921 



ZENO. 



ZENO. 



022 



Another argument is to this effect : If a thing exists, it must have 

 magnitude ; for wo cannot imagine a thing as existing which will not 

 increase another thing by being added to it, or diminish another 

 thing if taken from it. Now, if a thing has magnitude, it is capable 

 of infinite subdivision ; therefore, if things are many, they must be 

 both small and great small so as to have no magnitude, and great so 

 as to bo infinite. This is the literal version of Simpliuius, which 

 seems to mean, that infinite division of a thing implies an infinite 

 number of corpuscles; and in this view a body is infinitely great, but 

 the corpuscles are infinitely small. 



Zeno had four arguments against motion. The first argument is 

 this : If a certain space is to be passed over, the half must be passed 

 over before the whole space, and the half of that half before the whole 

 of it, and so on in infinitum. There is therefore an infinite number 

 of spaces to be passed over ; and if the whole is passed over in a 

 limited time, then an infinite number of spaces will be passed over in 

 a finite time, which is impossible. Bayle calls Aristotle's solution of 

 the difficulty ' pitiable." Aristotle's solution is this, as explained by 

 the ' Coininentarii Conimbricences : ' That which is infinite in divi- 

 sion, inasmuch as it is not infinite in act but in capacity only (non 

 actu sed potestate), may be passed over in a finite time ; for since 

 time is continuous, and iii like manner infinite, the time and the space 

 will correspond in the same law of infinity, and in the same division 

 of parts. It is easy to show that this is no solution. 



Another argument is the Achilles, as it is called, which is akin to 

 the last. Achilles runs a race with a tortoise, which has a certain 

 start, but Achilles, though swift, can never overtake the tortoise, which 

 is slow. For when Achilles has reached the point from which the 

 tortoise started, the tortoise has advanced a certain distance ; and 

 this will always be the case : therefore Achilles can never overtake 

 the tortoise. On this Hitter observes : " We cannot suppose that 

 Zeno, who in his proofs always maintained the infinite divisibility of 

 space, should not also have considered the infinite "divisibility of every 

 portion of time ; and yet the fallacy of the argument consists entirely 

 in neglecting this consideration." But Zeno only admitted the infinite 

 divisibility of space in order to show the consequences of the hypo- 

 thesis. What Ritter says is no solution. We may take the fingers of 

 the clock for Achilles and the tortoise, and assume that there is no 

 other measure of time ; and we will suppose the long finger to be at 

 twelve, when the short finger is at one, and Zeno's argument is the 

 same still. The difficulty lies in the idea of motion, of which Zeno 

 gives another instance in a third argument against motion. An arrow 

 when it moves through the air is at every moment in a space equal to 

 itself, and therefore is at rest, for nothing moves in the space ia which 

 it in : but that which does not move is at rest, for everything either 

 moves or ia at rest. Therefore the arrow which moves, while it 

 moves is at rest. Aristotle replies that this argument is false, for 

 it supposes that time is composed of indivisible moments, and he 

 adds, that time is not composed of indivisible parts, nor is anything 

 else composed of such parts. But this is not an answer, for time may 

 be excluded from the consideration. The arrow is supposed by those 

 who admit motion, to pass from one point in space to another. But 

 in every position between these two points it is, as Zeno says, where it 

 is ; and when a thing is where it is, we conceive it to be at rest, and we 

 cannot conceive otherwise. Bayle, who seems not to approve of Aris- 

 totle's solution, offers one which is no better. Zeno's difficulty remains. 

 There is no absolute motion : we only conceive motion relatively. 



There is a fourth argument, which is well stated by Bayle. 



If we view the arguments of Zeno as mere sophisms, we view them 

 wrongly. They touch the fundamental difficulties of all science, and 

 Aristotle admits that their solution is not easy (' Topic./ viii. 8.) His 

 arguments were directed to show the difficulties inherent! n all our 

 abstract notions. When, as Aristotle says, he denied motion and said 

 that the space of a stadium could not be passed over, we need not 

 suppose that he denied the phenomenon of a stadium being passed 

 over by him who seemed to pass over it. He would not deny that 

 there was the appearance of a stadium being passed over, but he 

 denied that we could conceive how it was passed over, or that we 

 could conceive absolutely any amount of motion. There is no autho- 

 rity for saying that he denied the existence of the One, even if he 

 denied the existence of individual things. He did not admit that the 

 true nature of the One could be known, for he said that if any person 

 would show him what the One is, he would be able to tell him what 

 things are (TO. own). His speculations all point to the difficulty of 

 determining the notion of individual things, and to the consequent 

 conclusion of all things being One, without parts, an absolute, immea- 

 surable, inconceivable Existence. Nothing particular is said of his 

 theological doctrines, and the few physical doctrines that are attributed 

 to him are not worth mentioning. 



(Diogenes Laertius, Zeno of Elea ; Hitter, Geschichte der Philosophic, 

 vol. i., and the Fragments of Zeno, by Ritter and Preller, in their 

 Historia Pholosoph. draco-Roman. ; Bayle, Diet., art. ' Zeno,' which 

 has very copious and curious notes ; Biographic Universelle, art. ' Zeno,' 

 by Victor Cousin, and the reference there; Kant, Kritik, &c, } Die 

 Antinomic der Reinen Vernunft.) 



ZENO of Citium, a small town in the island of Cyprus, was the 

 founder of the sect of the Stoics. The time of his birth cannot be 

 accurately ascertained, nor the dates of the other events of his life. 



