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WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



610 



Such were the gigantic efforts made by the master of half of Europe 

 to crush ail English army of 30,000 men, whilst Lord Wellington, after 

 urgent applications to ministers at home, received reinforcements to 

 the amount of from 6000 to 7000 men only in the beginning of March. 

 But all Napoleon's efforts did not prevail. Massena was waiting for 

 Soult to appear on the left bank of the Tagus opposite to his position, 

 but Soult was obliged to maintain the blockade of Cadiz, in which 

 there was a British garrison of 6000 men ; he was obliged to leave 

 Sebastian! on the side of Granada and Murcia to keep in check the 

 Spanish armed parties; and he could nob therefore dispose of more 

 than 20,000 men, with whom he durst nob enter Alemtejo, leaving the 

 Spanish fortress of Badajos in his rear. He therefore began by attack- 

 ing the fortress of Olivenca, which he took January 22, and then 

 marched to Badajos. On the 19th of February he defeated a Spanish 

 force. of nearly 12,000 men under General Meudizabal, which was 

 posted on the river Gebora, an affluent of the Guadiana, and then 

 commenced the siege of Badajos. 



In the mean time Massena remained in his position at Santarem, 

 waiting for Soult's appearance on the Tagus, till he became so dis- 

 tressed for provisions that he could wait no longer. All the means of 

 collecting provisions by violence were exhausted, large moveable 

 columns had been sent at different times both on the side of Castello 

 Brauco and on that of the Mondego, which scoured the country and 

 carried away cattle and provisions, committing horrible excesses, 

 which were' retaliated by the infuriated peasantry upon the French 

 stragglers and wounded. The discipline of the army was broken by 

 this barbarous system of warfare. They had no less than 10,000 

 sick ; they could obtain no news from Spain, and had no more pro- 

 visions left than would serve the troops during their retreat to the 

 frontiers. 



In the beginning of March Massena moved his sick and baggage by 

 degrees to the rear, and after demonstrations in various directions the 

 divisions of his army filed off in the direction of Pombal. Santarem 

 was evacuated in the night of the 5th of March, and next morning it 

 was entered by the English. Massena however had gained two days' 

 march, and his army was not overtaken by the English till the 10th, 

 when it was concentrated on a table-land before Pombal, presenting a 

 front of resistance. There was some skirmishing with the light 

 division, whilst Wellington brought up his other divisions, but the 

 French having gained time for their baggage to file off, retreated on 

 the llth through the town. A detachment which Ney had left in the 

 castle of Pombal waa driven away with some loss by the English, 

 and in the night Massena continued his retreat. On the 12th the 

 English advance found Ney with the French rear-guard posted on 

 a high table-land in front of the village of Redinba, when another 

 skirmishing took place. As the French seemed disposed to stand 

 their ground, and made a show of considerable force, Lord Wellington 

 formed his army in line and moved on to the attack, when, after a 

 general discharge from the French battalions, which hid them in 

 smoke, the French were again in full retreat through the village, and 

 joined that evening the main body at Condeixa, where one road leads 

 to Coimbra and another ascends the valley of the Mondego. Massena's 

 intention was to seize Coimbra and, if possible, Oporto, and there 

 to wait for reinforcements from Spain, and he had sent a division 

 under Montbrun to secure the bridge of Coimbra. Wellington had 

 foreseen his intention, and had ordered Wilson and Trant with the 

 Portuguese militia to look to the security of the important town of 

 Oporto, and to abandon the line of the Mondego, which was fordable 

 in many places, and retire across the Douro, removing all the boats. 

 Coimbra was thus necessarily left to a surprise by the French retreat- 

 ing army. But it luckily happened that Trant lingered behind at 

 Coimbra with a small force, and, having destroyed one arch of the 

 bridge, and placed guards at the fords, he determined to defend the 

 town, thinking that, if he could parry a sudden assault, Massena could 

 not stay long on the left bank of the Mondego with the allied army at 

 his heels. On the lltb of March Montbrun appeared at the suburb of 

 Santa Clara, and on the 12th made an attempt to force the bridge, but 

 his men were repulsed by grape-shot. Montbrun fancied that Trant 

 had been reinforced with some English regiments by sea, and having 

 made his report, Massena relinquished the idea of crossing the Mon- 

 dego, and determined to retreat by Ponte de Murcella and the left 

 bank of the Mondego. Thus Coimbra was saved from the impending 

 visitation. 



Massena resumed his retreat on the 13th of March in rather a hurried 

 manner, being on the point of having his left turned by Picton's 

 division, which had marched by a path over the mountains of Anciao. 

 Ney, in command of the rear-guard, set fire to the town of Condeixa, 

 in order to stop the British artillery, but the light division pursued 

 the retreating enemy, and penetrated between their columns, until 

 night stopped any further pursuit. By the aid of darkness the French 

 got together again, and on the morning of the 14th, when the fog 

 which enveloped the mountains began to clear off, Ney was seen posted 

 on a hill near Casal Nova. The light division attacked him; and 

 Picton's and Cole's divisions appearing on his left, he renewed his 

 retreat with admirable precision from ridge to ridge, covering his rear 

 with guns and light troops, until he gained the strong defile of Miranda 

 de Corvo, where the main body of the French was already posted. 

