NCE OF I'. 



HALANVK UK TUAHK. 



Trr*""**- 1 . ore alto plane. The distance between the extreme knife 

 ed U about 15-0 inches, the length of i^h about 1-05 inch. Instead 

 of having an index pointing downwards, aa is uul in lalanoss of this 

 description, the beam ha* a pointer at each end, and a graduated Male 

 is oairied by an aim attached to the pillar of th* balance at a little 

 diiUaoe behind the left-hand pointer. Affixed to the right hand end 

 of the beam U a thin .lip of ivory, a little more than halfan inch long, 

 divided into unace* of about 001 inch each, or subtending an angle of 

 about 5' each at the middle knife-edge. Tbii scale is viewed through a 

 compound microscope, having a aingTe horizontal wire in the fociu of 

 the eye-piece. The dutanoebetween two divitiona of the scale , u Been 

 through the microaoope, subtends an angle of 37'. This contrivance 

 for determining the position of the beam at the extremity of an oncil- 

 lation was found so superior to a scale and pointer viewed with the 

 naked eye, that after a trial of a few days, the scale at the left hand 

 was found to be a useless incuinbrance, and was accordingly removed. 

 A screen was interposed between the observer and the front of the 

 balance-caw, having a small opening opposite to the eye-piece of the 

 microscope, through which the scale could be seen." 



BALANCE OF POWER. The notion upon which this phrase U 

 founded appears to be the following. When a number of separate and 

 sovereign states have grown up beside each other, the entire system 

 which they constitute may be conceived to be in cqitiiibrio, or evenly 

 balanced, so long as no single one of them is in a condition to inter- 

 fere with the independence of any of the rest. 



But as in such a system of states so connected there are generally a 

 few which may be considered as leading powers, it is by these being 

 being made to counterpoise each other that the balance U principally 

 m .j n tinM it u in this way only that the safety of the smaller states 

 can be secured. Thus, in the ancient world, after the destruction of 

 Carthage, there was no power any where left strong enough to cope 

 with tome ; and the consequence was, that, one after another, the 

 countries that yet remained sovereign powers fell under her dominion, 

 until she became the mistress of the ancient world. 



On the contrary, so long as the power of one great state (however 

 far surpassing in extent of territory, or other resources of strength and 

 influence, many of thone in its neighbourhood) can be kept in check, 

 or, in other words, balanced by that of another, the independence of 

 the smaller states is secured against both. Neither will be disposed 

 to allow its rival to add to its power by the conquest or absorption of 

 any of these minor and otherwise defenceless members of the system. 

 And in this way it happens that each state, whether great or small, 

 has an interest and a motive to exert itself in the preservation of the 

 balance. 



This point of policy is so obvious, that it must have been acted upon 

 in all ages, by every assemblage of states so connected or situated as 

 to influence one another. There may have been leas or more of skill 

 or wisdom in the manner of acting upon it, or the attempt to act upon 

 it may have been more or less successful, in different cases; but to 

 suppose that its importance had been overlooked by any states that 

 ever existed in the circumstances described, would be to suppose such 

 states to have been destitute of the instinct of self-preservation. 



Hume (see his ' Essays,' part ii. essay 7th) has shown conclu- 

 sively, in opposition to the opinion sometimes expressed, that ancient 

 politicians were well acquainted with the principle of the balance of 

 power, although, as far as appears, they did not designate it by that 

 name. " In all the politics of Greece," he observes, " the anxiety with 

 regard to the balance of power is apparent, and is expressly pointed 

 out U> us even by the ancient historians. Thucydides (lib. i.) repre- 

 sent* the league which was formed against Athens, and which pro- 

 duced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to this principle ; and 

 after the decline of Athens, when the Tbebans and Lacedaemonians 

 disputed for sovereignty, we find that the Athenians (as well as many 

 other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and 

 endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported Thebes against 

 Sparta, till the great victory gained by Epaminondaa at Lcuctra : after 

 which they immediately went over to the conquered from generosity, 

 as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealousy of the con- 

 querors." " Whoever," he adds, " will read Demosthenes' oration for 

 the llegalopolitans, may see the utmost refinements on this principle 

 that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculating" 

 He afterwards quotes a passage from Polybius (lib. i. c. 83), in which 

 that writer states that Micro, king of Syracuse, though the ally of 

 BOOM, yet sent assist anoe to the Carthaginians, during the war of the 

 auxiliaries, " esteeming it requisite, both in order to retain his do- 

 minions in Sicily, and to preserve the Roman friendship, that Carthage 

 should be safe ; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, 

 without contest or opposition, to execute every purpose and under- 

 taking. And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence; for 

 that is never on any account to be overlooked ; nor ought such a force 

 ever to be thrown into one land as to incapacitate the neighbouring 

 states from defending their rights against it." " Mere,' y remarks 

 Hume, " U the aim of modern politics pointed out in express 

 t- r*M ' 



It must be confessed, however, that the preservation of the balance 

 of power was never so distinctly recognised and adopted as a prin.-ipl- 

 of general policy in ancient as it has been in modern times. The 

 of the principle of the balance, subsequently 



to the subversion of the Roman empire, may be first traced in the 

 conduct of the several Italian republics. It appears clearly to have 

 formed part of what may be called the public law of these rival 

 sovereignties from about the co-nmenccmeut of the 15th century. 

