873 



PLATO. 



PLATO. 



874 



philosopher has adopted in two most important and interesting 

 dialogues, the ' Gorgias ' and ' Thesetetus,' which are the counterparts 

 of one another, and which Schleiermacher places at the head of the 

 second class of Plato's works, the dialogues of which occupy a middle 

 position between the elementary and constructive ones, and treat not 

 of the method of philosophy, as is the case with dialogues of the first 

 class, but of its object. The opposition between these two dialogues 

 has been well pointed out by Schleiermacher, in his introduction to 

 the former of them (p. 5, seqq.). The highest and most -general 

 problem of science is to seize upon essence and being while still 

 enveloped in the fleeting and transitory phautasmagoria of the senses, 

 to represent the essence as that which is real and good in the being, 

 and to point out and reconcile the apparent opposition between these 

 two contrasted objects of contemplation. There are two ways of 

 effecting this : the immediate method, or that by which we pass at 

 once from the true to its semblance ; the indirect method, or that by 

 which we pass from the feeling of opposition, as a datum, to the 

 primary intention, which forms the starting point in the other case. 

 In the opposition which it is the object of these methods to reconcile, 

 the antithesis is between being and semblance : in ethics this amounts 

 to the antithesis of moral good, in the province of being, to pleasure, 

 or pleasurable feelings, in the province of semblance ; and in physics 

 this is the antithesis of science, in the one domain, to sensation, in the 

 other. The ' Gorgias ' is the development of the former antithesis ; 

 the ' Thesetetus ' of the latter. 



The interlocutors in the ' Gorgias' are Gorgias, the celebrated sophist 

 and rhetorician ; Polus, a rich and arrogant Agrigentine, who had 

 written a book ou rhetoric ; and Callicles of Acharnso, an ambitious 

 demagogue ; to whom are opposed Socrates and his friend Chaerephon, 

 the latter of whom however takes but little share in the discussion. 

 The business of the dialogue is divided into three parts. I. The refu- 

 tation of Gorgiaa with regard to the subject of rhetoric. Gorgias says 

 the subjects of rhetoric are justice and injustice, but that the rheto- 

 rician sometimes acts unjustly : " but," says Socrates, " if justice and 

 injustice are the subjects of the rhetorician's art, the rhetorician, as 

 such, must be jubt always: therefore Gorgias contradicts himself." 

 II. The refutation of Polus with regard to the distinction between 

 the good or the beautiful, and the pleasant. Polus fays " to act 

 unjustly has less of the beautiful (it is ofcrxioc) than to suffer injury, 

 but the latter has less of the good (it is KOKUII>) than the former." 

 Socrates replies " the beautiful (ri> Ka\bv) excels in pleasure (riSovij), in 

 utility (i</>tAeia) or in both : the deformed (rb aiVxpi") is so called 

 from the pain (AOTTJ) or evil (KaKbv) which attends it, or from both : to 

 act unjustly (rb atixilv) does not surpass the suffering of au injury (rb 

 aSiKfiaBcu) in the fain which attends it ; consequently it must surpass 

 it in the evil or badness of it, therefore it is both worse (KOKIOV), and 

 has also less of the beautiful (rb Ka\6v) ; and therefore it will not be a 

 reasonable object of preference. Again, it is well for the unjust man 

 to be punished; for the act and the suffering are homologous : now the 

 act of punishing an unjust man is just; therefore the suffering of the 

 unjust man is just also: consequently, as before, it is Ka\6y; therefore 

 it has some excellence either of pleasure or of profit : but its excel- 

 lence is not of pleasure; therefore it is profitable for him. III. 

 The refutation of C'allicles with regard to the proposition that all 

 good is exhausted in the pleasant. Callicles asserts that though rb 

 a5i*iV has more of deformity than rb aStKeiadai, this is only by law or 

 convention, and not by nature. For rb aSixtiv is an endeavour to get 

 more than others, and this is natural. Socrates first confutes Callicles' 

 idea of a distinction between law and nature (p. 488, B. 489), and 

 then brings three decisive arguments against his position that every- 

 thing pleasant is good, the first in p. 495, D, the second in p. 495, E 

 497, D, the third in p. 499, E 499, B. To escape from the conse- 

 quences of these arguments, Callicles makes a distinction between 

 good and bad pleasures ; but Socrates refutes this at once by showing 

 that if we are to make this distinction, it follows that we seek for an 

 object not because it is pleasurable, but because it is good (p. 499, B, 

 500, A) ; and then maintains that the rhetoric, or what is the same 

 thing, the political principles of demagogues, like Callicles, are morally 

 bad, for they have pleasure for their object, not good. Socrates then 

 proceeds by himaelf to show that happiness consists in justice and 

 order (p. 506-508) ; that life is not in itself desirable (p. 508-512), and 

 o on : and the dialogue concludes with a fable relating to the state of 

 the soul after death. 



The interlocutors in the ' Thesetetus ' are Theodoras, a mathematician 

 of Cyrene, who is represented as attached to the materialism of Pro- 

 tagoraa. and a young Athenian named Theastetus, who carries on nearly 

 the whole of the argument with Socrates. The dialogue consists of a 

 refutation of three positions with regard to science (i-marri^ri), whjch 

 are put into the mouth of Thesetetus. (I.) That science is sensation 

 (afaSriais). This, says (Socrates, is much the same as the dogma of 

 Protagoras, " the individual man is the standard of all things " (TT&VTUV 

 pl-Tfoti &t>epanros) ; for his Qaii/erai, ' it appears,' is equivalent to your 

 alaSdmfuu, '1 perceive;' but in this opinion of Protagoras is implied 

 (1) that there is only agenesis and no being, and that all things are the 

 :iiig of flowing and motion; (2) that the objects of the senses 

 have neither an objective nor a subjective existence, but exist only by 

 the concurrence of object and subject; that is to say, according to his 

 principle, rb -nor K/njo-fi fan, ' every thing is motion.' Now there are 



two kinds of motion, (1) active, (2) passive ; the first comprehends the 

 ulvSrifftis (perceptions), the second the aiVOrrra (things perceived), and 

 qualities are generated from the concurrence of the percipient and the 

 perceivable. Hence it follows, according to Protagoras, that nothing is 

 of itself, but cornea into being by the instrumentality of something 

 else. 



