871 PLATO. 



planned and contructcd the new edifice, to Plato should receive the 

 idation which is due to him for the elaborate and searching 



PLATO. 



87s 



scrutiny to which he subjected the erroneous Tiews current iu his time, 

 b*fr* be ventured to propound the grand and original conceptions on 

 which hi* own philosophy was built up. 



II. The t-thical system of Plato, though traces of his views in this 

 field are discernible in many of his other dialogues, is most fully 

 developed iu lit two Urgent treatises, the ' Republic ' and the ' Laws,' 

 and most distinctly in the former. From Plato's general plan of con- 

 altering everything controversially and with reference to the theories 

 of his predecessors, we might draw two conclusions with regard to liis 

 system of moral philosophy : lit, that he would at once discard the 

 notion that the pleasure resulting from sensible impressions could bo 

 the highest good, for this would be to allow the influence of the 

 enact to be paramount, the very point in which ho was so directly 

 opposed to the lieracleiteans ; 2udly, that he would also reject the 

 claim of knowledge alone to be considered as the good, for that 

 would lead him to coincide, more nearly than would have suited 

 his general views, with the positions of the Eleatics. Wo see the 

 first germs of his opinions on these two points in the contrast 

 wl.u h we have pointed out between the ' Qorgias ' and ' Theaetetus ; ' 

 and in the ' Puilebus,' which may justly be considered at an introduc- 

 tion to the 'Republic,' he formally confutes the dogma that the 

 tummupi bonum is cither pleasure or knowledge alone. The highest 

 good, as is hinted iu the ' Philebus,' and distinctly shown iu the 

 ' Republic,' is moral virtue : this principle it the basis of man's intel- 

 lectual and moral constitution ; it is his good quo man, that is, as fur 

 at he is an intellectual and moral agent. Moral virtue, According to 

 Plato, it the subordination of roan's lower faculties to his reason as 

 the sovereign faculty : a man is virtuous wheu the will acts as the 

 servant of the reason in controlling the appetite. When this 

 subordination is perfect in the individual, it constitutes his rectitude, 

 righteousness, justice, or, iu general, his virtue or goodness; conse- 

 quently, his happiness in this world. Wheu a corresponding sub- 

 ordination exists in the state, that is to say, when the guards, or 

 military caste, in perfect subordination to philosophic) rulers, assist 

 the reasoning and governing power in regulating and controlling the 

 passions of the populace, the state is a perfect one. The 'Republic' 

 of Plato it a development of this analogy between the ideas of the 

 perfect man and the perfect state. This analogy depends upon the 

 old and well-known division of virtue into the four cardinal virtues, 

 at they are called, namely (1), prudence or wisdom (fpdiTjo-is) ; (2), 

 courage, constancy, or fortitude (avSpiia) ; (3), temperance, discretion, 

 or s- If-control (aoitypoavyri), and (4), justice or righteousness (Smaioawri): 

 and on the supposition that the whole province of virtue is exhausted 

 by these four virtues. We cannot agree with Sohleiermocher ( Kiu- 

 leitung cum Staat,' p. 26), that " Plato manifestly took up his 

 description of the four connected virtues only out of respect for the 

 existing classification, just as they had passed in a similar manner 

 from common conventional usage into the philosophy of Socrates." 

 To us it appeart that the classification of the four cardinal virtues 

 is so intimately connected with the very groundwork of Plato's whole 

 physical and dialectical system, that it must have been in the most 

 serious earnest, and with the most deliberate choice, that he assumed 

 this division of virtue as the basis of his moral philosophy. In the 

 'Ui-public,' Plato argues thus with regard to the fourfold division of 

 virtu* (' l)e Hf pub.,' ir., p. 427-434) : The state, being a perfect one, 

 mutt exhibit in itself the four cardinal virtues ; not that every one of 

 its citizens 'must exhibit them all perfectly : but the philosophic rulers 

 will represent its fptniiru ; the courageous standing-army its avtptia ; 

 and the well-conducted populace and craftsmen its awtyxxriW The 

 remaining virtue, Suuuoainni, is the virtue of the whole ; it is the prin- 

 ciple and cause of the existence of the other three virtues, com- 

 pelling each portion of the state to keep to its own business and to 

 abstain from all interference with the affaire of the other portions. 

 Pasting from the state to the individual, Plato recognises three 

 distinct principles in the soul of man : TO \oyiaTut6v, TO Su^onSii, and 

 rl tVitfv/tirrwoV (p. 489, D) ; the first belongs to the rational part of 

 the soul ; the two hut to the irrational part, with this distinction, 

 that the topoiMi, though it is clawed under the same general head 

 with the twitvuTfTutfo, is very different from it, and often assists the 

 Ao-yiaTutoV iu governing and controlling the taOuyurriKo'i' (p. 440, A ; 

 p. 441, E.) These three principles correspond in our philosophical 

 language to the reason, the will, and the appetite. The second is 

 often rendered ' the irascible principle,' and Cicero translated it by 

 ira and wveundia (' De Kepub ,' i. 88) ; but we follow Hooker, who 

 translates it ' the will,' and iloumterhuy s the younger, who substitutes 

 for it the scholastic synonym vilUttc. These three principles in the 

 soul of man Plato considers to bo analogout to the three classes in 

 the perfect state : the philosophic rulers represent the reason, the 

 standing army is the will, and the populace the appetite ; and at there 

 wan a virtue corresponding to each of the divisions of the perfect state, 

 and also on* which kept them altogether, so, in the righteous or virtuous 

 man, the reason is full of wisdom, the will is strong in fortitude, and 

 the appetite is under the healthy influence of self-control; and all 

 three ate kept together by justice, as the musical harmony keeps 

 together the highest, the lowest, and the middle sound, or the octave, 

 th* bass, and the fifth (p. 448, D) ; or, to express the whole iu 



the words which Shakspera has apparently borrowed from Plato 

 ('Hen. V.,'act i., so. 2):- 



Eict. While tint the armed bud doth fight abroad, 



The advised head defends iuclf at home j 



For government, through high, and low, and lover, 



Put into parti, doth keep la one concent, 



Congrccing in a full and natural cloo, 



Like music. 

