613 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



WELLINGTON, DUKE OF. 



614 



day, Massena, who had been joined by Bessieres with a body of the 

 Imperial Guards, recounoitered the position of the Allies ; and on the 

 5th of May he made a grand attack with the greater part of his force 

 on the British right, which he expected to turn by the plain which 

 extends between the hill of Fuentes de Onoro and that of Nava d' Aver, 

 and between Poco Velho on the river Das Cusas to the Turones, which 

 last stream flowed in the rear of the British position. Had they 

 passed the Turones, the French would have spread into the open 

 country about Frenada, and cut off the English from the Coa. The 

 French, crossing the Das Casas at Pogo Velho, attacked the Spanish 

 party of Julian Sanchez, and drove him from Nava d'Aver ; they then 

 charged the 7th light division, which formed the British right. The 

 light division immediately formed into squares ; but the numerous 

 French cavalry fell upon the 7th division before it could effect a like 

 formation. The troops however stood firm ; and although some were 

 cut down, the enemy was checked by the steady fire of the Chasseurs 

 Britunniques, a foreign regiment in the British service, and of the 

 other regiments of the 7th division. Lord Wellington however, con- 

 sidering his position too far extended to the right, gave up Nava d'Aver 

 and his communication with Sabugal, and ordered the 7th and light 

 divisions to retire across the plain, and the 1st and 3rd divisions to 

 wheel back and take up a new alignement on a steep ridge which runs 

 from the Das Casas and Turoues, nearly at right angles with the 

 original position. The village of Fuentes de Onoro thus became the 

 left of the new position, and the right was at Frenada, beyond the 

 Turones, and between that and the Coa. Thia movement was well 

 executed, though under very critical circumstances, for the British 

 squares had to cross a vast plain, exposed to the charge of a numerous 

 French cavalry supported by artillery, the British cavalry being too 

 weak to give much protection. The non-combatants, who had gathered 

 behiud the British Hue, were hurrying away, driven by the French 

 horsemen across the plain. Colonel Napier says that " in all this war 

 there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole of the 

 vast plain, as far as the Turones, was covered with a confused multi- 

 tude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks; for there 

 was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of the 

 camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curio- 

 sity, and finally the broken piquets and parties coming out of the 

 woods. The 7th division was separated from the army by the Turones ; 

 5000 French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were close at hand 

 impatient to charge ; the infantry of the 8th corps was in order of 

 battle behind the horsemen ; the wood was filled with the skirmishers 

 of the 6th corps ; and if the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had 

 issued forth, while Drouet's divisions fell on that village, while the 

 8th corps attacked the light division, and while the whole of the 

 cavalry made a general charge, the loose multitude encumbering the 

 plain would have been driven violently in upon the 1st division, in 

 such a manner as to have intercepted the latter's fire, and broken 

 their ranks. No such effort however was made ; Montbrun's cavalry 

 merely hovered about Craufurd's squares, the plain was soon cleared, 

 the cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed 

 a reserve to the right of the 1st division, sending the riflemen among 

 the rocks to connect it with the 7th division, which had arrived at 

 Frenada, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez. At the sight of this 

 new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French stopped short and 

 commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution, from the 

 closeness of the allied masses ; but twelve British guns replied with 

 vigour, and the violence of the enemy's fire abated : their cavalry 

 then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry attempting to 

 glide down the ravine of the Turones, was repulsed by the riflemen 

 and light companies of the Guards. But all -this time a fierce battle 

 was going on at Fuentes de Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to 

 carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun's cavalry should 

 turn the right wing. It was, however, two hours later ere the 

 attack commenced. The three British regiments (24th, 71st, and 

 79th) made a desperate resistance; but, overmatched in number, and 

 little accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they 

 were pierced and divided : two companies of the 79th were taken, 

 Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the 

 town was carried : the upper part however was stiffly held, and the 

 rolling of the musketry waa incessant. Had the attack been made 

 earlier, and the whole of Drouet's division thrown boldly into the 

 fight, while the 6th corps, moving through the wood, closely turned 

 the village, the passage must have been forced, and the left of the new 

 position outflanked ; but now Lord Wellington having all his reserves 

 in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments 

 in Fuentes. The French continued also to reinforce their troops, 

 until the whole of the 6th corps and a part of Drouet's division 

 were engaged, when several turns of fortune occurred. At one time 

 the fighting was on the banks of the stream, and amongst the lower 

 houses ; at another upon the lower heights and round the chapel, and 

 some of the enemy's skirmishers even penetrated completely through 

 towards the main position : but the village was never entirely aban- 

 doned by its defenders; and in a charge of the 71st, 79th, and 88th 

 regiments, led by Colonel M'Kianon, against a heavy mass which had 

 gained the chapel eminence, a great number of French fell. In this 

 manner the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town 

 vyas abandoned by both parties the British maintaining the chapel 



and crags, and the French retiring a cannon-shot from the stream. 

 ('History of the Peninsular War.' iii. 514-16.) 



