4 ITALY AND TRIPOLI 



which Great Britain obtained a free hand in Egypt in return for giving France one in 

 Morocco, had no real parallel in the shape of French concessions to Germany; and it 

 could hardly be expected that Germany would be contented without compensation of 

 some sort. This was secured, and Germany's reiterated claim for a larger place " in the 

 Sun " was aggressively vindicated. 



The achievement left the international situation in Europe where it was. Germany 

 could count, of course, on her allies, when she threw the sword into the scales. Any idea 

 however that may have been entertained that France could be coerced, and that the 

 Anglo-French entente would not stand the test, must have been dissipated. It was clear 

 that French confidence, by no means conspicuous in the crisis of 1905, had been com- 

 pletely restored. The entente with Great Britain was decidedly strengthened; and as 

 between Germany and England an object-lesson was given to the British Empire, which 

 all parts of it were quick to grasp, of the dangers of the naval situation, with Anglo- 

 German relations as they existed, and Germany forcing the pace in competition with 

 Great Britain on the sea. The naval rivalry between the two countries remained one of 

 the permanent dangers in international politics, and German susceptibilities were once 

 more touched on the raw a little later when on February 9, 1912 Mr. Winston Churchill 

 at Glasgow described the British fleet as a " necessity " and the German only a " lux- 

 ury," but the British Government sent Lord Haldane to Berlin on a mission to smooth 

 matters over, with apparently good results, and relations gradually became normal 

 again. As between the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy) and the Triple Entente 

 (France, Russia, England) the crisis served even to clear the air; and this was shown 

 in the most public way at the beginning of July 1912, when the German and Russian 

 Emperors had a meeting, accompanied by their foreign ministers, at Port Baltic. 

 Emphatic recognition was then given to the relations existing between the Powers by an 

 official communique saying that " there could be no question of producing alterations 

 in the grouping of the European Powers, the value of which for the maintenance of 

 equilibrium and of peace has already been proved." 



ITALY AND TRIPOLI 



The case is somewhat different with the ensuing annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica 

 by Italy, to which, after a one-sided war (see below) had gone on from November 1911 

 till October 1912, Turkey was compelled to submit by the pressure of the Balkan crisis. 

 The contemporary historian cannot satisfactorily pronounce, for want of exact informa- 

 tion, on either the moral or the legal aspects of this piece of territorial self-aggrandise- 

 ment. The reasons given in Italy's sudden ultimatum to Turkey (Sept. 26, 1911), 

 prefaced by no warning to any of the Powers, but announcing her intention to proceed 

 to establish a military occupation in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, followed as it was by a 

 declaration of war (Sept. 2gth) which gave no proper opportunity for peaceful negotia- 

 tions, were by themselves quite insufficient however adequate to justify the taking of 

 strong measures to satisfy impartial international jurists that a simple redress of the 

 undoubted grievances of which Italy had a right to complain was the real motive foi 

 such peremptory action. If consideration is given only to the normal procedure expecl- 

 ed between nations in such circumstances, it can only be said that in this case once more 

 " might " asserted itself, irrespectively of public law or international rights. But the 

 real circumstances are still not definitely known. There is good reason for believing 

 that Italy's action was really forced on her as an alternative to other eventualities, 

 which, without in anyway safe-guarding Turkish rights in Tripoli, would have demol- 

 ished the whole claim of Italy herself long an integral part cf her national policy to 

 fall heir to those rights whenever Turkey should become unable to exercise them. 



If, as has been hinted, the Italian government had information that the Franco- 

 German negotiations were proceeding in such a way that Germany was being driven to 

 look for compensation for the French annexation of Morocco by extending her influence 

 elsewhere along the North African coast, and it is suggested that, with Turkey's con- 

 sent, Germany had an eye on a Tripolitan harbour for a Mediterranean point d'appui '< 



