690 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



600 



on the 8th. Cuesta crossed the Tagua by the bridge of Almaraz, and 

 the two armies made their junction at Oropesa on the 20th. Sir 

 Robert Wilson, with the Lusitanian Legion, one Portuguese and two 

 Spanish battalions, moved on to Escaloua, about eight leagues from 

 Madrid, throating the rear of Victor's army, which was posted at 

 Talavera de la Keyna. On the 22nd the combined Spanish and 

 British armies attacked Victor's outposts at Talavera, and drove them 

 in. The enemy would have suffered more if General Cuesta had not 

 been absent from the field. The British columns were formed for the 

 attack of the French position ou the 23rd, as General Wellesley 

 wished to attack Victor before he was joined by Sebastiani, but 

 General Cuesta " contrived to lose the whole of the day, owing to the 

 whimsical perverseness of his disposition." (Dispatch to J. H. Frere, 

 24th of July, vol. iv., p. 526.) On the morning of the 24th Victor 

 retired across the Alberche to St. Olalla on the Madrid road, and 

 thence to Torrijos, where he was joined by Sebastiaui's corp?, and 

 soon after by King Joseph in person, attended by Marshal Jourdan 

 with the Guards and the garrison of Madrid. General Cuesta, who 

 now seemed eager for battle, although General Wellesley recommended 

 him to be very cautious in his movements, followed Victor to St. 

 Olalla, and pushed his advanced guard to Torrijos, when the French 

 attacked him briskly on the 2t>th, and obliged him to fall back 

 upon the British, on the Alberche. On the 27th General Wellesley, 

 expecting to be attacked, took up his ground in the position of 

 Talavera. 



The position of the English army was daily becoming more critical, 

 for Soult was rapidly advancing from Salamanca, by the Puerto de 

 Baiios, upon Plasencia, in the rear of the British. General Wellesley 

 had charged Cuesta to guard the mountain-pass of Puerto de Banos, 

 but the Spanish general sent only 600 men thither, a force which of 

 course proved insufficient to arrest Soult's march. General Wellesley 

 did not know that Ney had unexpectedly evacuated Galicia, and was 

 also advancing from Astorga upon the British left. Mortier also, 

 with the 5th corps, was at Valladolid, ready to move forward ; so 

 that there were more than 50,000 fighting men of the enemy behind 

 the mountains of Plaseucia, ready to act on the left flank and rear 

 of the British, who had besides 50,000 more in front of them. The 

 British force in the field did not exceed 20,000. There were a few 

 more battalions on their march from Lisbon to join the army, but 

 they did not arrive till after the battle. The Spanish army of Cuesta 

 mustered about 34,000 men, such as they were. The Portuguese 

 regular troops, under Beresford, had remained to guard the north-east 

 frontier of Portugal, towards Almeida. It had been previously agreed 

 between General Wellesley, Cuesta, and the Spanish Supreme Junta, 

 or Central Government, that General Venegas, who was at the head 

 of the Spanish army of Andalucia, consisting of about 25,000 men, 

 should march through La Mancha upon Madrid, whilst Wellesley and 

 Cuesta were advancing by the valley of the Tagus. Venegas did 

 advance through La Mancha, but it seems that he received counter- 

 orders from the Supreme Junta which had the effect of slackening his 

 march; he however made his appearance at last towards Aranjuez and 

 Toledo, and it was his approach on that side which induced King 

 Joseph to engage Wellesley and Cuesta, in order to save his capital. 

 If he had kept the Allies in check for a few days longer, Soult's arrival 

 at Plasencia would have obliged the English to retire precipitately. 

 But King Joseph fearing that Venegas from, the south, and Sir Robert 

 Wilson, who, with the Lusitaniau Legion, was hovering in the neigh- 

 bourhood on the north, would enter Madrid and seize the stores, 

 reserves, &c., he and Marshal Victor determined to give battle to the 

 Allies in front : for if they were defeated, Madrid could be easily pro- 

 tected. General Wellesley, perceiving, from the movements of the 

 enemy, that a battle was at hand, with much difficulty prevailed upon 

 Cuesta to fall back with him upon the position of Talavera, where 

 there was good ground for defence. He placed the Spanish army on 

 the right near the Tagus, before the town of Talavera, its front pro- 

 tected by redoubts, ditches, mud walls, and felled trees. In this 

 position they could hardly be seriously attacked. The British infantry 

 on whom the general could depend, occupied the left of the line, 

 which was open in front, but its extreme left rested upon a steep hill, 

 which was the key of the whole position. The whole line extended 

 in length about two miles. 



On the 27th of July the French moved from St. Olalla, crossed the 

 river Alberche, drove in the British outposts, and attacked two 

 advanced brigades of the English, which fell back steadily across the 

 plain into their assigned position in the line. Victor now attacked 

 the British left, whilst the 4th corps made a demonstration against 

 the Spaniards on the right, several thousands of whom, after dis- 

 charging their pieces, fled panic-struck to the rear, followed by their 

 artillery, and creating the greatest confusion among the baggage 

 retainers and mules, &c. ; and it was with difficulty that Generals 

 Wellesley and Cuesta prevented the rest of the Spanish troops from 

 following the example. Luckily the position of the Spanish army was 

 strong in front, and the French, not knowing exactly what was going 

 on, made no further attack on that side ; their efforts were directed 

 against the British left, which they succeeded for a moment in turning, 

 and they gained the summit of the hill; but General Hill, being 

 ordered to that point with more troops, drove the French down after 

 an obstinate struggle which lasted till after dark, and in which the 



French lost about 1000 men and the British 800. Next morning, the 

 28th, the French renewed the attack on the hill on the British left, 

 and were again repulsed after losing about 1500 men. After a pause 

 of some hours the attack was renewed upon the whole British front. 

