CHINA AND TIBET 



agreed in defining their respective spheres of interest in Manchuria and Mongolia, makes 

 any recovery of Chinese authority improbable. The Chinese Government was warned 

 in September 1912 that Russia would support the Mongols if an expedition were sent 

 against them. 



THE SITUATION IN TIBET. 



Similarly, in Tibet, the attempt made after the British expedition to Lhassa in 1904 

 to maintain a recognition of Chinese authority has broken down, in direct consequence 

 of the new situation in China itself. British intervention in 1906 was prompted by 

 apprehensions of Russian intrigue, in the person of the Buriat Dorjieff, whose ascendancy 

 in Lhassa at that time was inimical to British interests and to the relations between Tibet 

 and India. The result of the expedition, and of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, 

 was to remove the difficulties so far as England and Russia were concerned, but the inter- 

 nal situation in Tibet developed on lines which had not been foreseen, in consequence of 

 the reestablishment of a Chinese suzerainty which previously had become merely nomi- 

 nal. 1 Chinese troops were sent to Lhassa, the Dalai Lama fled to India and was formal- 

 ly deposed by the Chinese Government, and a direct exercise of Chinese suzerainty was 

 instituted; but when the Chinese revolution occurred, the garrison at Lhassa mutinied 

 and committed gross excesses, and retaliation by the Tibetans resulted in a state of 

 turmoil, in which Chinese authority was destroyed. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhas- 

 sa and reasserted himself in practical independence. 



A new situation was thus created in the autumn of 1912, in which the recognition of 

 Chinese suzerainty, contained in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Anglo- 

 Chinese Convention of 1906, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, ceased to be 

 operative; and it became clear that the arrangements made on behalf of the Indian Gov- 

 ernment for the protection of British interests in Tibet would require reconsideration. 

 It was known moreover that Dorjieff had once more made his appearance in Lhassa. 

 The immediate prospect was thus unsatisfactory in various ways. What is certain is 

 that the conditions are entirely adverse to another restoration of Chinese authority. 

 Tibet has become independent of the new Chinese regime, and, in so far as British rela- 

 tions depended on the recognition of Chinese control, this aspect of its international 

 status disappears. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 definitely admitted " the 

 fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in 

 the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Tibet;" and the Treaty of 

 Lhassa, besides dealing with British commercial rights, provided that, without British 

 consent, Tibet might not cede or lease any territory, admit representatives or agents of 

 any foreign power, give mining or other concessions to foreigners, or pledge her revenues. 

 It may be expected that British relations with Tibet will in future be readjusted so as to 

 assert British influence there irrespectively of the obsolete international theory that it is 

 part of the Chinese Empire. British policy in this matter was defined in a Memoran- 

 dum presented on August 17, 1912 to the Chinese Government, in which it was intimated 

 that Great Britain would make it a condition of her recognition of the Republic that 

 China should leave the Tibetan situation to develop on its own lines and should cease to 

 regard Tibet as a Chinese province. 



THE PANAMA CANAL ACT CONTROVERSY 



On August 24, 1912 President Taft signed the Panama Canal Act, which had been 

 passed by the American Congress, and it became law in spite of a protest from Great 

 Britain which has led to a controversy of considerable international interest. 



The Act provided in detail for the general operation of the Canal and the regulation 

 of commerce passing through it, but the point in question was concerned with the 

 tolls. The President was empowered, within his discretion, to impose tolls not exceed- 

 ing $1.25 per registered ton on all vessels using the canal except vessels engaged in the 

 American coastwise trade (restricted by law already to American vessels) on which 

 no tolls at all were to be levied. The British contention, more or less informally con- 



1 See E. B. xxvi, 928. 



