MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1911 3 



whole of French Congo from the coast to the river Sanga, and also her right of preemp- 

 tion to the Belgian Congo; but up to July 2ist, the requests made by the British Govern- 

 ment for definite information as to German intentions were passed by in a way which 

 suggested that Great Britain was being treated as of no particular account in the matter. 

 The result was that, after consultation with Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, Mr. 

 Lloyd George made a speech that day at the Mansion-house which caused considerable 

 sensation, particularly as it was delivered by a British statesman who had been generally 

 regarded as sympathetic towards Germany and an opponent of militarism. He declared 

 pointedly that if a situation were to be forced on Great Britain in which peace could 

 only be preserved by the surrender of her position in Europe, and she was to be treated 

 as of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, peace at that price would be an intolerable 

 humiliation. So far as the actual language used by Mr. Lloyd George was concerned, 

 it might have been a rhetorical flourish in the mouth of any statesman in any country; 

 indeed the German Chancellor afterwards (Xov. gth) accepted his words as a patriotic 

 declaration which might equally well have come from a German minister. But it was 

 meant as a warning to Germany, and was universally interpreted, and welcomed both 

 in England and in France, in that sense, while in Germany it created a furious uproar 

 and a situation of unprecedented bitterness. In the result, and in opening diplomatic 

 communications, in an ostensibly amicable spirit, between the German and British 

 Governments, its effect was a good one, but not by any means in the immediate relations 

 between the two peoples. Anti-English feeling in Germany boiled over, and for a time 

 it looked as though a rupture was inevitable. 



This state of tension between England and German}- , though relieved by the peaceful 

 issue of the Franco-German conversations, was in fact independent of the Morocco diffi- 

 culties themselves. Mr. Lloyd George's speech simply put the match to an highly 

 inflammable situation, brought about by mutual suspicion and jealousy; and the de- 

 termination of Great Britain, without distinction of party, not to allow France to be 

 brow-beaten by Germany over the Morocco -question, brought all the elements of nation- 

 al antagonism into play. On the part of the Governments on both sides however cooler 

 heads were displayed. On July 24th the German Ambassador told Sir Edward Grey 

 that Germany did not propose to establish herself in Morocco, and was prepared to make 

 concessions to France; and on July -2jth the German Government sent a dispatch, 

 repudiating any intention to injure British interests, and expressing the hope that the 

 arrangement contemplated with France would diminish further opportunities for fric- 

 tion. From this point the negotiations concerning Morocco and the compensation to 

 be made to Germany proceeded more smoothly, though at times they caused consider- 

 able anxiety. At length however, on November 4th, two Franco-German treaties were 

 signed, one recognising a French protectorate over Morocco, and the second providing 

 for the cession by France of about 100,000 square miles of territory in the Congo basin. 



It was perhaps inevitable that, in the circumstances, no particular national satisfac- 

 tion should exist in either country over the result. In Germany the public had been led 

 to expect much more, and the Colonial Minister, Herr Lindequist, resigned in protest 

 against the insufficiency of the compensation obtained. The discussions in France over 

 the ratification of the treaties disclosed some intriguing on the part of the Premier, M. 

 Caillaux, behind the back of the Foreign Minister, M. de Selves, during the negotiations, 

 which resulted in the resignation of M. de Selves, and then to the fall of the Ministry. 

 But peace had been preserved, with honour, under highly unpropitious conditions. 

 Germany had asserted herself, in a decidedly provocative way, and with the result of 

 securing a large addition of Colonial territory. France had obtained a free hand in 

 Morocco, at a price well worth paying. And Great Britain had shown her determina- 

 tion to uphold the Anglo-French entente at all costs. It should be added that, on the 

 merits, and irrespectively of the methods adopted, the French action in Morocco, though 

 practically forced upon France by the conditions in that country, undoubtedly provided 

 justification for the German view that the arrangements contemplated in 1906 and 1909 

 had been altered to Germany's detriment. The Anglo-French agreement of 1004, by 