 Heavy columns of French infantry of Sebastiani's corps twice attacked 

 the British right under General Campbell, which joined the Spanish 

 army, but were each time repulsed by the steady fire of the English ; 

 a Spanish cavalry regiment charging on their flank ut the same time, 

 they retired in disorder, after losing a number of meu and 10 guns. 

 In the mean time a French division, supported by two regiments of 

 cavalry, again advanced to turn the British left, aud here a cavalry 

 fight occurred in which the 23rd Light Dragoons lost one-half of their 

 number. General Wellesley had taken the precaution of posting the 

 Spanish division of Bassecour in the rear, together with the cavalry of 

 both armies, and the sight of these effectually precluded any further 

 advance of the French on that side. The principal attack of the 

 French was against the British centre, which consisted of the Guards 

 and the German Legion. The French columns came resolutely close 

 up to the British line, but they were recsived with a discharge of 

 musketry which made them reel back in disorder. The Guards then 

 charged them, and in the ardour of the moment were carried too far, 

 upon which the enemy's supporting columns and dragoons advanced, 

 and those who had been repulsed rallied and faced again, while the 

 French batteries poured their shot upon the flank of the Guards, who 

 in their turn drew back in some disorder ; at the same time the 

 German Legion, which was on the left of the Guards, being hard 

 pressed by the French, got into confusion, and the British centre was 

 thus broken. This was the critical moment of the battle. General 

 Wellesley, who, from the hill on the left of the position, had a clear 

 view of the whole field, seeing the charge of the Guards, and expecting 

 the issue of it, immediately ordered the 48th regiment, under Colonel 

 Donellan, which was posted on the hill on the left, to advance in sup- 

 port of the centre, and at the same time directed General Cotton's 

 light cavalry to advance. The 4Sth moved on in perfect order amidst 

 the retiring crowds, and wheeling back by companies let them pass 

 through the intervals; then, resuming its line, the 48th marched 

 against the right of the pursuing columns, plied them with destructive 

 discharges of musketry, and closing upon them with a firm and 

 regular pace, checked their forward movement. The Guards and 

 Germans quickly rallied, and the brigade of light cavalry coming up 

 from the rear at a trot, the French began to waver, and at last gave 

 way and retired to their original position, their retreat being protected 

 by their light troops and artillery. The British, reduced to less than 

 14,000 men, and exhausted by fatigue,'were unable to pursue them ; 

 and the Spanish army, which had been scarcely engaged, was incapable 

 of making any evolutions ; and thus about six in the evening all right- 

 ing and firing ceased, each army retaining the position that it had 

 occupied in the morning. The French were repulsed at all points, 

 and lost two generals and nearly 1000 men, and about COOO wounded, 

 besides the loss of 17 guns. On the side of the British, two generals 

 and 800 men were killed, and three generals and about 4000 meu 

 wounded. 



The next morning, July 29, at daybreak, the French army made a 

 retrograde movement, recrossed the Alberche, and took a position on 

 the heights of Salinas. On that day General Robert Crauford reached 

 the English camp from Lisbon with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th. This 

 was the light brigade, which afterwards acquired a military celebrity 

 for its gallantry and the quickness of its movements. 



Sir Arthur Wellesley passed the 29th and 30th in establishing his 

 hospitals in the town of Talavera, and endeavouring to get provisions, 

 as his men were nearly starving. In this he was not at all assisted by 

 the Spanish authorities or the Spanish inhabitants. " We are miserably 

 supplied with provisions " thus he wrote to Lord Castlereagh on the 

 1st of August from Talavera : " the Spanish armies are now so nume- 

 rous that they eat up the whole country. They have no magazines, 

 nor have we, nor can we collect any, and there is a scramble for 

 everything. I think the battle of the 28th is likely to be of great use 

 to the Spaniards ; but I do not think them in a state of discipline to 

 contend with the French." ('Dispatches,' iv., p. 554.) 



King Joseph, with the 4th corps and the reserve, moved on the 1st 

 of August farther back to Illescas, on the road between Madrid and 

 Toledo, in order to oppose the army of Andalucia under Venegas; and 

 Victor, who had remained on the Alberohe with the 1st corps, retreated 

 likewise on the road to Madrid, from alarm at the movements of Sir 

 Robert Wilson on his flank. Soult was now advancing from the north 

 with no less than three corps, one of which, commanded by Mortier, 

 entered Plasencia on the 31st, having passed, without encountering any 

 resistance, the defile of Baiios, which Cuesta had promised to guard. 

 Soult himself, with the 2nd corps, entered Pasencia on the 1st of 

 August, whilst Ney was moving on from Salamanca in the same 

 direction. The French found Plasencia deserted by most of the 

 inhabitants, and they could learn no intelligence of the position of the 

 British and Spanish armies, except vague rumours of a battle having 

 been fought a few days before. On the 2nd of August Sir Arthur 

 Wellesley learnt that the enemy had entered Plasencia. Supposing 

 that Soult was alone with his corps, which he estimated at only 15,000 

 men, and that his intention was to join Victor, he determined to 

 encounter him before he could effect the junction : he therefore 



