6 BALKAN CRISIS. OF 1912 



had then passed beyond the power of diplomacy to control the march of events. On 

 October 8th Montenegro declared war and invaded Albania; on the i3th Greece, Bulga- 

 ria and Servia presented their ultimatum; and by the lyth a formal state of war existed 

 between the Allies and Turkey. (For the events of the war, see below). 



At the outset it was the declared object of the Powers to co-operate in localising the 

 war, themselves remaining neutral, and to keep its results, whatever they might be, from 

 embroiling the rest of Europe. With this end in view they agreed to notify the bellig- 

 erents that the territorial status quo would not be allowed to be altered. But the un- 

 expectedly rapid and overwhelming success of the Allies, and the complete collapse of 

 the Turkish arms, upset all the preliminary formulas. By the end of October it was clear 

 that the old maps of Eastern Europe might be rolled up, and that " Turkey in Europe " 

 had ceased to exist. It was no longer a question of maintaining the status quo. That 

 was gone for ever so far as Turkey was concerned. The " Eastern Question " (see E. B. 

 viii, 831 et seq.) had entered an entirely new phase, with the proof that Bulgaria and the 

 allies were in a position, by their own strong hand, to make " the Balkan States for the 

 Balkan peoples " the principle of a territorial readjustment. The problem now was hew 

 the old ambitions and rival sympathies of Austria and Russia in that part of the world 

 should be reconciled with the new situation. Speaking at the Guildhall, London, on 

 November gth, Mr. Asquith gave public expression to the necessity of recognising the 

 logic of the stricken field, when he said that " on one thing I believe the general opinion 

 of Europe to be unanimous that the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which 

 have cost them so dear;" and in reference to alarming reports of growing tension between 

 Austria-Hungary and Servia concerning the latter's declared policy of extending her 

 territory to the Adriatic, he emphatically deprecated the raising and pressing at this 

 stage of isolated questions which would probably assume a more tractable aspect when 

 the time came for a general settlement in which Europe as a whole must have a voice. 



Mr. Asquith's speech was made at an opportune moment. Just previously (Oct. 

 3<Dth) a proposal by the French Premier, M. Poincare, that all the Powers should make 

 a declaration of " disinterestedness," in the territorial readjustment resulting from the 

 war, had done harm rather than good. Austria was not prepared to be other than very 

 much " interested " in the matter, and was irritated at the suggestion that she should 

 subscribe to such a declaration. But Mr. Asquith's " wait and see " formula putting 

 into other words for the policy of Europe his favourite advice on difficult points of 

 English domestic politics had a soothing influence and was generally approved. 



Everything now depended however on a speedy conclusion to the actual fighting. 

 The Bulgarians had driven Nazim Pasha's main army back to the Chatalja lines and 

 were threatening to march on Constantinople itself. An appeal was made by Turkey 

 to the Powers to mediate, but to no purpose; and on November i2th the Porte applied 

 directly to the Allies for an armistice, as the Powers advised. On the ipth the terms of 

 the Allies were notified, plenipotentiaries being nominated by them and invited from 

 Turkey in order to discuss conditions of peace. The Allies demanded the surrender of 

 all Turkish positions still holding out in Europe, including the Chatalja lines, as well 

 as Adrianople, Scutari and Yanina, only Constantinople and a strip of adjacent territory 

 being left to Turkey. On the 2ist the Porte rejected these terms, bitterly complaining 

 that Europe, which had stepped in to save Greece in 1897 when Turkey was the victor, 

 would do nothing now for Turkey when the position was reversed. Nazim Pasha was 

 ordered to continue fighting till " reasonable and moderate conditions " were proposed. 

 At the same time, however, he and Izzet Pasha, Osman Nizami Pasha and Shadan Bey, 

 were appointed Turkish plenipotentiaries to carry on further negotiations for an armistice, 

 Dr. Daneff, General SavofT and General Fitcheff being nominated as Bulgarian delegates. 



The possibility of European complications at this juncture acted as an encourage- 

 ment to Turkey to hold out. Servia, whose arms had been so conspicuously successful 

 in the west-central area, was straining the patience of Austria almost to breaking-point 

 by aggressively announcing her determination to incorporate the whole of northern 

 Albania, including a good deal more of the Adriatic coast than the Dual Monarchy was 



