i PLATO. 



the work U inconsistent with Plato's views as developed in the ' Re- 

 public.' Hut with regard to the non-introduction of Socrates, surely 

 no argument of spuriousness can be drawn from this : because Socrates 

 was generally the chief speaker, it was not necessary that he should 

 always tx to, and it is probable that the ' Laws' were written with an 

 object totally different from that which Plato generally proposed to 

 hiuirelf. With regard to the style, it may be argued, with Cousin, 

 that the ' Laws' had not received the last touches of the author's pen; 

 and it is said that Pbilippus found the work on the waxen tablets, and 

 copied it out : and with regard to the discrepancies between the ' Laws' 

 and the 'Republic,' Ast seems to have overlooked the distinction 

 which Plato himself has drawn between the two works ; for the philo- 

 sopher says that the second state is not intended to be a perfect one, 

 but only so relatively ; besides, the points of discrepancy which have 

 been noticed arc not such as to affect any leading principle in Plato's 

 system of ethics; the age fixed for marriage is different in the two 

 works, there is no military caste in the ' Laws,' and the cruel and 

 heartless socialism of the ' Republic' is not mentioned in it : but all 

 these are objections of little weight, and even if they were more difficult 

 to encounter, they would be at once overthrown by the express and 

 positive testimony of Aristotle to the genuineness of the work, and by 

 the internal evidence which must convince every intelligent reader 

 than no man but Plato then living in Greece could have written a 

 treatise at once 10 comprehensive and so profound. Schleiermacher's 

 arrangement of the works of Plato corresponds in its main features 

 with the one suggested above ; it deserves however a separate mention 

 on account of the celebrity of this writer and the important effects 

 which have been produced by his acute and careful examination of 

 the connection of thought running through the dialogues. He also 

 divides them into three classes, 1, elementary dialogues, or those 

 which contain the germs of all that follows, of logic as the, instrument 

 of philosophy, and of ideas as its proper object ; consequently, of the 

 possibility of the conditions of knowledge ; these are the ' 1'lucdrus,' 

 ' Lysis,' ' Protagoras,' ' Laches,' ' Charmides,' ' Euthyphro,' and ' Par- 

 menides.' to which he subjoins, as an appendix, the ' Apologia,' ' Crito,' 

 ' Io,' ' Hippias minor,' ' Hipparchua,' 'Minos,' and 'Alcibiades II. ;' 2, 

 progressive dialogues, which treat of the distinction between philoso- 

 phical and common knowledge in their united application to the two 

 proposed and real sciences, ' Ethics ' and ' Physics ;' these are the 

 ' Gorgias,' ' Theastetug,' ' Heno,' ' Euthydemus,' ' Cratylus,' ' Sophistes,' 

 ' Politicus,' ' Symposium,' ' Phsedo;* and ' Philebns,' with an appendix 

 containing the 'Theages,' 'Erasto,' 'Alcibiades I.,' 'Menexenus,' 

 ' Hippias major,' and ' Clitophon ;' 3, constructive dialogues, in which 

 the practical is completely united with the speculative ; these are the 

 ' Republic,' ' Tiuiaeus,' and ' Critias,' with an appendix consisting of 

 the ' Laws,' the ' Epistles,' 4c. We cannot here enter upon a criticism 

 of this arrangement ; we will only remark that we strongly object to 

 Schleiermacher's separation of the ' Theaitetus ' from the ' Sophistes ' 

 and ' Politicus,' which form, with it, a trilogy of dialogues, like the 

 three which are placed together in his third class ; and we think that, 

 according to his own principle, as the ' Phiedo ' is preparatory to the 

 ' Tinueus,' and as the ' Pbilebus,' as an approximate discussion of the 

 idea of the good, is preliminary to tho ' Republic,' these two dialogues 

 should occupy the same relative position as the two which they precede. 

