TURCO-ITALIAN WAR 23 



troops had landed. The remaining 5 battalions of this division were landed at Horns on 

 October 2ist. 



The transports conveying 10,000 men of the 2d Division arrived off Benghazi on Oc- 

 tober 1 8th escorted by part of the First Squadron. On the morning of the igth, fire was 

 opened by the ships and a landing was effected on Giuliana Point, west of the harbour, 

 in the face of opposition by some 300 Turkish regulars and 2000 Arabs. In the after- 

 noon the troops, under General Ameglio, advanced on Berca, which was captured by 

 nightfall. After a nocturnal bombardment by the fleet Benghazi was occupied by the 

 Italians on the 2oth. The rest of the 2d Division occupied Derna on the i8th, an at- 

 tempt made on the nth having failed, owing to bad weather. During the passage of 

 these convoys from Italy to Africa, the Independent Naval Division patrolled the en- 

 trances to the Aegean Sea. 



Land Operations. The Italian operations were limited, at the outset, to the occupa- 

 tion of the coast towns. The defeat of Adowa (1896) had not been forgotten and public 

 opinion favoured a cautious policy. It was hoped that the Arabs would accept the 

 situation, and that the Turkish troops, cut off from the coast, would surrender or re- 

 treat across the frontier. The Italian entrenchments round Tripoli had a front of 10 

 miles; on the right, west of Bu Mellian wells, the field of fire was good; in the centre, 

 near " Fort " Mesri an old earthwork it was indifferent; for two miles on the left, 

 in the -oasis, it was limited to a few yards. 



The Turks had now established an advanced base at Ain Zara. Early on October 

 23d, Neschat Bey, who had succeeded Munir Pasha, directed a strong attack through 

 the oasis, against the left of the Italian line. At the crisis of the fight, when most of the 

 reserves had been drawn in, the Arabs in the suburbs behind the entrenchments treach- 

 erously rose in arms, and assailed the Italians in rear. The situation was for a time most 

 critical, and it. was only after eight hours fighting that the attack was driven off by the 

 remaining reserves. After this incident, drastic measures were taken to disarm the 

 natives and to clear the zone in rear of the outpost line. On October 26th the Turks 

 again attacked the centre and left of the line, and were only repulsed when most of the 

 Italian reserves had been employed. 



General Caneva now withdrew his left to Mesri and Dahra, abandoning Fort Hami- 

 dieh and " Fort " Mesri. The attacks on the 23d and 26th had cost the Italians 374 

 killed and only 158 wounded, the small proportion of the latter being remarkable. 



It was now evident that the Arab population must be considered hostile and that 

 more troops would be needed. General Caneva was, therefore, reinforced by the 3d 

 Division from Italy; the ist and 3d Divisions at Tripoli were organised as an Army 

 Corps under General Frugoni. 



On November 5th the annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica by Italy was decreed, 

 possibly as an indication that no compromise would be accepted. 



Thus reinforced, General Caneva resumed the offensive. On the 7th of November 

 Fort Hamidieh was retaken by a brigade of the 3d Division, and on the 26th, after an 

 attack by three brigades, the old outpost line and " Fort " Mesri were reoccupied. This 

 success was followed up on December 4th by an attack on the Turkish base at Ain 

 Zara. The advance was carried out in three columns, of a brigade each, which con- 

 verged on the Turkish position. The Turks, finding their flanks threatened, abandoned 

 their camp and eight guns, and retreated towards Gharian, leaving detachments at 

 Tarhuna and Azizie. Ain Zara was now strongly fortified by the Italians; Tajura was 

 occupied, and the whole oasis was cleared of the enemy. 



On the night of December i8th and igth, a force of three battalions, one squadron, 

 and one battery under Colonel Fara, set out from Ain Zara to surprise a hostile force 

 reported at Bir Tobras. Misled by incorrect maps the column lost its way; at day- 

 break the enemy was encountered in superior force; after maintaining its ground with 

 difficulty during the day, the column withdrew by night to Ain Zara. That a disaster 

 was averted was due to the skill and gallantry of Colonel Fara, who was rewarded by 

 promotion to Major-General. 