Socrates next proceeds to show, in defence of Protagoras, that the 

 objection in respect of dreams and madness is of no force, aud that the 

 perceptions of a person mad or asleep are true as far as they go ; for, 

 in the first place, we have no means of proving that we are not asleep 

 when we think ourselves awake ; and next, it may be shown that, 

 whatever we perceive, we alone perceive it, and that therefore the 

 perception, if it is a perception at all, must be a true one. The opinion 

 of Thesetetus, thus far established, is of no validity unless we admit 

 that Protagoras has overthrown his pretensions to superior wisdom by 

 advancing this doctrine. Socrates however concedes that Protagoras 

 might reasonably object to this confutation as not amounting to a 

 regular proof. In the next place then he shows that if perception is 

 science, we arrive at the absurd conclusion that it is possible to 

 remember a thing once known, and yet not to know it. He checks 

 himself however by suggesting (p. 114, C) that this reductio ad 

 absurdum has been obtained by an acquiescence in the common, 

 acceptations of terms, and then undertakes to defend the doctrine of 

 Protagoras as far as it will go. Speaking then in the person of Pro- 

 tagoras, he begins by denying that perception (ataS-qms) and memory 

 (jurtlini) are the same affection (m0oj). Next, he denies that he con- 

 siders all men alike in wisdom. He says that some opinions may be 

 better than others, but he denies that any are false ; and having, in 

 the name of Protagoras, found fault with himself for his mode of 

 arguing, he invites Theodorus to answer him in Protagoras's name. 

 Theodoras having reluctantly consented to do so, Socrates proceeds 

 (p. 170, A) to refute seriously the ledvTur peTpov uvOptowos of Protagoras. 

 In the first place he asserts that almost every action of man implies 

 the belief that there are different degrees of wisdom, aud therefore 

 that there is such a thing as false opinion. Next he shows tbat 

 Protagoras himself must confess his opiniou to be false, if it be con- 

 ceded that most people think it so, and that all these think rightly. 

 Again, this rule of Protagoras will not apply to the profitable ; aud 

 tbis Socrates, after a digression on the difference between the babbling 

 politician and the true philosopher, proceeds (p. 177, C) to prove by 

 showing that the profitable belongs to the future, and that no one 

 excepting the man of science can judge of the future as respecting 

 the object of his science. These two last conclusions Theodorus 

 admits to be decisive (p. 179, B, C); but Socrates doubts if the 

 refutation of Protagoras as regards the present be made out, unless the 

 Heracleitean doctrine be also refuted. This then is the next step. 

 In the first place he makes Theodorus concede that all things are 

 moved according to both kinds of motion, that is, change of place and 

 change of form. Then alluding to his former distinction of TO. irowvura 

 =:TO aia&Tird, and ra Trd<rxovTa=rd alaBainintva, and to what he said 

 about the effects of their concurrence, he shows that, according to this 

 doctrine, no quality can be predicated of anything; and that we 

 neither can be said to perceive, nor yet not to perceive, that is, neither 

 to have science nor to have it not ; and hence every proposition is 

 equally right and equally wrong, and nothing is left but the oiiS' Swas. 

 To this Socrates adds (p. 184, C) that the senses are the St 'ou, not the 

 <5 alffOav6fj.f6a the mere instruments, not the causes of sensations; 

 we perceive each sort or quality by a different !< 'ou, or organ, and 

 consequently must compare them, &c., by some other means than by 

 the senses themselves, that is, the tyvxh &vrij tcaO' avT-fiv, " the soul 

 considered as unconnected with the senses," is the subject of essence 

 and truth, and therefore science and sensation are different, for science 

 is not without essence and truth. " Hence it follows," says Socrates, 

 " that we must seek for science in that name, whatever it is, which is 

 given to the soul when it is engaged in abstract speculation" (p. 187, 

 A). From this, Theajtetus asserts (II.) that science is right conception 

 (?j dA7j07)s 5<ia) ; and when he is driven from this, after a series of 

 subtle disquisitions on the nature of false conception, he maintains 

 (III.) that science is right conception combined with reasonable 

 explanation (p. 201, D). This is discussed with reference to the 

 different meanings of \oyos, and the opinion is finally refuted. The 

 dialogue ends with this recapitulation of the results obtained : 

 "Therefore neither perception nor right conception, nor right con- 

 ception combined with reasonable explanation, can be science." 



Wo have dwelt at some length upon these two dialogues because 

 they furnish a direct transition to Plato's application of his dialectical 

 system to the departments of ethics and physics. The ' Gorgias ' 

 points out the steps by which Plato would proceed in handling the 

 moral questions of common occurrence in his time ; for ethics was 

 always treated in those days as a part of politics, aud the sophists, to 

 whom ho was opposed, were principally dangerous from the bearing of 

 their doctrines on political morality. The ' Thesetetus ' is a critical 

 review of certain materialistic opinions, which it was necessary to 

 confute before a new system could be fairly set on foot. Plato himself 

 says, " It is better to do a little well than a great deal in an unsatisfactory 

 manner" (' Thesotet.,' p. 187, E) ; and as Sir C. Wren gained nearly 

 as much credit for the scientific manner in which he removed the ruins 

 of the old St. Paul's church as for the genius and skill with which he 



