PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



603 



and not In mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. 

 The Government will not assail you. You can have 

 no contlict without being yourselves the aggressors. 

 You have no oath registelred in Heaven to destroy the 

 Government, while f shall have the most solemn one 

 to ' preserve, protect, and defend it." 



I am loth t<> close. \\"e are not enemies, but friends. 

 We must not be enemies. Though passion may have 

 strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The 

 mystic chords of memory, stretching from every bat- 

 tle-tield and patriot grave to every living heart and 

 hearth-stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell 

 the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as sure- 

 ly they will be, by the better angels of our nature. 



\GE of President Lincoln at the First, or 

 Extra Session of the 37th Congress, July 4, 

 1861. 



e Senate and 

 ffou-se of liepresentatitts : 



Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, 

 as authorized by the Constitution, your attention is not 

 called to any ordinary subject of legislation. 



At the be'ginning of the present presidential term, 

 four months ago, the functions of the Federal Govern- 

 ment were found to be generally suspended within the 

 several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, 

 Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only 

 those of the Post-Office Department. 



Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dock- 

 yards, custom houses and the like, including the mov- 

 able and stationary property in and about'tbem, had 

 been seized, and were held in open hostility to this 

 Government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, 

 and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort 

 Sumter, in Charleston harbor, South Carolina. The 

 forts thus seized had been put in improved condition, 

 new ones had been built, and armed forces had been 

 organized and were organizing, all avowedly with the 

 same hostile purpose. 



The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal 

 Government in and near these States were either be- 

 sieged or menaced by warlike preparations, and es- 

 pecially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well- 

 protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality 

 to the best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as 

 perhaps ten to one. A disproportionate share of the 

 Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their 

 way into these States, and had been seized to be used 

 against the Government. Accumulations of the public 

 revenue, lying within them, had been seized for the 

 same object. The Navy was scattered in distant seas, 

 leaving but a very small part of it within the immedi- 

 ate reach of the Government. Officers of the Federal 

 Army and Navy had resigned in great numbers ; and 

 of those resigning, a large proportion had taken up 

 arms against the Government. Simultaneously, and 

 in connection with all this, the purpose to sever the 

 Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance 

 with this purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in 

 each of these States, declaring the States, respectively, 

 to be separated from the National Union. A formula 

 for instituting a combined government of these States 

 had been promulgated ; and this illegal organization, 

 In the character of Confederate States! was already in- 

 voking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign 

 Powers. 



Finding this condition of things, and believing it to 

 be an imperative duty upon the incoming Executive 

 to prevent, if possible, the consummation of such at- 

 tempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means 

 to that end became indispensable. This choice was 

 made, and was declared in the inaugural address. The 

 policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful 

 measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It 

 sought only to hold the public places and property not 

 already wrested from the Government, and to collect 

 the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, 

 and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the 



mails, at Government expense, to the very people who 

 were resisting the Government; and it gave repeated 

 pledges against anv disturbance to any of the people, 

 or any of "their rights. Of all that which a President 

 might constitutionallv and justifiably lo in such a case, 

 every thins was forborne, without which it was be- 

 lieved possible to keep the Government on foot. 



On the 5th of March, (the present incumbent's first 

 full day in office,) a letter of Major Anderson, com- 

 manding at Fort Sumter, written on the -^\\\ of Feb- 

 ruary, and received at the War Department on the 4th 

 of March, was by that Department placed in his hands. 

 This letter expressed the professional opinion of the 

 writer, that reinforcements could not be thrown into 

 that fort within the time for bis relief, rendered neces- 

 sary by the- limited supply of provisions, and with a 

 view of holding possession of the same, with a force of 

 less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined 

 men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers 

 of his command, and their memoranda on the subject 

 were made enclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The 

 whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General 

 Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in 

 opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, 

 consulting with other officers, both of the army and 

 the navyT and at the end of four days came reluctant- 

 ly, but "decidedly, to the same conclusion as before. 

 He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient 

 force was then at the control of the Government, or 

 could be raised and brought to the ground within the 

 time when the provisions in the fort would be ex- 

 hausted. In a purely military point of view, this re- 

 duced the duty of the Administration in the case to 

 the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of 

 the fort. 



It was believed, however, that to so abandon that 

 position, under the circumstances, would be utterly 

 ruinous ; that the necessity under which it was to be 

 done would not be fully understood ; that by many it 

 would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; 

 that at home it would discourage the friends of the 

 Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure 

 to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it 

 would be our national destruction consummated. This 

 could not be allowed. Starvation was cot yet upon 

 the garrison ; and ere it would be reached Fort Pickena 

 might be ret nforced. This last would be a clear indi- 

 cation of policy, and would better enable the eonntrj 

 to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military 

 necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent 

 for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brook- 

 lyn into ForT Pickens. This order could not go by 

 land, but must take the longer and slower route by 

 sea. The first return news'from the order was re- 

 ceived just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. 

 The news itself was that the officer commanding the 

 Sabine. to which vessel the troops had been transferred 

 from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice 

 of the late Administra|io_n, (and of the existence of 

 which the present Administration, up to the time the 

 order was despatched, had only too vague and uncer- 

 tain rumors to fix attention,) h'ad refused to land the 

 troops. To now reenforce Fort Pickens before a crisis 

 would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible- 

 rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in 

 the latter-named fort. In precaution against snch a 

 conjuncture, the Government had a few days before 

 commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted 

 as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition 

 was intended to be ultimately used or not, according 

 to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for 

 using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send 

 it forward. As had been intended in this contingency, 

 it was also resolved to notify the Governor of South 

 Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be 

 made to provision the fort ; and that, if the attempt 

 should not be resisted, there would be no effort to 

 throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further 

 notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This no- 

 tice was accordingly given ; whereupon the fort was 

 attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even 