 Thus much may suffice for the arrangement of the several dialogues 

 according to some real train of succession. According to their con- 

 tents, they also form three classes : the dialectical, ethical, and physical 

 dialogues. The formal division of philosophy into these three parts 

 U subsequent to Plato's time, as it was first established by Xenocrates 

 and Aristotle (Sextus Empir., 'Adv. Math.,' vii. 16); but Plato cer- 

 tainly bad started the idea of such a division, which ia distinctly 

 attributed to him by Cicero (' Aead. Post,' L, c. 5, 19), and it is 

 clearly discernible in his works, though many of them may not be 

 assignable to any one part in particular : thus the ' Thextetus ' and 

 its two connected dialogues are clearly dialectical ; the ' Republic ' and 

 ' Laws ' ethical ; and the ' Timama ' physical. In endeavouring there- 

 fore to give a general view of Plato's philosophical system, we shall 

 adhere to this division, and consider first his views on dialectics, on 

 which his whole system was based, and then his applications of these 

 views to the two provinces of moral and natural philosophy. 



I. Plato's system of dialectics is baited upon a view of the defini' 

 tion ' real,' which he wot the first to bring forward. The definition, 

 he saw, contisu in generalisation and division namely, it is made 

 either per geinu or f*r differentiate The former process is the base 

 of the second ; the second is the development of the former. Con 

 sequently, as science, according to Plato, depends upon dialectics 

 and dialectics on the definition ' real,' in order to general scientific 

 reasoning we must generalise and classify KOT* tior, <ntoveiy and KOTO 

 yJrot tuutflrtir. The ideal of Plato are, strictly speaking, nothing 

 more than general terms, the main part of the definition 'real,' as 

 Leibnitz calls it, and Plato seems to have constructed his theory o 

 ideas as a mean between the contradictory systems of Heracleitus anc 

 the Eleatics. The Jferaclftiean doctrine of a perpetual flux, modified 

 into the dogma of Protagoras, tivrur ptrpoy ftytywiroi, " The indi 

 vicinal man is the standard of all things," was directly opposed to 

 Plato's notion of science as based upon an idea or general definition 

 which U in itself its own ground and authority ; for it peremptorily 

 denied being (ru, oixrla), and set up in its stead a mere geneiil or 



PLATO. 87S 



becoming (ylyytffiat), so that nothing could be predicated of anything 

 as fixed. On the other hand, the Kleatic doctrines 1, that all is one, 

 and that there is no multiplicity ; 2, that all is one immutable being, 

 and that there is no becoming, no change, no generation, augmentation, 

 or decay were equally opposed to Plato's belief in the reality of 

 sensation, for they absolutely denied the genait. Now as Plato was 

 convinced of the reality, both of the permanent being (ovala}, namely, 

 of the genus signified by the general term, and of the mutable genesis 

 of the phenomena, of the idea as well as of the multiplicity of things, 

 t was necessary that he should form some conception of science which 

 would admit of both. The general science which Plato set forth wits> 

 this view was called dialectic, or the art of conversing, and was based 

 on an examination (the first which had been attempted) of the syntax 

 of the Greek language. In order to make a sent nee, to affirm or 

 deny anything, to express a judgment of the mind, it was necessary, 

 no saw, to have at least a tubject of which something was to be 

 affirmed or denied, and a predicate which affirmed or denied some- 

 thing of the subject This predicate would generally be a verb, but 

 it might be an adjective, as the Greek sentence tolerated an om 

 of the copula. Words, he says, whether subjects (oyo/tara) or predicates 

 \jrt\iMTa.), express neither entity (oixrla) ror action (pafu), neither 

 being nor becominy, unless they are joined together in a sentence, and 

 then some tense of becominy is predicated of some state of being : 

 STJAOI 70^ ijSij irou TtJTt irtpl TWV uyruy (the predicates), 4 fiyyopfvoir 

 (present), J) -ytyovoTuy (past), *, in\\6yr<a>i (future), ol oinc 

 oropafft ftiyoy, aAAi n Trtpalyti <rvnTr\fnui> T& ^ijiiara rots i>r6fuuriy. 