 Cant. Therefore doth heaven divide 



The state of man in divers functions, 



Setting endeavour In continual motion, 



To which i> Axed, as an aim or butt, 



Obedience. 



This idea of the three principles in the human soul, and of the, 

 subordination of the two inferior faculties to the sovereign reason, is 

 most beautifully and clearly worked out in the my thus which i'. 

 prominent part of Plato's earliest dialogue, tho ' Phaxlrus ' (p. - 

 seqq.), where the soul is compared to a charioteer (the reason) u; 

 a pujr of wiuged steeds, ono of which is well bred and wvllti 

 and the other quite the contrary : the quiet horse (the will) is ol 

 to the rein, and strives to draw its wilder yoke-fellow (the appetite) 

 along with it, and to induce it to listen to the voice of the charioteer 

 (the reason) ; but they have both of them much pain and trouble with 

 it, and the whole object of their charioteering is lost if it contrives to 

 get the better of them. In this allegory the aim of the reason in 

 exacting obedience from the lower faculties is not merely thia obe- 

 dience or subordination itself, which constitutes the goodness of man ; 

 the reason endeavours, by keeping under control the senses, with all 

 their cravings for gratification, to take a calm view of abstract truth, 

 and to gaze upon the eternal realities which are here clothed iu the 

 garb of space and time. This is described as if the soul, iu its stato 

 of previous existence, went the circuit of the universe in the train of 

 the gods : if, in performing thia journey, tho reason, or charioteer, 

 could control the restive steed so as to raise his own head above tho 

 surface of the heavenly vault, he was borne round with the revolution 

 of the sphere, and; in that position, though struggling and striving 

 with his unruly steed, he saw, however faintly and imperfectly, the 

 essences of tilings which ore collected in that super-celestial i 

 and the remembrances of which furnish the soul with ideas after it 

 ha- du-cended to earth and become united with the body. Now tlai 

 is carrying the definition of moral excellence, or virtue, one step 

 farther. A man is in a state of virtue, righteousness, or moral excel- 

 lence, when his will and his appetite are subordinated to his reason ; 

 but this subordination is necessary as a previous condition, iu order 

 that a man may contemplate the idea of the good ; or, iu our phra- 

 seology, a man must be in a moral state before he can place himself in 

 a religious state. This idea of the good, the real lummum bonum, the 

 complement of all morality, is discussed in a remarkable passage of 

 the 'Republic' (vi. p. 505, A, seqq.), in which Plato takes u; 

 finishes the argument iu the ' Philebus.' It was there shown that the 

 lummum bonum is not to be sought either in pleasure or in knowledge: 

 it remained to be shown then in what this tummum bonum actually 

 consists; in other words, what is its idea. 



Iu the language of Plato, idea and atence are synonymous. Thus 

 by the idea of the good, he only means the nature and essence of good, 

 or of tho sovereign good, that is, of Qod, and not iu this case the 

 abstract and intellectual images which we form of it. In opposition 

 to this idea or essence, Plato uses the term yeiieraliun, or becoming, by 

 which he means all sensible things, everything that is born aud perishes. 

 Corresponding to this opposition of generation to encore, Plato, fol- 

 lowing Parmeuides (Simplicius, on Aristotle's ' Phyu.,' fol. 7, 15.), 

 supposed two worlds, the world of matter and the world of mind, 

 the visible and tho ideal world ; the former being on the model of the 

 latter. Immutable essences, or ideas, are contained in the ideal world. 

 Material essences, or substances, are not real essences, for they are 

 subject to generation and corruption ; we cannot predicate tfvai of 

 them ; they can only be said ylyvtaiau. Having premised, or rnther 

 reminded his readers of this opposition of the oparbs rorot to the 

 I/OTJTOS TO>OJ (p. 07, B-), Plato proceeds in the following strain : The 

 un is an image of the idea of the good ; for while the other senses, 

 such as the hearing, need nothing intermediate or additional in order 

 to the perception of objects, sight, on the other hand, does need the 

 intervention of light, otherwise the colour and the form will not be 

 visible : this light is derived from the sun, aud the benefit which our 

 sight derives from the sun is analogous to the benefit which our reason 

 derives from the idea of tho good ; for as the eye caunot see without 

 the intervention of light, so the reason cannot discern the things of 

 the ideal world without the light of truth. Consequently, the i.li a ..!' 

 the good is that which imparts truth to the objects of our reason and 

 the power of discerning truth to the reason itself. The idea of the 

 good is therefore far above truth and the knowledge of truth ; and as 

 light and the power of seeing are akin to the sun, but not identical 

 with it, so truth and the knowledge of truth are related to the idea of 

 the good, but are not identical with this idea. The sun is alro an 

 image of the idea of the good in this, that as the sun not merely 

 enables tho eye to see, but likewise supplies nourishment aud growth 

 to the visible objects ; so the idea of the good not merely enables the 

 reason to discern and know, but likewise give* to the ideas of tho 