 Massena, fearing that Cole's and Nightingale's divisions, which were 



BIOG, DIV. VOL. VI, 



advancing by the road of Espinhal, might gain his rear, Bet fire to the 

 town of Miranda in the night, and passed the river Ceira, an affluent 

 of the Moudego, destroying a great quantity of his baggage and ammu- 

 nition, and leaving Ney to cover the passage of the river, without 

 however risking an action. Ney remained on the left bank, and took 

 up a position near the village of Fons de Arronce. The Allies coming 

 up about four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, Wellington com- 

 menced an attack on Ney's troops, in which the French lost 500 men, 

 one-half of whom were drowned in endeavouring to pass the swollen 

 river in their rear. Night put an end to the fight, but not to the con- 

 fusion ; for as the French baggage and other incumbrances were 

 pressing along the bridge, panic spread among their troops, who, in 

 the midst of the disorder, darkness, and rain, fired upon one another. 

 In the night Ney blew up part of the bridge, and moved on his corps, 

 keeping a rear-guard on the right bank the whole of the 16th. The 

 Allies halted on the left bank that day, partly because the river was not 

 fordable, and partly because they were in want of provisions, especially 

 the Portuguese troops, for the Portuguese Regency, in spite of the 

 urgent representations of Wellington and Beresford, had neglected to 

 collect the means of carrying provisions along with the army. Nothing 

 could be got from the country, which had been twice ravaged. Some 

 of the Portuguese brigades were actually starving; many men fell off 

 and died, and to save the rest the British supplies were shared with 

 them. The British commissary-general's means were thus overlaid, 

 and the whole army suffered in consequence. (Dispatches to Charles 

 Stuart, dated Louzao, March 16, and Pombeiro, March 18, and 

 another to the Earl of Liverpool of March 16.) On the 1 7th the British 

 army crossed the Ceira over a trestle bridge, the French having 

 withdrawn in the night. 



Massena had taken up a strong position on the river Alva, another 

 affluent of the Mondego, which was swollen by the rains, and had 

 destroyed the bridge of Murcella, apparently intending to remain there 

 some days. He had also sent out detachments to scour the neigh- 

 bouring country for provisions. But Wellington marched three divi- 

 sions by the mountains of Quiteria to Arganil, on the Upper Alva, 

 which movement obliged the French marshal to abandon the Lower 

 Alva, and continue his retreat by Moita, towards Celorico. The 

 English army crossed the Alva near Pombeira, and collected at Moita 

 on the 19th. Here again Massena destroyed much of his baggage and 

 ammunition, for want of cattle to drag it, and also forsook the 

 foraging parties that he had sent out, which were intercepted and 

 taken by the English, to the number of about 800 men. The main 

 body of the allied army halted at Moita for several days, in order to 

 give time for the provisions to come up which had been sent round by 

 sea from Lisbon to the Mondego. The light division and cavalry 

 however continued to follow the French, who reached Celorico and 

 Guarda on the 21st, and remained there for several days, and re-opened 

 his communications with Almeida and the Spanish frontier. The 

 retreat of the French, properly speaking, may be considered as having 

 terminated here a fortnight's retreat "in which the French com- 

 mander displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless 

 spirit. I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda 

 de Corvo, and many villages on the route ; the burning of those towns 

 covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must 

 be attributed to the disorder which usually attends a forced retreat ; 

 but the town of Leiria and the convent of Alcobaga were given to the 

 flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and although 

 the laws of war, rigorously interpreted, authorise such examples when 

 the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done for the purpose 

 of overawing the people, and not from a spirit of vengeance when 

 abandoning the country. But every horror that could make war 

 hideous attended this dreadful march. Distress, conflagration, death 

 in all modes ! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, 

 from starvation ! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited ven- 

 geance ! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog to devour the 

 dead and dying ; and the spirit of cruelty, once unchained, smote even 

 the brute creation. On the 15th the French general, to diminish the 

 encumbrances of his march, ordered a number of beasts of burden to 

 be destroyed. The inhuman fellow charged with the execution ham- 

 stringed 500 asses, and left them to starve, and thus they were found 

 by the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression of 

 pain and grief visible in these poor creatures' looks wonderfully roused 

 the fury of our soldiers, and so little weight has reason with the mul- 

 titude when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would 

 have been given to any prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling 

 would have led to direct cruelty. This shows how dangerous it is in 

 war to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could 

 be thus perverted by an accidental combination of circumstances." 

 (Napier, ' Peninsular War,' vol. hi., pp. 471, 472.) Lord Wellington, 

 habitually sober in the expression of his sentiments, assumes even a 

 more decided and indignant tone on the same occasion. In his official 

 dispatch to Lord Liverpool, dated March 14, after detailing the move- 

 ments of the French to that day, he thus continues : " I am sorry to 

 be obliged to add to this account that their conduct throughout this 

 retreat has been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never 

 surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, 

 in which the head-quarters of some of the corps had been for four 

 months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by promises 



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