274 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 



it necessary to adhere to and practise upon the specu- 

 lation concerning the condition of our internal affairs 

 which she has proposed to communicate to us. But 

 however this may be, the United States will not an- 

 ticipate any occasion for a change of the relations 

 which, with scarcely any interruption, have existed 

 between the two nations for three-quarters of a cen- 

 tury, and have been very instrumental in promoting, 

 not merely the prosperity and greatness of each State, 

 but the cause of civil and religious liberty and free in- 

 stitutions throughout the world. 



This Government understands equally the interest 

 of friendly nations and its own in the present emer- 

 gency. If they shall not interfere, the attempt at revo- 

 lution here will cease without inflicting serious evils 

 upon foreign nations. All that they can do by any in- 

 terference, with a view to modify our action, will only 

 serve to prolong the present unpleasant condition of 

 things, and possibly to produce results that would be 

 as universally calamitous as they would be irretriev- 

 able. 



The case, as it now stands, is the simple, ordinary 

 one that has happened at all times and in all countries. 

 A discontented domestic faction seeks foreign inter- 

 vention to overthrow the Constitution and the liberties 

 of its own country. Such intervention, if yielded, is 

 ultimately disastrous to the cause it is designed to aid. 

 Every uncorrupted nation, in its deliberate moments, 

 prefers its own integrity, even with unbearable evils, 

 to division through the power or influence of any for- 

 eign State. This is so in France. It is not less so in 

 this country. Down deep in the heart of the American 

 people deeper than the love of trade, or of freedom 

 deeper than the attachment to any local or sectional 

 interest, or partisan pride or individual ambition 

 deeper than any other sentiment is that one out of 

 which the Constitution of this Union arose, namely, 

 American independence independence of all foreign 

 control, alliance, or influence. Next above it lies the 

 conviction that neither peace, nor safety, nor public 

 liberty, nor prosperity, nor greatness, nor empire, can 

 be attained here with the sacrifice of the unity of the 

 people of North America. Those who, in a frenzy of 

 passion, are building expectations on other principles, 

 do not know what they are doing. Whenever one 

 part of this Union shall be found assuming bonds 

 of dependence or of fraternity towards any foreign 

 people, to the exclusion of the sympathies of their 

 native land, then, even if not before, that spirit will 

 be reawakened which brought the States of this re- 

 public into existence, and which will preserve them 

 united until the common destiny which it opened to 

 them shall be fully and completely realized. 



On the 6th of July, writing to Mr. Dayton, 

 Mr. Seward gives the reasons why a speedy 

 adhesion to the declaration of the Paris Congress 

 had been desired. This letter presents also the 

 aspect of the question of neutral rights as viewed 

 by our Government, and was intended when 

 written to be regarded as a private communica- 

 tion between himself and Mr. Dayton. 



The reason why we wished it done immediately was, 

 that we supposed the French Government would nat- 

 urally feel a deep anxiety about the safety of their 

 commerce, threatened distinctly with privateering by 

 the insurgents, while at the same time, as this Govern- 

 ment had heretofore persistently declined to relinquish 

 the right of issuing letters of marque, it would be ap- 



grehended by France that we too should take up that 

 >rm of maritime warfare in the present domestic con- 

 troversy. We apprehended that the danger of such a 

 case of depredation upon commerce equally by the 

 Government itself, and by its enemies, would operate 

 as- a provocation to France and other commercial na- 

 tions to recognize the insurrectionary party in viola- 

 tion of our national rights and sovereignty. On the 

 contrary, we did not desire to depredate on friendly 

 commerce ourselves, and we thought it our duty to 



prevent such depredations by the insurgents by execut- 

 ingourown laws, which make privateering by disloyal 

 citizens piracy, and punish its pursuit as such. We 

 thought it wise, just, and prudent to give, unasked, 

 guarantees to France and other friendly nations for the 

 security of their commerce from exposure to such dep- 

 redations on either side, at the very moment when we 

 were delivering to them our protest against the recog- 

 nition of the insurgents. The accession to the declara- 

 tion of Paris would be the form in which these guar- 

 antees could be given that for obvious reasons must 

 be more unobjectionable to France and to other com- 

 mercial nations than any other. It was safe on our 

 part, because we tendered it, of course, as the act of 

 this Federal Government, to be obligatory equally upon 

 disloyal as upon loyal citizens. 



The instructions waived the Marcy amendment, 

 (which proposed to exempt private property from con- 

 fiscation in maritime war,) and required yon to propose 

 our accession to the declaration of the Congress of 

 Paris, pure and simple. These were the reasons for 

 this course, namely : First, It was as well understood 

 by this Government then, as it is now by yourself, that 

 an article of that celebrated declaration "prohibits every 

 one of the parties to it from negotiating upon the sub- 

 ject of neutral rights in maritime warfare with any 

 nation not a party to it, except for the adhesion of such 

 outstanding party to the declaration of the Congress of 

 Paris, pure and simple. An attempt to obtain an ac- 

 ceptance of Mr. Marcy's amendment would require a 

 negotiation not merely with France alone, but with all 

 the other original parties of the Congress of Paris, and 

 every Government that has since acceded to the dec- 

 laration. Nay, more: we must obtain their unanimous 

 consent to the amendment before being able to commit 

 ourselves or to engage any other nation, however well 

 disposed, to commit itself to us on the propositions 

 actually contained in the declaration. On the other 

 hand, each nation which is a party to the declaration 

 of Paris is at liberty to stipulate singly with us for 

 acceptance of that declaration for the government of 

 our neutral relations. If, therefore, we should waive 

 the Marcy proposition, or leave it for ultimate consid- 

 eration, we could establish a complete agreement 

 between ourselves and France on a subject which, if 

 it should be left open, might produce consequences 

 very much to be deprecated. It is almost unnecessary 

 to say that what we proposed to France was equally 

 and simultaneously proposed to every other maritime 

 power. In this way we expected to remove every 

 cause that any foreign power could have for the recog- 

 nition of the insurgents as a belligerent power. 



The matter stood in this plain and intelligible way 

 until certain declarations or expressions of the French 

 Government induced you to believe that they would 

 recognize and treat the insurgents as a distinct national 

 power for belligerent purposes. It was not altogether 

 unreasonable that you, being at Paris, should suppose 

 that this Government would think itself obliged to 

 acquiesce in such a course by the Government of 

 France. So assuming, you thought that we would not 

 adhere to our proposition to accede to the declaration, 

 pure and simple, since such a course would, as you 

 thought, be effective to bind this Government without 

 binding the insurgents, and would leave France at 

 liberty to hold us bound, and the insurgents free from 

 the obligations created by our adhesion. Moreover, if 

 we correctly understand your despatch on that subject, 

 you supposed that you might propose our adhesion to 

 the treaty of Paris, not pure and simple, but with the 

 addition of the Marcy proposition in the first instance, 

 and might afterwards, in case of its being declined in 

 that form, withdraw the addition, and then propose our 

 accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple. 



While you were acting on these views on your side 

 of the Atlantic, we on this side, not less confident in 

 our strength than in our rights, as you are now awaro, 

 were acting on another view, which is altogether dif- 

 ferent, namely, that we shall not acquiesce in any 

 declaration of the Government of France that assumes 

 that this Government is not now, as it always has beeu, 



