136 



COKFEDEKATE STATES. 





the commissioners say : " On the 1st of April 

 they were again informed that there might be 

 an attempt to supply Fort Sumter with pro- 

 visions, but that Governor Pickens should have 

 previous notice of this attempt. There was no 

 suggestion of any reinforcements." (See UNITED 

 STATES.) 



In his Message to Congress in July, Presi- 

 ent Lincoln thus describes his actions relative 

 to the relief of Fort Sumter : 



" On the 5th of March, {the present incum- 

 bent's first full day in office,) a letter of Major 

 Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written 

 on the 28th of February, and received at the 

 War Department on the 4th of March, was, by 

 that department, placed in his hands. This 

 letter expressed the professional opinion of the 

 writer, that reinforcements could not be thrown 

 into that fort within the time for his relief, ren- 

 dered necessary by the limited supply of pro- 

 visions, and with a view of holding possession 

 of the same, with a force of less than twenty 

 thousand good and well-disciplined men. This 

 opinion was concurred in by all the officers of 

 his command, and their memoranda on the sub- 

 ject, were made enclosures of Major Ander- 

 son's letter. The whole was immediately laid 

 before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once 

 concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. 

 On reflection, however, he took full time, con- 

 sulting with other officers, both of the army 

 and navy, and, at the end of four days, came 

 reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclu- 

 sion as before. He also stated at the same 

 time that no sufficient force was then at the 

 control of the Government, or could be raised 

 and brought to the ground within the time 

 when the provisions in the fort would be ex- 

 hausted. In a purely military point of view, 

 this reduced the duty of the Administration in 

 the case, to the mere matter of getting the gar- 

 rison safely out of the fort. 



" It was believed, however, that to so aban- 

 don that position, under the circumstances, 

 would be utterly ruinous ; that the necessity 

 under which it was to be done, would not be 

 fully understood; that by many, it would be 

 construed as a part of a voluntary policy ; that 

 at home, it would discourage the friends of the 

 Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to 

 insure to the latter a recognition abroad ; that, 

 in fact, it would be our national destruction 

 consummated. This could not be allowed. 

 Starvation was not yet upon the garrison ; and 

 ere it would be reached, Fort Pickens might be 

 reenforced. This last would be a clear indica- 

 tion of policy, and would better enable the 

 country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sum- 

 ter, as a military necessity. An order was at 

 once directed to be sent for the landing of the 

 troops from the steamship Brooklyn, into Fort 

 Pickens. This order could not go by land, but 

 must take the longer and slower route by sea. 

 The first return news from the order was re- 

 ceived just one week before the fall of Fort 

 Sumter. The news itself was, that the officer 



commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the 

 troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, 

 acting upon some quasi armistice of the late 

 Administration, (and of the existence of which 

 the present Administration, up to the time the 

 order was despatched, had only too vague and 

 uncertain rumors to fix attention,) had refused 

 to land the troops. To now reenforce Fort 

 Pickens, before a crisis would be reached at 

 Fort Sumter, was impossible rendered so by 

 the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter- 

 named fort. In precaution against such a con- 

 juncture, the Government had, a few days before, 

 commenced preparing an expedition, as well 

 adapted as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, 

 which expedition was intended to be ultimately 

 used, or not, according to circumstances. The 

 strongest anticipated case for using it was now 

 presented ; and it was resolved to send it for- 

 ward. As had been intended, in this contin- 

 gency, it was also resolved to notify the Gov- 

 ernor of South Carolina that he might expect 

 an attempt would be made to provision the 

 fort ; and that, if the attempt should not be re- 

 sisted, there would be no effort to throw in 

 men, arms, or ammunition, without further no- 

 tice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This 

 notice was accordingly given ; whereupon the 

 fort was attacked, and bombarded to its fall, 

 without even awaiting the arrival of the pro- 

 visioning expedition." 



On the 8th of April General Beauregard 

 sent a despatch by telegraph to Secretary 

 Walker, that a notice had that day been given 

 to Governor Pickens and himself, "that pro- 

 visions will be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably or 

 otherwise by force." Such are the facts. If the 

 garrison of Fort Sumter had received no sup- 

 plies, they must have abandoned it in a few 

 days. If they had received supplies of pro- 

 visions merely, they would have been fully as 

 unable to have defended the fort at a future 

 day, as they proved to have been when it was 

 attacked. If Fort Sumter had been reenforced 

 with men and provisions, it had no power of 

 aggression, but its final capture by the Confed- 

 erate Government would have been more diffi- 

 cult and distant. President Davis, however, 

 says: "The conclusion was, that the design of 

 the United States was to place the besieging 

 force at Charleston between the simultaneous 

 fire of the fleet and the fort." 



There were some other facts which occurred 

 at this time of sufficient importance to excite 

 the inquiry whether the capture of Fort Sum- 

 ter was not a political necessity with the Con- 

 federate Government. 



The Convention of the State of Virginia was 

 in session at this time, but manifested no dispo- 

 sition to adopt an ordinance of secession, or to 

 join the Confederate States. The bombard- 

 ment of Fort Sumter begun at 4.30 o'clock on 

 the morning of the 12th of April. At 10 o'clock 

 on the same day the following despatch was 

 sent by telegraph to the President of the State 

 Convention : 



