hour the 

 fugitives became victors in every contest, and the 

 triumphant foe were fleeing from every point. 



Fortunately for the remnants of the Federal 

 army, the Confederate forces did not pursue 

 their flying foe. The reasons for this omission 

 are thus stated by Gen. Johnston in his official 

 report : 



" The apparent firmness of the United States 

 troops at Centreville who had not been engaged, 

 which checked our pursuit ; the strong forces 

 occupying the works near Georgetown, Ar- 

 lington, and Alexandria; the certainty, too, 

 that General Patterson, if needed, would reach 

 Washington, with his army of thirty thousand 

 men, sooner than we could ; and the condition 

 and inadequate means of the army in ammuni- 

 tion, provisions, and transportation, prevented 

 any serious thoughts of advancing* against the 

 capital. It is certain that the fresh troops with- 

 in the works were, in number, quite sufficient 

 for their defence; if not, General Patterson's 

 army would certainly reinforce them soon 

 enough." 1 



After the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the 

 18th, Gen. McDowell became convinced that 

 the nature of t\2 country to the left or south- 

 ward to Manassas was unfit for the operations 

 of a large army, and he determined to move by 

 the right, turning the enemy's left. An exam- 

 ination was made during the next day, and in 

 consequence of the information thus obtained, 

 the following plan of attack was determined 

 upon : (See orders, p. 78.) 



1st. A false attack to be made by Richard- 

 son's brigade (temporarily attached to Miles' 

 division) on Blackburn's Ford, the rest of that 

 division remaining in reserve at Centreville. 



2d. Tylers division to move from its camp 

 at2i A.X., (the 21st,) towards the stone bridge 

 of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main 

 attack upon this point. 



3d. The divisions of Hunter and Heintzel- 

 man (iu the order named) to leave their camps 

 at 2 and 2i A. M., (they were encamped about 

 two or three miles behind Tyler,) and, follow- 

 ing his movement, to diverge from the War- 

 renton turnpike at the by-road beyond Cub 

 Run, and take the road for Sudley's Spring; 

 or, rather, it was provided that Hunter's divi- 

 sion should proceed to Sudley's Spring, and 

 Heintzelman take the lower ford. These mat- 

 ters, however, were to be regulated by circum- 

 stances. 



It was intended that the head of Hunter's 

 division should be at the turn-on at early day- 



light, or about 4 A M., and that it should reach 

 Sudley by six or seven. 



The two leading brigades of Tyler's had not 

 cleared the road for Hunter to this point until 

 half-past five, and the guide, alleging that a 

 nearer route to the ford would bring the col- 

 umn in sight of the enemy's batteries, led them 

 by so circuitous a way that Hunter did not 

 reach Sudley's Spring until half-past nine or 

 thereabouts. 



The explanation given by Gen. McDowell for 

 the disasters of the day, although rather lengthy, 

 is entitled to full consideration. He thus re- 

 ports : 



" As my position may warrant, even if it does 

 not call for some explanation of the causes, as 

 far as they can be seen, which led to the results 

 herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place 

 if I refer in a few words to the immediate ante- 

 cedents of the battle. When I submitted to the 

 General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal 

 instructions, the plan of operations and estimate 

 of force required, the time I was to proceed to 

 carry it inta effect was fixed for the 8th of July, 

 Monday. Every facility possible was given 

 me by the General-in-Chief and the heads of 

 the administrative departments, in making the 

 necessary preparations. But the regiments, 

 owing, I was told, to a want of transportation, 

 came over slowly. Many of them did not come 

 across till eight or nine days after the time fixed 

 upon, and went forward without my even see- 

 ing them, and without having been together 

 before in a brigade. The sending reinforce- 

 ments to General Patterson, by drawing off the 

 wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause 

 of delay. Notwithstanding the Herculean ef- 

 forts of the Quartermaster-General, and his fa- 

 voring me in every way, the wagons for ammu- 

 nition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the 

 trams aud the artillery, did not arrive for more 

 than a week after the tune appointed to move. 

 I was not even prepared as late as the loth ul- 

 timo ; and the desire I should move became 

 great, and it was wished I should not, if possi- 

 ble, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. 

 When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still de- 

 ficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went 

 forward, trusting to their being procured in tune 

 to follow me. The trams thus hurriedly gath- 

 ered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and 

 wagon managers, all new and unused to each 

 other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and 

 was the cause of a day's delay in getting the 

 provisions forward, making it necessary to make, 

 on Sunday, the attack we should have made 

 on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, 

 get forward with the troops earlier than we 

 did. I wished to go to Centreville the second 

 day, which would have taken us there on the 

 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were con- 

 cerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead 

 of the 21st ; but when I went forward from 

 Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to 

 urge them forward, I was told it was impossi- 

 ble for the men to march further. Thev had 