 (' Sophist,' p. 262, D.) He speaks here of the mere name of the sub- 

 ject as predicating being of it, for we may always predicate being of 

 every individual which has a name, in addition to tho particular 

 nature which it has ('Sophist,' p. 251, A); indeed the act of naming 

 or of affixing a general name, the name of the genus, to the indi- 

 vidual, is the first step in classification, and in itself gives a fixity to 

 things which is opposed to generation and becoming. (' TheaUetua,' 

 p. 157, A.) Thinking being the discourse of the soul with itself 

 (' Theastet.,' p. 189, E ; ' Sophist,' p. 263, E), and ipeeck being a com- 

 bination of words so as to form discourse for the cognisance of 

 another (' Sophist.,' p. 259, E), thinking is a similar combination of 

 thoughts for the cognisance of a man himself : and thus the science 

 which regulates the combination of thoughts may be called !iaAe-nrj;, 

 or the science of discourse. (' Sophist,' p. 252, E.) It is a science 

 presiding over the faculty which investigates the properties of all 

 sensations. (Thcmtet,' p. 185, 13.) This science depends upon defini- 

 tion. Now definition necessarily presumes that some general term 

 should be given, including a multiplicity of objects (' Euthyphr.,' 

 p. 6, D; 'ThejBtet,' p. 146, D; p. 185, D), and it must then be 

 explained wherein the term to be defined differs from others which 

 belong to the same genus with it, (' Euthyphr.,' p. 11, E. ; ' Thuctet,' 

 p. 208, D.) The second process, or the per differentiam, is subordinate 

 to the former, which is the all-importaut one in this science of 

 dialectics. 



The great object then of the dialectician U to establish what are 

 those general terms which ore the object of the mind when a man 

 thinks. It is clear that they cannot be objects of sense, for these 

 are in a continual state of transition. (' Parmeuid.,' p. 152, A.) 

 They must therefore be of the number of those things which wo 

 know by means of reflection (ttdrota) through the understanding 

 (AoyiffjuJ?, yovs, yvtiats), for these things beiug fixed, belong to oiiirta, 

 and can become the objects of science or certain knowledge. (' Paruieu.,' 

 p. 129, E. ; 'Phasd.,' p. 65, C; 'Respubl.,' vil, p. 532, A.) Every 

 thing of this kind is an tJSos, that is, a general term, (' Resp.,' x., 

 p. 596, A; ' Lcgg.,' x., p. 835-5), or quiddity ( Phadr.,' p. 237, I'..) 

 Consequently there is an idea, or tISos, of everything that is 

 by a general name. Hence the formula for tho universal is neither 

 to only, as the Eleatics said, nor iroAAi only, as the Heracleiteans 

 asserted, but <V KO! voAAct, " the one and the many," namely, the 

 subject of which many predicates may be asserted, and which there- 

 fore appears as manifold. ('Respubl.,' v. p. 476, A; 'Sophist,' 

 p. 251, A; 'Parmenid,' p. 129, E, etc.) From all this it will appear 

 that Plato, like a writer of our own time, regarded philosophy as an 

 undressing of the world, as the means of discovering the certainty 

 and eternity, which are in this world hidden and wrapped up in the 

 garb of the mutable and the temporal. For if the sensible U true, 

 which he maintains against the Eleatics, it is true only through the 

 essence of which it partakes (' Phscd.,' p. 100, C ; ' Euthydem,' p. 300, 

 K. ; 'Sympos.,' p. 210, E), and therefore the object of philosophy 

 must be to strip off this garment of the sensible, and ascend to tho 

 supreme idea which contains all the subordinate ones, and which has 

 nothing in it capable of being apprehended by the senses, for indi- 

 vidual ideas are but hypothetical notions, for which a true ground can 

 only be given by a higher hypothesis. ('Respubl.,' vi. p. 511, B. com- 

 pared with 'Pbsod.,' p. 100, A, ' Philebus.,' p. 20, D, and Respubl.,' 

 p. 610, C ) This supreme idea is God ; and thus God is the common 

 standard of all things, and not tho individual man, as Protagoras said. 

 ('Legg.,'iv. p. 716, C.) 



Before we pass from this outline of Plato's dialectical system to its 

 application to ethics and physics, it will be advantageous to the reader 

 that he should see how Plato made this application himself. With 

 this view we shall give a sketch of the mode of reasoning which the 