 From the commencement of the next century it became an influencing 

 principle in the general policj of Europe. 



The leading rule l.y u huh l.luu ever since then been attempted to 

 maintain the balance in questii'i, may be stated to be the opposing of 

 every new arrangement which threatens either materially to augment 

 the strength of one of the greater powers, or to diminish that of 

 another. Thus, first Austria, and afterwards France, have been the 

 great objects of the jealousy and vigilance of the other states of 

 Europe. While the supremacy of the Empire was united in the 

 person of Charles V. to the monarchy of Spain, that province was 

 naturally regarded as formidable both by France and England. If he 

 could have effected a permanent alliance with either of these powers, 

 or could have even induced one of them to stand aside and acquiesce, 

 there can be little doubt that he would have taken that occa 

 attempt to crush the other. The vast possessions of Philip II. 

 appeared to call for the same watchfulness and opposition in regard 

 to his projects, from all other states that valued their independence. 

 In later times, the ambition of Louis XIV. of France, and the scheme 

 concerted under his management to unite in one family the crowns of 

 France and Spain, drew upon him, in like manner, the general hos- 

 tility of Europe. There can be no manner of doubt, that, if the 

 designs of this sovereign had not been thus resisted, France would 

 have become a century earlier than it did the mistress of the conti- 

 nent, and the independence of all other nations would, for a time at 

 least, have been extinguished. Our own liberties, as founded upon the 

 Revolution of 1683, could, in such circumstances, certainly not have 

 been maintained. 



It is nothing to the purpose to argue that the maintenance of the 

 balance of power has often involved the nations of Europe in contests 

 with each other, which, if they had disregarded that priin-ipli . \\ :M 

 not have taken place, at least, not at the time. It may be better that 

 all nations should be subject to one, than that each should preserve its 

 independence; but that is not the question here : if nations will be 

 sovereign and independent, they must fight for their sovereignty, as 

 men must do for any other possession, when it ia attacked. 



But some persons appear to think that we in this country have 

 nothing to do with the maintenance of the so-called balance of power 

 in Europe, because we live not on the continent, but in an island 

 by ourselves. If the whole continent were reduced under suV 

 to a single despot, we certainly should not long remain independent. 

 The protection which we now possess from the sea with which we are 

 surrounded would, in the case supposed, certainly become insufficient. 

 The water alone would not keep off an enemy, if we had not a navy 

 to ride on it ; and we could not maintain a great navy without our 

 foreign trade; which, with all the rest of Europe united under one 

 head against us, certainly could not subsist. 



The maintenance of the principle of the balance of power, h<>v 

 although it has no doubt given occasion to some wars, has probably 

 prevented more. Its general recognition has, to a certain extent, 

 united all the states of Europe into one great confederacy, and 

 habituated each of the leading powers to the expectation of a most 

 formidable resistance in case of its making any attempt to eu< 

 upon the rights of its neighbours. It is not sufficient objection to say 

 that such attempts have been actually made. They would have been 

 made much oftencr had there been no such general understanding as 

 we have spoken of. It must have operated as a great discouragement 

 and check to the schemes of ambitious potentates, to know that, from 

 the first consolidation of the modern European system down to the 

 partition of Poland in 1772 a period, we may say, of three centuries 

 not the smallest independent state had suffered extinction, or had been 

 even very seriously curtailed of power or territory, notwithstanding all 

 the wars for the purpose of conquest and aggrandisement that had 

 been waged during that long interval. 



BALANCE OF TRADK. In a tract published in 1D77, called 

 ' England's Great Happiness/ which is quoted by Mr. M'C'nll 

 the introductory discourse to his edition of Smith's ' \\YV.th ; 

 Nations,' is the following dialogue between " Complaint" and " Con- 

 tent:" 



" Complaint. What think you of the French trade which draws away 

 our money by wholesale 1 Mr. Kortrey gives on account that they get 

 l.SQO.OOW. a year from us. 



" Content. Tis a great sum ; but, perhaps, were it put to a vote in 

 a wise council, whether for that reason the trade should be left off, 

 'twould go in the negative. I must confess I hod rather they'd use 

 our goods than our money ; but if not, I would not lose the getting of 

 ten pounds because I can t get an hundred. . . . I'll suppose John-o- 

 Nokes to be a butcher, Dick-a-Styles to be on exchange-man, yourself 

 a lawyer, will you buy no meat or ribands, or your wife a fine Indian 

 gown or fan, because they will not Irm-k with you for indentures which 

 they have need of T I suppose no ; but if you get money enough of 

 others, you care not though you give it away in specie for these things. 

 I think 'tis the same cose." 



The year after this sensible and conclusive passage was written, th. 

 French trade was prohibited for three years; and in the reign <>f 



