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WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



002 



marched on the 3rd of August to Oropesa with the British army, 

 leaving Cuesta at Talavera, particularly recommending him to protect 

 the hospitals ; and, iu case he should be obliged by any advance of 

 Victor to leave Talavera, to collect carts to move away the wounded. 

 The position of the hostile armies was now very singular : they were 

 all crowded along the narrow valley of the Tagus, from the neighbour- 

 hood of Madrid to the frontiers of Portugal. King Joseph and Sebas- 

 tiani were at Illescas and Valdemoro, between Madrid and the Tagus, 

 while the advanced posta of Venegas were on the left or opposite side 

 of the river, opposite Toledo. Victor was lower down on the right 

 bank, at Maqueda, near the Alberche, watching Cuesta, who was at 

 Talavera. General Wellesley was farther down, at Oropesa. Soult 

 was on the Tietar, on the road from Plasencia to Almaraz. Beresford, 

 with the Portuguese, was said to be moving farther west along the 

 frontiers of Portugal. " The allies under Wellesley and Cuesta held 

 the centre, being only ono day's march asunder ; but their force, when 

 concentrated, was not more than 47,000 men. The French could not 

 unito under three days, but their combined forces exceeded 90,000 

 men, of whom 53,000 were under Soult; and this singular situation 

 was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties 

 were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor 

 and the King, frightened by Wilson's partisan corps of 4000 men, were 

 preparing to unite at Mostoles, near Madrid ; while Cuesta, equally 

 alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley 

 was supposed by King Joseph to be at the head of 25,000 British; and 

 Sir Arthur, calculating on Soult's weakness, was marching with 23,000 

 English and Spanish to engage 53,000 French ; while Soult, unable to 

 ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little sus- 

 pected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment the 

 fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear the 

 weight for twenty-four hours ; yet fortune so ordained that no 

 irreparable disaster ensued." (Napier's ' History of the Peninsular 

 War,' b. ix.) 



In the evening of the 3rd of August, Sir Arthur Wellesley learned 

 that Soult's advanced posts were at Naval Moral, and consequently 

 between him and the bridge of Almaraz, on the Tagus, thus cutting 

 his line of communication with Portugal. At the same time letters 

 from Cuesta informed him that King Joseph was again advancing to 

 joiu Victor, and that Soult must be stronger than was supposed ; and 

 that therefore he, Cuesta, would quit Talavera that evening, and join 

 the British at Oropesa. Sir Arthur immediately replied, requesting 

 Cuesta to wait at least till next morning, in order to cover the evacua- 

 tion of the British hospitals from Talavera. But Cuesta was already 

 on his march, and tarly on the morning of the 4th appeared near 

 Oropesa. Sir Arthur by this time had learned from intercepted letters 

 that Soult's force was much stronger than he had supposed, though 

 he could not guess its full strength. Cuesta's retreat would imme- 

 diately bring the King and Victor upon him. He was placed between 

 the mountains and the Tagus, with a French army advancing upon 

 him on each flank ; the retreat by Almaraz was cut off ; he had seen 

 enough of Cuesta and the Spanish army not to rely upon them on a 

 field of battle; and he could not, with 17,000 British, fatigued and 

 in want of provisions, fight successively two French armies, each 

 much stronger than his own. His only remaining line of retreat was 

 across the Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo, below Talavera. By 

 taking up a line of defence beyond that river he might keep open the 

 road by Trujillo to Badajoz. This however must be done immediately, 

 before the enemy intercepted the road to Arzobispo. Sir Arthur com- 

 municated his determination to Cuesta, who, according to his custom, 

 opposed it : he wanted now to fight the French at Oropesa ; but the 

 English general told him sternly that he might do as he liked that 

 he, Sir Arthur, was responsible for his own army, and should move 

 forthwith. Accordingly, on that morning, the 4th of August, the 

 British army filed off towards Arzobispo, where it crossed the river 

 with its artillery, stores, and 2000 wounded from Talavera, and took a 

 position on the other side. Thus the British army was saved from 

 impending ruin. Here ended the fighting campaign of the British for 

 1809. 



Sir Arthur Wellesley now moved his head -quarters to Deleytosa, and 

 afterwards to Jaraicejo, on the high road to Badajoz, leaving a sorong 

 rear-guard to protect the south bank of the Tagus, and prevent the 

 enemy from passing the river. The bridge of Almaraz had already 

 been broken by the Spaniards. Cuesta, following the British move- 

 ment, passed to the south of the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo, 

 followed close by the French, who, discovering a ford, crossed the 

 river on the 8th with a numerous cavalry, overpowered the Spanish 

 rear-guard, and seized the guns. General Wellesley however caused 

 the remainder of the Spanish artillery to be dragged up the mountain 

 of Meza d'Ibor, a strong position, while the British guarded the 

 equally strong pass of Mirabete, facing the bridge of Almaraz. The 

 line of defence of the Allies was thus re-established. Meantime King 

 Joseph recalled Mortier's corps, which had crossed the Tagus at Tala- 

 vera, and ordered it to join Sebastiani against Venegas, who had again 

 advanced to Almonacid, near Toledo. Marshal Ney, on the other side, 

 whom Soult had directed to ford the Tagus below Almaraz, could not 

 discover the ford. Soult now proposed to march with his three corps 

 by Coria and Abrantes, and reach Lisbon, by the right bank of the 

 Tagus, before the English; but Ney, Jourdan, and King Joseph 



opposed the plan, and soon afterwards a dispatch came from Napoleon, 

 dated after the battle of Wagram, from the Austrian emperor's palace 

 at Schoubrunn, forbidding further offensive operations till the rein- 

 forcements which the termination of the Austrian war placed at his 

 disposal should reach Spain. 