The total loss of the British was 235 killed, 1234 wounded, and 317 

 missing or taken prisoners. The loss of the French was certainly 

 greater, judging from the number of dead bodies found in the vilbge. 

 No fighting of any consequence occurred oa the left of the British 

 position, where the fifth and sixth divisions were posted to protect the 

 blockade of Almeida, the second corps of the French merely waiting 

 the issue of the battle at Fueutes de Onoro, and watching for an 

 opportunity of throwing provisions into Almeida, which however did 

 not occur. The battle of Fuentea de Oiioro was of importance, being 

 a regular pitched battle fought by the British in a position of no par- 

 ticular strength, and indeed very weak in one point, under great dis- 

 advantage of numbers, and especially of cavalry. The great majority 

 of the troops engaged were British, for the Portuguese were mostly 

 with Marshal Beresford in the south. There were only four British 

 divisions and one Portuguese brigade and about 1000 cavalry engaged 

 against three French corps of infantry and 5000 cavalry. Massena 

 fought the battle for the purpose of relieving Almeida, but lie failed, 

 and Almeida a few days afterwards was evacuated by the French 

 garrison in the night. With this battle Massena closed his long and 

 active career. He withdrew his army beyond the Agueda, and soon 

 afterwards Marshal Marmont, duke of Kagusa, arrived at Salamanca 

 to supersede him. The order of Napoleon by which Massena was 

 directed to give up the command to Marmout was not conceived in 

 very gracious terms. He was allowed to take with him to France his 

 son and one of his aides-de-camp only. Marmont was told to take 

 the reins of command with a firm hand. (Napier, ' Peninsular War,' 

 vol. iii., Appendix vii., p. 622.) 



Whilst these things were happening iu the north, Marshal Beres- 

 ford had invested Badajoz, when Soult marched from Seville to relieve 

 that place. On the 13th of May, Beresford raised the siege, removed 

 his artillery, platforms, and stores, and prepared to meet Soult in 

 position on the ridge of Albuera with above 7000 British infantry, 

 several Portuguese brigades, and Blake's Spanish corps, in all about 

 30,000 infantry and about 2000 cavalry, but hardly one-half of this 

 force could be depended upon in the field. He had with him thirty - 

 eight pieces of artillery. On the evening of the 15th Soult came up 

 with about 19,000 chosen infantry, about 4000 cavalry, and fifty guns. 

 He immediately reconnoitred Beresford's position, and determined 

 upon an attack on the right flank of the Allies, which was their weak 

 point, though Beresford had directed his chief attention to the centre, 

 where he had placed his British troops. It was on the French part 

 the same game as at the battles of Talavera and Fuentes ; but Wel- 

 lington was not there, nor were British troops at hand all along the 

 line ; and when Beresford, perceiving his mistake, ordered Blake to 

 change his front so as to face the French marching upon his right, 

 Blake refused, saying that the real attack was against the centre by the 

 bridge of Albuera. There was indeed an attack by the French in that 

 quarter, but it was only intended to mask and support the grand attack 

 on the right of the Allies. It was only when the French actually ap- 

 peared on the table-land on the right, commanding and enfilading the 

 whole position of the Allies, that Blake consented, with much slowness, 

 to change his front. In the mean time the French columns were already 

 in possession of the table-land ; their guns opened, and their cavalry 

 outflanking the front, put the Spaniards in disorder, and they gave way. 

 The brigades of the second division, British, were ordered to advance 

 to the right ; the first, or Colborne's brigade, while in the act of 

 deploying, was attacked in flauk and rear, and nearly destroyed by 

 the French and Polish cavalry : the next, Houghton's brigade, reached 

 the summit, and maintained a desperate struggle. But the men fell 

 fast, ammunition failed, and Beresford began to think of a retreat, 

 which would have been ruinous, when, at the suggestion of Colonel 

 Hardinge, General Cole, with the 4th division, was ordered to 

 march up the hill. It consisted of only two brigades, one Portuguese 

 and the English Fusileer brigade (7th aud 23rd regiments), commanded 

 by Sir William Myers. This last brigade restored the tight and saved 

 the army. General Cole directed the Portuguese brigade under 

 General Harvey to move round the hill on the right, whilst Aber- 

 crombie's brigade, the last remaining one of the second division, 

 moved up the hill on the left ; Cole himself led the brave f usileers up 

 the fatal hill, which was crowned by the French masses and artillery. 

 Six British guns were already in the enemy's possession, the whole 

 French reserve was coming forward to reinforce their front column, 

 and what remained of Houghton's brigade could no longer maintain 

 its position. The ground was heaped with dead bodies, and the Polish 

 lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper 

 part of the hill. General Cole at the head of the fusileers, flanked by 

 a battalion of the Lu&itanian Legion under Colonel Hawkshawe, dis- 

 persed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on the 

 right of Houghton's brigade exactly as Abercrombie's issued out on the 

 left. We must now once more borrow Sir William Napier's eloquent 

 pen : " Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke, and 

 rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, 

 startled the enemy's heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing 

 onwards as to an assured victory : they wavered, hesitated, and then, 

 vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their 

 front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery 



