607 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OP. 



along the first and second lines (Dispatch to Lord Liverpool, vol. vi 

 p. 582), besides the Portuguese militia and artillery which mannec 

 the forts and redoubts and garrisoned Lisbon, a fine body of English 

 marines which occupied the line of embarkation, a powerful flcei 

 in the Tagus, and a flotilla of gun-boats flanking the right of the 

 British line. Altogether these lines of defence were of stupendous 

 strength, conceived by the military genius of Lord Wellington, anc 

 executed by the military skill of the British engineer officers. 



Massena seems to have been taken by surprise at the sight of the 

 lines, and he employed several days in reconnoitering them. He 

 made some demonstrations in order to make the British divisions 

 show out their force j but after one or two slight attacks, which were 

 repulsed, he made no further attempt. He put the second and eighth 

 corps partly in the villages and partly in bivouacs in front of the 

 right and centre of the British position, leaving the sixth corps at 

 Otta in his rear. He established his depot and hospitals, and com- 

 menced forming magazines at Santarem, and for this purpose sent 

 moveable columns to scour the country for provisions, for he had 

 entered Portugal without magazines, every soldier carrying fifteen 

 days' bread, which many however threw away or wasted on the road. 

 The country had been partly stripped by the inhabitants, who had 

 retired to the mountains or within the lines, and the French foraging 

 parties destroyed what was left, so that for many leagues in rear of 

 the French the country became a scene of devastation and almost a 

 desert. In addition to this, the Portuguese militia under Trant, 

 Millar, and Wilson, came down from the north and cut off all commu- 

 nication between Massena's army and the Spanish frontier. Whilst 

 the French were in march for Lisbon, as they thought, Colonel Trant 

 surprised Coimbra, seized many prisoners, and all the sick and wounded, 

 between four and five thousand in number, whom he removed to 

 Oporto. Trant and Wilson came down towards Ourem, Thomar, and 

 the banks of the Zezere, hovering in the rear of Massena, who was 

 obliged to move back a whole division to hold them in check. Towards 

 the end of October, Massena sent 2000 men across the Zezere in order 

 to re-open a communication with Spain by way of Castello Branco ; 

 and General Foy proceeded with a strong escort by way of Penomacor 

 to Ciudad Rodrigo, whence he hastened to Paris to inform Napoleon 

 of the real state of affairs in Portugal. 



_ Massena had now given up all idea of attempting to force the British 

 lines unless he received large reinforcements. He had entered Por- 

 tugal with about 70,000 men, of whom 15,000 had been either killed 

 or taken prisoners or were in the hospitals ; his army had become 

 very sickly in consequence of privations and of being exposed to 

 inclement weather mostly without shelter, and bivouacking in low 

 grounds. On the 15th of November he began a retrograde movement, 

 with great order and caution, for the purpose of placing his army in 

 cantonments for the winter. On the 17th the French second corps 

 was established at and near Sautarem, in a very strong position; the 

 eighth corps at Perues; and the sixth corps at Thomar, farther in the 

 rear. Massena's head- quarters were fixed at Torres Novas. The 

 British light divisions and cavalry followed the French movements 

 and took some prisoners, but nothing of importance occurred. Lord 

 Wellington, leaving part of his troops in the lines, moved forward the 

 remainder towards the Rio Mayor, which separated him from the 

 French position at Santarem. Hill's division was placed on the left 

 bank of the Tagus opposite Santarem. Wellington's head-quarters 

 were fixed at Cartaxo. Both armies were now in cantonments for the 

 winter. Thus ended the campaign of 1810. As a defensive campaign 

 on the part of Lord Wellington it was successful, for the French 

 army at the end of that year held no other ground in Portugal than 

 that on which its divisions stood, being hemmed in between the 

 northern bank of the Tagus, the Rio Mayor, and the ridge of the 

 Serra do Estrelia, having the allied regular force on its front and 

 flanks, nnd the Portuguese militia on its rear, and its communications 

 with Spain intercepted. 



All th north of Portugal was free from the French, and also the 

 whole of the kingdom south of the Tagus, and the fine country near 

 Lisbon. All the large towns, Lisbon, Oporto, Coinjbra, Abrantes, were 

 in possession of the Allies, as well as all the fortresses, with the ex- 

 ception of Almeida. As the French had advanced by the valley of the 

 Mondego and the country west of the Serra de Estrelia, the people of 

 that tract of country had in great measure deserted it and carried off 

 the provisions ; but the population east of the mountains, and between 

 them, the Tagus, and the Zezere, had remained in fancied security, so 

 that, when Masseua withdrew his army to that quarter, he found the 

 towns of Thomar, Femes, Torres Novas, and Golegao inhabited and 

 untouched. The corn-mills, little injured, were quickly repaired; 