He was however a contemporary of Antigonus Gonatus, king of Mace- 

 donia, and died before him. Antigonus Gonatua died B.C. 240. Clin- 

 ton places the birth of Zeno between B.C. 357 and 352, and his death 

 either in B.C. 263, or in B.C. 259 according to Diogenes Laertius. Hia 

 father was a merchant, and Zeno when young followed his father's 

 business. It is said that his father, on returning from one of his 

 voyages, brought homo some of the writings of the followers of 

 Socrates, and that the perusal of them determined Zeno to the study 

 of philosophy. It is not certain what his age was when he came to 

 Athens : some accounts make him to have been thirty years of age, 

 but his disciple Persaeus says he was only two and twenty. He taught 

 at Athens for fifty-eight years, and he lived to the age of ninety-two, 

 or, according to other accounts, to the age of ninety-eight. In a 

 letter addressed to King Antigonus, which is preserved by Diogenes 

 Laertius, Zeno says that he is then eighty years of age, and he alleges 

 this as a reason for not being able to visit the king according to his 

 invitation ; but he sent to him his disciples, Persaeus and Philonides. 



When Zeno first arrived at Athens, he became the pupil of Crates 

 the Cynic, and this will account for his doctrines having some rela- 

 tionship to those of the Cynic school. But Zeno's moral character 

 was above the standard of the Cynics, and their meagre philosophy 

 could not satisfy his intellectual desires. He subsequently attended 

 the lectures of Stilpo and of Diogenes Cronus, who belonged to the 

 Megaric school ; but it is probable that he was not satisfied with them, 

 for he ultimately cime over to the Academy, and became a hearer of 

 Polemo. Zeno's doctrines, so far as we know them, show traces of 

 the various schools in which his philosophical character was formed. 

 He was not an original thinker; he selected out of all that he 

 learned what seemed to him the best for his purpose. It was accord- 

 ingly objected to Zeno, that though he differed little from his pre- 

 decessors, he still wished to found a school of his own ; and it was 

 further objected, that he made fewer changes in doctrines than in words. 

 His pupils assembled in the painted colonnade (aroa.) at Athens, whence 

 they received the name of Stoics (SrcoiKoi) : they were at first called 

 Zenonians from the name of their master. A slight accident which 

 happened to him on coming out of his school, determined Zeno to 

 put an end to his life on the spot. His practice was, in accordance 

 with his doctrines, characterised by the strictest integrity and mo- 

 rality : his mastery over all sensual gratifications was complete. A 

 story is told which, whether true or false, shows at least the estima- 

 tion in which he was held : it is said that the Athenians entrusted the 

 key's of their fortresses to his keeping. 



The name of Zeno is more conspicuous as the founder of a school, 

 which continued for several centuries, than for what he did himself, 

 though his writings were numerous. A list of them is given by 

 Diogenes ; a very few fragments of them remain. His style is said to 

 have been characterised by brevity and closeness of argumentation. It 

 seems probable that the Stoical doctrines, as exhibited in the opinions 

 and writings of his followers, cannot be considered to have been 

 elaborated by Zeno, though, according to all testimony, he laid the 

 foundation of that which was developed and extended by others. 

 His successors in the Stoic school were as follow : Cleanthes, Chry- 

 sippus, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, 

 Pansetius of Rhodes, tmd Posidonius. According to Clinton, Posi- 

 donius came to Rome B.C. 51. Pansetius was the friend of Scipio 

 Africanus the Younger, Laelius, and other distinguished Romans, and 

 he introduced the Stoical philosophy at Rome. The Stoical doctrines 

 suited in many respects the Roman character, especially in the modi- 

 fied form in which they received them, and these doctrines were 

 embraced by many distinguished persons. In the imperial period the 

 chief writers who belonged to the sect were L. Aunaeus Seneca, Muso- 

 nius Rufus, who lived to the time of Vespasian, and Epictetus, a native 

 of Hierapolis in Phrygia, and the master of Arrian, the historian of 

 Alexander. But the most illustrious of all the Roman Stoics was the 

 emperor Marcus Aurelius, who in his own work, which is extant, has 

 left his portrait painted to the life. 



Zeno's doctrines were mainly directed to the moral part of philoso- 

 phy, and he approached nearer to the Cynics than his followers. It 

 appears from the fact of his disciples separating into different parties, 

 that his system was either not completely developed or that it pos- 

 sessed too little originality to unite all his followers. Chrysippus is 

 said to have been the person who gave to the Stoical system its full 

 development and fixed its doctrines ; accordingly there was a saying, 

 " If there had been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa. 1 ' 

 The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, which Plutarch calls 

 the Physical, Ethical, and Logical (\oyuc6v), of which our word Logical 

 is not a translation. But other Stoics made different divisions. The 

 triple division was made by Zeno himself, as Diodorus states in his 

 Life of Zeno, in which he has collected all the Stoical doctrines. The 

 Logical part of the Stoical system comprehended their metaphysics. 

 They made a distinction between truth (aATjOeto) and true (a.\T)0es) : 

 truth implied body (o-cD^a) ; but true was without body, and was 

 merely in opinion. They attributed to things an absolute existence in 

 themselves. Their system so far as we can learn what it was, was 

 obscure, and they were certainly not well agreed among themselves 

 on their metaphysical doctrines. They cultivated logic, rhetoric, 

 and grammar. In their Physical doctrines they assumed two first 

 principles, the Active and the Passive : the Passive was Matter (ovcria), 