The Emperor Napoleon now, to crush his enemies, trusted chiefly 

 to- his overwhelming masses, which he recruited so cheaply by means 

 of the conscription. The proportion of cavalry in hia armies in Spain 

 was boyoud all precedent. Napoleon was resolved to play a sure 

 game. He bad already 200,000 men in Spain, and yet he did not 

 think them enough. His generals had adopted the same views. " It 

 is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will suc- 

 ceed :" thus wrote Soult to King Joseph before the battle of Talavera. 

 It is worthy of remark that Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing about the 

 same time, said "I conceive that the French are dangerous only when 

 iu large masses." 



Soult's army now went into cantonments in Estremadura and Leon, 

 near the borders of Portugal. Sebastiani, having defeated Venegas at 

 Almonacid, drove him back upon the Sierra Morena. King Joseph was 

 again residing quietly at Madrid. 



In England, on the receipt of the news of the battle of Talavera, Sir 

 Arthur Wellesley was raised to the peerage by the titles of Baron 

 Douro and Viscount Wellington. 



On the 20th of August Lord Wellington removed his head-quarters 

 to Badajoz, and placed his army in cantonments on the line of the 

 Guadiana. His chief motive was the neglect of the Spanish authorities 

 in supplying his army with provisions, which obliged him to draw 

 near his magazines in Portugal ; and another reason was, the impossi- 

 bility of co operating with the undisciplined Spanish armies. Lord 

 Wellington had contrived, notwithstanding Cuesta's neglect, to carry 

 away 2000 sick and wounded from Talavera; the remaining 1500, 

 whom he was obliged to leave there, he recommended earnestly to the 

 French generals, Mortier and Kellerman, and his expectations were 

 not deceived. Marshal Mortier in particular showed the utmost kind- 

 ness to the British wounded, and would have them attended to before 

 his own men. 



In October Lord Wellington repaired to Lisbon, and proceeded to 

 reconnoitre the whole country in front of that capital, for it was then 

 that he resolved upon the construction of the celebrated lines of 

 Torres Vedras, which enabled him to baffle all the efforts of the 

 French iu the following year. We can only refer the reader to the 

 ' Memorandum ' which he wrote at Lisbon on the 20th of October for 

 Lieutenant- Colonel Fletcher, of the Engineers, in which he clearly 

 points out the double line of position, the entrenchments and redoubts, 

 the number of men required at each post, &c., as if the whole were 

 already in existence before his eyes. This paper, so remarkable con- 

 sidering the epoch and circumstances in which it was written, ia a 

 most striking evidence of Wellington's comprehensive mind, his pene- 

 tration, and foresight. (See ' Dispatches,' vol. v., pp. 234-39.) Of his 

 plan however nothing was said or even whispered at the time. He 

 returned to his head-quarters at Badajoz, wheuce-he made an excursion 

 to Seville, where he conferred with his brother the Marquis Wellesley, 

 who was then the British ambassador in Spain, and whom he accom- 

 panied to Cadiz. On the llth of November he returned to his head- 

 quarters at Badajoz. At the same time another fatal blunder was 

 committed by the Spaniards. About the middle of November the 

 Supreme Junta ordered the army of Andalucia, joined by the greater 

 part of the army of Estremadura, to advance suddenly upon Madrid, 

 and this without any previous communication with Lord Wellington, 

 who was at Badajoz, or with the Duke del Parque and other Spanish 

 commanders in the north of Spain. Venegas, the general of the army 

 of Andalucia, had been superseded by Areizaga, an inexperienced 

 young officer, who was in favour with the Junta. Old Cuesta had 

 also retired, and made room for Eguia in the command of the army 

 of Estremadura. These two armies, which constituted the principal 

 regular force of the Spaniards, and which, posted within the line of 

 the Tagus and along the range of the Sierra Morena, protected, and 

 might long have protected, the south of Spain, were thrown away 

 upon a foolish attempt. Areizaga, with nearly 50,000 men and 60 

 pieces of artillery, advanced into the plains of La Mancha, and was 

 attacked on the 16th of November, in the open fields of Ocana, by 

 the two French corps of Mortier and Sebastiani ; and, although 

 his men fought with sufficient courage, yet he was completely routed, 

 with the loss of more than one-half of his army, and all his baggage 

 and artillery, with the exception of 15 guns. About the same time 

 the Duke del Parque, with 20,000 Spaniards in the north, advanced 

 from Salamanca against Kellerman, but he was beaten, and driven to 

 the mountains of Pena de Francia. The French, north of the Tagus, 

 were thus left at liberty to attack Ciudad Eodrigo and the frontiers of 

 Portugal. " I lament," thus Lord Wellington writes from Badajoz on 

 the news of these mishaps, " 1 lament that a cause which promised so 

 well a few weeks ago should have been so completely lost by the igno- 

 rance, presumption, and mismanagement of those to whose direction it 

 was intrusted. I declare that, if they had preserved their two armies, 

 or even one of them, the cause was safe. The French could have sent 

 no reinforcements which could ha\ie been of any use; time would 

 have been gained ; the state of affairs would have improved daily ; all 

 the chances were in our favour , and in the first moment of weakness 