 cattle and corn were procured in abundance, especially from the fine 

 plains of Golegao, which supplied them with Indian corn ; and the 

 French thus obtained provisions at least for part of the winter. And, 

 what was worse for the Allies, a number of boats were left behind at 

 Santarem on the right bank of the Tagus?, by means of which the 

 French had the power of crossing the river whenever they liked. This 

 annoyed Lord Wellington more than anything else, and he expressed 

 himself strongly concerning the remissness of the Portuguese Regency 

 in neglecting to give or not enforcing the necessary orders for removing 

 everything out of the reach of the enemy, as he had urged them to do 

 months before. " The French could not have stayed if the provisions 



had been removed. . . . All our military arrangements are useless if 

 they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. . . . Then 

 the boats are left at Santarem in order to give the enemy an opportu- 

 nity of acting upou our flanks. ... It is heart-breaking to contemplate 

 the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly." (Dispatches to 

 Charles Stuart, the English Ambassador to the Portuguese Regency, 

 October 16 and 18, and November 1.) 



The perverse spirit of the Portuguese Regency had manifested itself 

 ever since the fall of Almeida. There was a faction in the Regency, 

 at the head of which was the Patriarch (former Bishop of Oporto), 

 who wanted to control and direct the operations of the British com- 

 mander, and, as he would not allow himself to be directed by them, 

 they thwarted him in every way. In a remarkable letter addressed to 

 Mr. Stuart from Gouvea, September 7, Lord Wellington had de- 

 nounced their practices : " In order to put an end at once to these 

 miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the Portuguese Govern- 

 ment that I will not stay in the country, and that I shall advise the 

 King's Government to withdraw the assistance which his Majesty 

 affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointments 

 of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible ; or with the 

 operations of the army ; or with any of the points whick, under the 

 original arrangement with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively 

 to his management. I propose also to report to his Majesty's Govern- 

 ment, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken if 

 the Portuguese Government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and 

 political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with 

 the military operations which I am carrying on. But it appears that 

 the Portuguese Government have lately discovered that we are all 

 wrong ; they have become impatient for the defeat of tho enemy, and, 

 in imitation of the Central Junta of Spain, call out for a battle and 

 early success." 



In another letter, dated Rio Mayor, October 6, addressed likewise to 

 Mr. Stuart, Lord Wellington says "You will do me the favour to 

 inform the Regency, and above all the Principal Souza, that, his 

 Majesty and the Prince Regent having intrusted me with the com- 

 mand of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military 

 operations, I will not suffer them, or anybody else, to interfere with 

 them; that I know best where to station my troops and when to 

 make a stand against the enemy ; and I shall not alter a system formed 

 upon mature consideration upon any suggestion of theirs. I am 

 responsible for what I do, and they are not ; and I recommend them 

 to look to the measures for which they are responsible, and which I 

 long ago recommended^ to them, viz. to provide for the tranquillity 

 of Lisbon, and for the food of their own army and of l,he people, 

 while tho troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for Principal 

 Souza, I beg you to tell him from me that I have had no satisfaction 

 in transacting the business of his country since he has been a member 

 of tho government; that, being embarked in a course of military 

 operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall 

 continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth 

 shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I 

 shall have obtained his Majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal 

 Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue 

 at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will ; and if I should 

 be obliged to go, I will take care that the world, or Portugal at least 

 and the Prince Recent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons. 

 .... I have but little doubt of success ; but, as I have fought a 

 sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not 

 certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the 

 Government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of 

 the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if 

 they were to fall into their hands." A perusal of this correspondence 

 is absolutely necessary to enable a person to form a just idea of the 

 difficulties which Lord Wellington had to contend with, and of the 

 strength of mind which enabled him to rise superior to' them. 



Campaign of 1811. During the months of January and February 

 the armies in Portugal remained in the same respective positions. The 

 low lands being flooded rendered field operations impossible. Mean- 

 while the 9th corps under Drouet had entered Portugal by the valley 

 of the Mondego, with a large convoy of provisions from Spain, and had 

 reinforced Massena's army, by being posted on its right about Leiria. 

 At the same time Soult, who commanded the army of Andalucia, 

 received orders from Napoleon to act in concert with Massena, by 

 attacking Portugal south of the Tagus ; and a now French army was 

 brmed in the north of Spain, consisting of about 70,000 men, and 

 placed under Marshal Bessieres, duke of Istria, who was ordered to 

 ;upport and furnish all necessary assistapce to the army of Portugal. 

 Letter from Berthier, Prince of Wagram, to the Prince of Essliug 

 Massena), Paris, January 16, 1811 ; another from the same to the Duko 

 if Dalmatia (Soult), January 24, 1811 ; and another from the same to 

 he Prince of Essling, February 7, 1811 ; in Appendix to Napier, 

 ol. iii.] " Make a bridge across the Tagus," said Napoleon, " and let 

 kla?sena and Soult form a junction. Meantime keep the English in 

 check, and make them lose men every day by engagements of the 

 advanced guards. Their army is small, and they cannot afford to 

 ose many men. Besides, people in London are much alarmed about 

 heir army in Portugal ; and when the season becomes favourable let 

 he main operations be carried on on the south bank of the Tagus." 



